Uppsala University
Swedish Collegium For Advanced Study

My profile


  • Uppsala University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
  • Swedish Collegium For Advanced Study
    Other
Uppsala, Uppsala Lan, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
PhilPapers Editorships
Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction
  •  10
    And and And*
    In Laurence Goldstein (ed.), Brevity, . 2013.
    This paper discusses a recent opposition between the influential dynamic semantic account of presupposition projection and a recent Gricean-pragmatic theory. The Gricean-pragmatic theory is partly motivated by an influential ob- jection to dynamic semantics based on the compatibility of dynamic systems with connectives and operators exhibiting deviant projection behaviors. By identifying key features of the role of prediction and explanation in semantics, it is argued that the objection is based…Read more
  •  6
    Truthfulness and Gricean Cooperation
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3): 489-510. 2016.
    This paper examines the Gricean view that quality maxims take priority over other conversational maxims. It is shown that Gricean conversational implicatures are routinely inferred from utterances that are recognized to be untruthful. It is argued that this observation falsifies Grice’s original claim that hearers assume that speakers are obeying other maxims only if the speaker is assumed to be obeying quality maxims, and furthermore the related claim that hearers assume that speakers are being…Read more
  •  145
    Intention-sensitive semantics
    Synthese 175 (3): 383-404. 2010.
    A number of authors have argued that the fact that certain indexicals depend for their reference-determination on the speaker’s referential intentions demonstrates the inadequacy of associating such expressions with functions from contexts to referents (characters). By distinguishing between different uses to which the notion of context is put in these argument, I show that this line of argument fails. In the course of doing so, I develop a way of incorporating the role played by intentions into…Read more
  •  11
    Lying and Insincerity
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Andreas Stokke presents a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. He investigates how lying relates to other forms of insincerity and explores the kinds of attitudes that go with insincere uses of language. Part I develops an account of insincerity as a linguistic phenomenon. Stokke provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and speaking insincerely, and accounts for the relationship between lying and deceiving. A novel framework of assertion underpins the anal…Read more
  •  18
    Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth
    with Don Fallis
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4. 2017.
    This paper is about some of the ways in which people sometimes speak while be- ing indifferent toward what they say. We argue that what Harry Frankfurt called ‘bullshitting’ is a mode of speech marked by indifference toward inquiry, the coop- erative project of reaching truth in discourse. On this view bullshitting is character- ized by indifference toward the project of advancing inquiry by making progress on specific subinquiries, represented by so-called questions under discussion. This ac- c…Read more
  •  5
    II—Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1): 127-147. 2017.
    Responding to parts of Sorensen, it is argued that the connectives therefore and but do not contribute conventional implicatures, but are rather to be treated as presupposition triggers. Their special contributions are therefore not asserted, but presupposed. Hence, given the generic assumption that one lies only if one makes an assertion, one cannot lie with arguments in the way Sorensen proposes. Yet, since conventional implicatures are asserted, one can lie with conventional implicatures. Mor…Read more
  • Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (edited book)
    with Eliot Michaelson
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  11
    Lies, Harm, And Practical Interests
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti-Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti-Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on the pa…Read more
  •  18
    Protagonist Projection
    Mind and Language 28 (2): 204-232. 2013.
    This article provides a semantic analysis of Protagonist Projection, the phenomenon by which things are described from a point of view different from that of the speaker. Against what has been argued by some, the account vindicates the intuitive idea that Protagonist Projection does not give rise to counterexamples to factivity, and similar plausible principles. A pragmatics is sketched that explains the attitude attributions generated by Protagonist Projection. Further, the phenomenon is compar…Read more
  •  188
    Lying and Asserting
    Journal of Philosophy 110 (1): 33-60. 2013.
    The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence counts so-called bald-faced lies as lie…Read more
  •  31
    Truth and Context Change
    Journal of Philosophical Logic (1): 1-19. 2012.
    Some dynamic semantic theories include an attempt to derive truth-conditional meaning from context change potential. This implies defining truth in terms of context change. Focusing on presuppositions and epistemic modals, this paper points out some problems with how this project has been carried out. It then suggests a way of overcoming these problems. This involves appealing to a richer notion of context than the one found in standard dynamic systems
  •  34
    Lying and Misleading in Discourse
    Philosophical Review 125 (1): 83-134. 2016.
    This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assertion of disbelieved information, where assertion is…Read more
  •  30
    Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1): 178-183. 2017.
    This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assert…Read more
  •  30
    Information Centrism and the Nature of Contexts
    with Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2): 301-314. 2016.
    Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contex…Read more
  •  3
    Uoprigtighed og viden via vidnesbyrd
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 48 (2): 121-132. 2013.
  •  99
    Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading
    Philosophy Compass 8 (4): 348-359. 2013.
    This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Two new developments in this area are considered: first, the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of lying without the intent to deceive , and second, recent work on the distinction between lying and merely misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions fo…Read more
  •  11
    Review of Wright and Jang (eds.), New Waves in Truth (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
  •  198
    What is Said?
    with Anders J. Schoubye
    Noûs 50 (4): 759-793. 2016.
    It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning using the notion of a question under discussion. This account explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined, provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences can come to h…Read more
  •  16
    Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser
    Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 853-859. 2017.
    This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both t…Read more
  •  50
    Stokke-Andreas_Saying-too-little-and-saying-too-much2.
  •  86
    Insincerity
    Noûs 48 (3): 496-520. 2014.
    This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sente…Read more