Andrés Rosler

"El nombre de Carl Schmitt se ha vuelto familiar en los medios de comunicación, que han convertido la ya famosa distinción "amigo/enemigo" en un lugar común de lo más triviales análisis políticos. Ensombrecida por ese uso vulgar, su obra, sin embargo, no ha dejado de crecer en infulencia en el mundo académico y es un instrumento cada vez más útil para comprender las variadas y contradictorias dimensiones de lo político en el mundo contemporáneo. Contra esos lugares comunes que hacen de Schmitt o bien el ideólogo del nazismo, o bien la referencia intelectual de los abundantes populismos que, a izquierda y derecha, se refugian detrás de sus teorías o son condenados por supuestamente abrevar en ellas, Andrés Rosler construye una interpretación original de una consistencia sorprendente. En forma de un comentario a "El concepto de lo político", obra cumbre del pensamiento schmittiano, aunque sin limitarse a ella, "Estado o revolución" muestra de qué modo el autor alemán, como buen hobbesiano, reivindica la soberanía estatal frente a los intereses corporativos (sean comunistas, fascistas o capitalistas) sin dejar de expresar su admiración por "los grandes liberales clásicos, como Burke, Constant y sobre todo Tocqueville"." --Descripción del editor.

Since in this study political obligation is conceived of as a moral requirement to comply with the dictates of political authority, the notion of morality and/or moral obligation should be fairly attributable to Aristotle. The claim is here defended that although his ethical theory does not hinge precisely on the concept of moral duty, there is no question that it does contain the idea. Finally, having seen that something akin to the notion of political obligation appears in Aristotle’s politics and having assumed that moral ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ are fairly interchangeable terms, at the end of the chapter we shall dwell on some of their differences when brought to bear on the issue of political allegiance in Aristotle.

Argues that Aristotle raises the question of political obligation in terms quite familiar to modern political theory, especially that his political theory contains the claim that the authority of the state stands in need of justification and that he actually faces up to an anarchist challenge of sorts to come up with a justification for the restriction of the liberty of subjects. Before going into the ways in which Aristotle answers the political question in terms of the well-being of those subject to political authority, some communitarian fallacies regarding the nature of political obligation are cleared out of the way of Aristotelian politics.

Aristotle’s philosophy of law does not make sense if read as a plea for, or as taking for granted, unconditional political obligation. To be sure, he subscribes to the view that some unjust laws are to be put up with in the face of the consequences of disobedience for the common good. But this should not prevent us from seeing that Aristotle does defend the view not only that government is limited but also that there is a right of resistance against oppression. Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship in terms of parts and wholes, Spartan constitutional law, and tyranny reveals that he is more than willing to acknowledge that, in some cases, the very failure of political authority in fulfilling its morally justified tasks releases citizens from their duty to obey the government.

It takes exception to the claim that since his political theory addresses legislators and statesmen rather than citizens or subjects, Aristotle is therefore not concerned about the interests of citizens and subjects and is thus unimpressed by the issue of political obligation. This chapter argues that once due consideration is given to Aristotle’s adoption of a practical viewpoint in his study of social reality, it is reasonable to conclude that the interests of citizens or free subjects are indeed a concern of his. It also explains that Aristotle’s political theory is not merely descriptive and/or explanatory but also basically normative. Special emphasis is given to the normative subtext of many of his descriptive and explanatory statements.

It is not unusual for Aristotelian scholars to claim that Aristotle does not have a notion of authority. The argument that insurmountable conceptual-historical barriers make it impossible for a Greek thinker to have something even similar to authority is usually put forward to deny the existence of such a concept in Aristotle. This chapter argues that this type of objection often mistakes the existence of a concept for the existence of a single word or expression used to convey such concept and that Aristotle’s texts are no stranger to a discernible concept of political authority. The claim that Aristotle does not have the notion of political authority is often tied in with a misunderstanding of the concept of authority itself. Once we get to the bottom of the concept of authority as employed by contemporary jurisprudence, it is fairly clear that Aristotle does accommodate such notion. Special consideration is given to the bearing of Hobbesian and Lockean accounts of authority upon Aristotle’s politics.

