Andrei Ponomarev

The aim of the paper is to analyse the influence of linguistic concepts of an agent on the qualitative aspects of her perception. We examine conceptualist and non-conceptualist approaches to the problem of what the content of perceptions is. The conceptualist approach asserts that the content of perception is similar to the content of beliefs: both types of content are assumed to be expressible in language. The non-conceptualist approach to the content of perception assumes that the content of perception cannot be conceptualized due to too much information available to the agent through visual perception. However, the assumption about non-conceptual content of perception leads to some serious difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of cognitive penetration of perception. This is an empirically established fact that some cognitive states may influence on the qualitative aspects of agent’s perception. We show that cognitive penetration of perception implies that perception and those cognitive states which affect it should have comparable content and this mechanism is based on the influence of expectations on perception.

Introduction. In modern philosophy of perception, the issue of the content of perceptual mental states is actively discussed, in particular the possibility of nonconceptual content is one of the most significant problem. Usually conceptual activity is attributed to thinking, and perception is intended to be non-conceptual. Such an approach may deprive perception of opportunity to serve as a basis for judgment. The paper analyzes Tye’s theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states, which does not deprive the perception of its epistemological function.Methodology and sources. Methodologically, the research work is based on philosophical analysis of modern theories of perception and results of cognitive research.Results and discussion. In accepted terminology, the content of perceptual mental states can be of three types: conceptual, non-conceptual detailed (fine-grained) and nonconceptual coarse (coarse-grained). Tye's position is that perceptual mental states have only the third kind of content. This approach faces a number of objections that are presented in this paper. The analysis of objections shows their surmount ability, thus, it can be concluded that the Tye’s position of nonconceptual content can be considered as reasonable. The main result of the presented research is the presentation of additional grounds for the theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states.Conclusion. The problem of the content of perceptual mental states is crucial for understanding the epistemological role of perception. The theory of non-conceptual content of perceptual mental states provides new insights into perception.

The paper contains analysis of Molyneux's question, one of the greatest problems of theory of perception. The problem can be put as, “Could a man born blind and once given the ability to see recognize how things known to him by touch look like?” The differences of Locke's, Berkeley's, Leibniz's and Reid's theoretical approaches to Molyneux’s question are shown. Locke and Berkeley answered the question negatively as for them experience is the only way to knowledge of things, and since the man born blind did not see things he could not know how they looked like. Leibniz gives an affirmative answer to Molyneux’s question as he assumes that we infer the idea of things through our understanding based on touch. Reid, like Locke and Berkeley, gives a negative answer because he thinks that through experience we become aware not only of visual and tactile properties of things but also about relation of different properties. Since man born blind did not have such an experience, Reid concludes, he cannot know how objects look like. Empirical studies mentioned in the paper cannot give the answer to the Molyneux’s problem either, because they can be interpreted in favour of each theoretical position. This problem should be solved by joining up philosophical and empirical approaches.

Introduction. Strategies for understanding another person, which play an important role in social interactions, are focused on recognizing the mental states of the person who is under consideration. These various strategies require a general theoretical conceptualization. One of attempts of this kind of conceptualization is carried out by A. Neven's person model theory. This theory is a subject of our investigation and the aim of this study is to critically analyze A. Neven's person model theory and demonstrate its advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other approaches.Methodology and sources. A. Neven's approach is compared with three competing approaches: folk psychology theory, A. Goldman's simulation theory, and S. Gallagher's interaction theory. Conceptual analysis shows that these theories face a number of serious difficulties, which are discussed in article.Results and discussion. Based on our analysis, we conclude that none of these three theories can be accepted as universal. At the same time, A. Newen's person model theory suggests a multiple strategy for understanding another person and seeks to incorporate the merits of other theories. Thus, the main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to consider the process of understanding another person not as a predetermined one, but as a variable dynamic process. Conclusion. This approach allows considering as a person not only an adult, but also a collective of people, as well as artificial intelligence, which has a great importance for the further improvement of moral practices. At the same time, the person model theory is not devoid of weaknesses; however, when overcoming them, it is able to present the most complete mechanism for understanding the personality.

Introduction. Empirical studies of recent years convincingly show that the character of sensory perception can be influenced by non-cognitive mental states of the agent, such as her desires. The aim of the paper is to analyze how this causal connection between agent's wishes and her sensations can affect the epistemological status of dependent sensations.Methodology and sources. The author examines S. Siegel's argument on this issue. S. Siegel argues that the empirically proven dependence of sensations on desires (wishful seeing) should lead to a decrease of the epistemological status of sensations to the same extent as the dependence of beliefs on desires (wishful thinking) leads to a decrease of the epistemological status of these beliefs. Thus Siegel's argument concludes that the phenomenon of wishful seeing deprives us of any reason to accept sensations as credible evidence of the states of the world. So, this is an argument in favor of skepticism.Results and discussion. The article discusses two main strategies for rejecting Siegel's argument. According to the first strategy proposed by R. Long, sensations are not so similar to beliefs that one can conclude that their epistemological status should be decreased on the basis of their dependence on desires. According to another strategy for refuting Siegel's argument, proposed by A. Raftopoulos, the influence of desires on perception does not extend to early vision. Early vision is free from the influence of higher order conscious mental states. The dependence of the results of sensory perception on other mental states is reduced to the influence of these states on the agent's attention. At the same time, attention can be volitionally controlled and can be trained. Therefore dependent perception under certain conditions can be rationally accepted.Conclusion. Thus, the article shows that, even though perception is dependent on other non-cognitive mental states, such as desires, this dependence does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the epistemological status of sensations, so sensations can be rationally accepted under certain conditions. This means that Siegel's argument for skepticism is not compelling.

The article is devoted to analysis of philosophical and methodological aspects of contemporary representationalism. The theory of Susanna Siegel was chosen as the investigation subject. She presented an argument of the phenomenological contrast in a couple of papers which can answer the question about what properties are represented in perceptual experiences. The paper deals with criticism of the argument by Portuguese theorist R. Jagnow who offers an alternative explanation for the phenomena under discussion.