This paper proposes a phenomenological approach to movement and temporality as it relates to a time of mourning, with an emphasis on the intersection between phenomenology and psychology, specifically, the psychology of loss. Its objective is to provide a clearer understanding on how loss, grief, and the death of the other impacts our experience of time, of being-in-time, of how we move in a world abounding in absence. The central argument is also meant to evolve towards the need for a comprehen…
Read moreThis paper proposes a phenomenological approach to movement and temporality as it relates to a time of mourning, with an emphasis on the intersection between phenomenology and psychology, specifically, the psychology of loss. Its objective is to provide a clearer understanding on how loss, grief, and the death of the other impacts our experience of time, of being-in-time, of how we move in a world abounding in absence. The central argument is also meant to evolve towards the need for a comprehensive phenomenology of mourning, and furthermore, towards the improvement of the dialogue between phenomenology and psychology, on both a theoretical and practical level. To that effect, I will make use of interdisciplinary resources, such as studies on the experience of grief, but also, among others, of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, Eugène Minkowski’s Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies, and Jan Patočka’s The Phenomenology of Afterlife. From the latter, I am predominantly interested in the questions that the philosopher poses in relation to how we carry our dead, such as: “How does the other live in us?” and “What is this mode of being?” and in how this interrogation relates to a sense of movement, mainly, a movement through a disjointed time.