The examination of Aristotle’s conception of nature in his practical works attempts to face some charges, which seem to undermine the normativity of Aristotle’s ethical and political theory and thus the very attempt to attribute a theory of political obligation to him. These charges, which basically come down to numerous variations on the theme of the naturalistic fallacy, derive essentially from a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s handling of the connection between well-being and human nature—especially his discussion of the human function and the theses that human beings are political by nature, that the polis exists by nature, and that the polis is naturally prior to its members. This chapter argues that Aristotle’s ethical and political naturalism is built upon a normatively safe foundation. Whereas Aristotle’s ethical naturalism is examined against the background of Kantian morality, his political naturalism is discussed vis-à-vis Hobbesian contractarianism.

In this paper, I would like to tackle first Schmitt’s defence of the role of exclusion in political reasoning and his attendant rejection of extreme political pluralism. I shall then move on to explain not only why there is nothing Nazi—or even antisemitic—about Schmitt’s concept of the political, but rather the other way around: Schmitt’s concept of the political not only must have been used against National Socialism but it did not fail to have his fair share of Jewish, or at the very least Zionist, enthusiasts.

According to Ronald Dworkin's mature views on jurisprudence, legal normativity depends on judges’ views about political morality. Plato's own mature views on this subject seem to take the contrary position as he claims that the law is expected to be authoritative in order to preserve a given state of affairs. Therefore, in Plato's view judges are not expected to interpret the law ubiquitously according to their own standards of political morality. In what follows, the discussion starts off by offering a brief account of Dworkin's interpretivism and some of its shortcomings. We shall then move on to Plato's account of legal normativity, especially his views on the authority of law, law as preservation, and finally the politics of law in the light of the debate between conservatism and progressivism.

En este libro, el autor traza un retrato histórico-conceptual del republicanismo que desmiente por completo la imagen con que se lo suele asociar: la de un discurso anticuado, conservador, que moraliza lo político. A contrapelo de esa visión, el autor desarrolla su argumentación a partir del análisis de cinco aspectos republicanos claves: "la libertad como no dominación, la virtud como soporte motivador y epistémico de la participación cívica, el debate como el elemento constitutivo de la política, la ley como la otra cara de la libertad y la patria como el espacio particularista aunque estrictamente institucional de la república"

Very few—if any—will doubt Hobbes's aversion to the state of nature and sympathy for civil society. On the other hand, it is not quite news that it would be inaccurate to claim that Hobbes rejected the state of nature entirely. Indeed, he embraced or at the very least tolerated the state of nature at the international level in order to escape from the individual state of nature. Hobbes's recommended exchange of an individual state of nature for an international one does seem to have a smack of contradiction, arguably first noted by Rousseau. There is yet another charge of contradiction lurking around Hobbes's account of the state of nature. Hobbes's political thought would still reflect an ambivalent attitude towards a third instantiation of the state of nature, i.e. civil war. This is one of the main reasons why the political allegiance of Thomas Hobbes has been an issue ever since the publication of De Cive at the very least. This paper deals with Hobbes's differential treatment of the original and the international states of nature and discusses the source of Hobbes's somewhat ambivalent attitude towards civil war. It is here argued that Hobbes can fairly hold his ground vis-à-vis Rousseau's criticism, in spite of the normative resemblance between the international state of nature and the initial state of nature, and that Hobbes ambivalent attitude of attraction and repulsion towards civil war is actually due not so much to opportunism on his part as to the normative autonomy he has granted to the state of nature

Este trabajo se propone contribuir al proyecto de atribuirle a Hobbes una teoríaautónoma de la política, la cual defiende la existencia de cuestiones políticas que nopueden ser subordinadas lógicamente a otras esferas como la moral o la religión. Segúnesta posición los conflictos políticos no pueden ser meramente atribuidos, por ejemplo, ala inmoralidad o irreligiosidad de los involucrados, sino que incluso personas completamentemorales y religiosas podrían llegar a verse envueltas en conflictos políticos.