Andreina Grgarevic

The aim of this paper is to provide an exegetical analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language as presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations. While the traditional interpretation assumes a strict division between an “early” and a “late” Wittgenstein, this paper critically examines this distinction. Through textual analysis of selected fragments, it is argued that there is no radical discontinuity, but rather a continuity of thought: (1) certain elements of the Tractatus may be read as anticipations of later views, while (2) parts of the Philosophical Investigations can be understood as supplements or modifications of earlier doctrines. Special attention is given to Wittgenstein’s notions of “picture,” “proposition,” and “paradigm,” which reveal significant conceptual overlaps across the two works. Moreover, the discussion of emotions—such as the attribution of pain—illustrates the strongest point of convergence. In both works, meaning is grounded in external, observable manifestations: in the Tractatus, the correlation between picture, proposition, and state of affairs, and in the Investigations, the agreement established through shared criteria of use. The results of this analysis indicate that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language develops along a line of inquiry rather than being split into two incompatible phases. One of the main implications is the need to reconsider the standard framework of interpretation: instead of a narrative of existing gap, Wittgenstein’s work may be approached as a unified investigation into the attribution of meaning within language.

This paper focuses primarily on Wittgenstein’s argument against the private language, which presupposes the possibility that sensations acquire meaning exclusively on a subjective level. According to Wittgenstein, language does not work that way because each person can experience a certain sensation in a different way. In that case, each of them would use the term correctly and perhaps use different terms on different occasions. In such cases, there would be no criterion by which to decide on the correctness of use. Such language is arbitrary, it does not offer a way of distinguishing between correct and incorrect uses of terms, and it is constantly subject to change. For this reason, according to Wittgenstein, language must be public and based on common rules. The public meaning of a term comes only through its usage – the way in which a certain expression is used in communication within a community. However, how then do emotions gain meaning, if the idea of a private language is completely rejected? Also, the question arises of whether it is justified to reject the possibility that language is subjective, especially when its evolution is considered? Finally, the paper explores the possibility that private experiences, nevertheless, play a certain role in assigning meaning, but based on mutual agreement, whereby the criterion of correctness is not lost.