Andrejs Balodis

The study interprets the de-Sovietization of Latvian philosophy as a complex process of intellectual reorientation rather than a radical rupture. It examines public debates on the role of philosophers, philosophy textbooks, the transformation of philosophical terminology, and the expansion of translations of Western philosophical works. The article also analyzes the rewriting of the historiography of philosophy in Latvia. Together, these developments suggest that the philosophical landscape after 1991 was shaped by processes of reinterpretation, selective continuity, and institutional adaptation, demonstrating how elements of Soviet philosophical practice were simultaneously rejected, transformed, and partially preserved within the emerging intellectual culture.

This article examines the reception and portrayal of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) legacy in Latvia from 2011 to 2024, focusing on academic discourse, public debates, and commemorative activities. It explores historical connections, translations, scholarly research, and public commemorations through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) theory of cultural and symbolic capital, illustrating how Kant’s legacy is contextualized and appropriated within Latvian intellectual traditions. The study examines Kant’s physical and symbolic presence in Latvian public spaces, such as monuments and plaques, highlighting the relationship between historical memory, cultural narratives, and myth-making. By providing a comprehensive account of Kant’s significance in Latvia, the study contributes to broader discussions on the integration of global intellectual heritage into national and local contexts.

This article aimed to show the analytical potential of the life-world concept in the field of public health, which has not received much attention in the phenomenological literature. Specifically, based on phenomenologically grounded qualitative research, we aimed to show how the life-world concept, as worked out in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, can offer new insights on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Although there are many ways in which the life-world can motivate vaccine hesitancy, we have narrowed our focus to one of them. Our aim is to argue that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is motivated by discrepancies and conflicts between the perceptual life-world and the scientific knowledge. If the scientific knowledge about the pandemic and the vaccine is not integrated in the life-world—which in its core is an embodied, perceptual world—and instead conflicts with it, people are more likely to become disinclined to get vaccinated rather than motivated to pursue vaccination. We conclude the discussion by outlining ideas on how the insights offered by our analysis could be potentially used in devising management and communication strategies in public health crises, such as a pandemic outbreak.

Many studies have used ideas from phenomenological philosophy to explore health and health care, yet topics related to public health have often been overlooked. We argue that at least one crucial issue in public health—the question of adherence (or lack thereof) to preventive health measures—can benefit from a phenomenological perspective. While numerous studies have examined the factors influencing adherence, none have addressed the role that embodiment plays in shaping adherence. Building on existing phenomenological research on adherence, we demonstrate that phenomenology can offer a novel, embodied perspective on this issue. This article draws on data from our phenomenologically grounded empirical study on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, which involved 16 in-depth interviews with individuals reluctant to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. However, the aim of this article is not to present the specific findings about vaccine hesitancy. Instead, referring to both theoretical research within phenomenological tradition and interview data, we seek to generate new insights into the motivational orientation toward preventive health measures more broadly. We demonstrate that adherence to a preventive measure depends on the type of bodily objectification involved—whether it is good or bad objectification. Good objectification involves a focus on one’s body that is compatible with one’s subjectivity, whereas bad objectification involves a focus on one’s body that disrupts subjectivity. We conclude that from an embodied perspective, nonadherence is grounded in a person’s wish to avoid the disruption of her subjectivity. By recognizing the role that our embodied being in-the-world plays in our willingness or unwillingness to comply with preventive measures, this study offers a deeper understanding of the embodied motivation behind adherence and provides insights for both developing strategies to enhance adherence to preventive health measures and new directions for future phenomenological research in relation to public health.

Many studies have used ideas from phenomenological philosophy to explore health and health care, yet topics related to public health have often been overlooked. We argue that at least one crucial issue in public health—the question of adherence (or lack thereof) to preventive health measures—can benefit from a phenomenological perspective. While numerous studies have examined the factors influencing adherence, none have addressed the role that embodiment plays in shaping adherence. Building on existing phenomenological research on adherence, we demonstrate that phenomenology can offer a novel, embodied perspective on this issue. This article draws on data from our phenomenologically grounded empirical study on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, which involved 16 in-depth interviews with individuals reluctant to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. However, the aim of this article is not to present the specific findings about vaccine hesitancy. Instead, referring to both theoretical research within phenomenological tradition and interview data, we seek to generate new insights into the motivational orientation toward preventive health measures more broadly. We demonstrate that adherence to a preventive measure depends on the type of bodily objectification involved—whether it is good or bad objectification. Good objectification involves a focus on one’s body that is compatible with one’s subjectivity, whereas bad objectification involves a focus on one’s body that disrupts subjectivity. We conclude that from an embodied perspective, nonadherence is grounded in a person’s wish to avoid the disruption of her subjectivity. By recognizing the role that our embodied being in-the-world plays in our willingness or unwillingness to comply with preventive measures, this study offers a deeper understanding of the embodied motivation behind adherence and provides insights for both developing strategies to enhance adherence to preventive health measures and new directions for future phenomenological research in relation to public health.

This article aimed to show the analytical potential of the life-world concept in the field of public health, which has not received much attention in the phenomenological literature. Specifically, based on phenomenologically grounded qualitative research, we aimed to show how the life-world concept, as worked out in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, can offer new insights on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Although there are many ways in which the life-world can motivate vaccine hesitancy, we have narrowed our focus to one of them. Our aim is to argue that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is motivated by discrepancies and conflicts between the perceptual life-world and the scientific knowledge. If the scientific knowledge about the pandemic and the vaccine is not integrated in the life-world—which in its core is an embodied, perceptual world—and instead conflicts with it, people are more likely to become disinclined to get vaccinated rather than motivated to pursue vaccination. We conclude the discussion by outlining ideas on how the insights offered by our analysis could be potentially used in devising management and communication strategies in public health crises, such as a pandemic outbreak.

By the close of the century the body had become the key site of political, social, economic and cultural intervention. For large part it has happen due to the topicality of the body in philosophical debates in the 20th century. In my paper I deal with Henry Bergson’s conception of body, its origins and its later reception in phenomenology. Bergson occupies dual position in the history of philosophy – on the one hand he revaluates the heritage of modern philosophy, on the other hand his thinking and method kick start completely different approach to classical philosophical issues, including the conception of the body. Bergsonian treatment of the body in terms of durée is one of his many innovations. I focus on the notion of my body in Bergson’s philosophy to show that despite criticism of phenomenological philosophy, Bergson offers radically new perspective on mind/body relation due to the understanding of the body.

The concept of memory rests at the heart of Bersgon’s theory of consciousness. His theory of memory is the novelty in the history of philosophy. It is not an affirmation either of the metaphysical conceptions (versions à la Platonism) where “all knowledge is recollection”, nor of empiricist psychology possibly traceble back to Aristotle, where, briefly speaking, the faculty of memory depends on the general perceptual capacity. Contrary to the majority of the philosophical and psychological theories of his epoch, Bergson assigns memory the most important role in the intellectual process, denying the characteristic of passivity (from greek word pathos meaning kind of affection) attached to it, instead concerning with the creative, productive and vital power of memory rather than merely its retentive and recalling capacity.