Andreas Wilmes

The main contention of this article is that, since the 20th century, violence has gradually turned into a purely technological concept. This great change amounts to a paradigm shift which can be traced back to Johan Galtung’s seminal article “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research” (1969). First, I show why the traditional view of violence revolving around the notions of force, intent and harm has been thrown into crisis by the technological evolution of the Western world. Second, I indicate how Galtung’s thorough redefinition of violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual” proves more compatible to technological societies. Finally, I suggest that this new definition of violence has become ever more appealing today in the age of artificial intelligence.

René Girard's stance towards the Western philosophical tradition was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, he acknowledged that major philosophers had influenced him and had contributed valuable insights on questions of desire, religion, violence, and the sacred. On the other hand, he felt that Western philosophy often, if not always, neglected the founding violence that lies at the origin of culture. The relevance of this contention is the pivotal question of the two volumes of René Girard and the Western Philosophical Tradition. The chapters in these books engage the French anthropologist in a dialogue with key figures in the history of Western philosophy. Volume 1 features chapters on Plato, Augustine of Hippo, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Blaise Pascal, Baruch Spinoza, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Alexis de Tocqueville, Søren Kierkegaard, as well as René Girard. Volume 2 features chapters on the pre-Socratics, Aristotle, René Descartes, Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Simone Weil, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben.

This paper will address René Girard’s critique of the “humanization of nothingness” in modern Western philosophy. I will first explain how the “desire for death” is related to a phenomenon that Girard refers to as “obstacle addiction.” Second, I will point out how mankind’s desire for death and illusory will to self-divinization gradually tend to converge within the history of modern Western humanism. In particular, I will show how this convergence between self-destruction and self-divinization gradually takes shape through the evolution of the concept of “the negative” from Hegel to Kojève, Sartre and Camus. Finally, we shall come to see that in Girard’s view “the negative” has tended to become an ever-preoccupying and unacknowledged symptom of mankind’s addiction to “model/obstacles” of desire.

In the present interview, Jacob Rogozinski elucidates the main concepts and theses he developed in his latest book dedicated to the issue of modern jihadism. On this occasion, he explains his disagreements with other philosophical (Badiou, Baudrillard, Žižek) and anthropological (Girard) accounts of Islamic terrorism. Rogozinski also explains that although jihadism betrays Islam, it nonetheless has everything to do with Islam. Eventually, he describes his own philosophical journey which led him from a phenomenological study of the ego and the flesh to the study of past (witch-hunts, French Reign of Terror) and contemporary (jihadism) terror apparatuses.

Although many psychiatrists regard psychopathy as a coherent scientific construction, some clinicians and philosophers regard it as irrelevant. According to the latter, psychopathy is nothing more than a means of social control. The present study focuses on the issues of the neurological bases and moral responsibility related to psychopathy. While neuroscience aims to identify dysfunctions in psychopaths, action theory and ethics tend to vindicate the hypothesis of the moral irresponsibility of the psychopath. However, rather than reinforcing the concept of psychopathy, recent results in neuroscience tend to stress its incoherence. Philosophical speculations on psychopaths’ responsibility are not sufficiently empirically informed and seem to announce endless ethical debates.