Andrés Vaccari

We examine the question of material agency as raised in material engagement theory (MET). Insofar as MET tends to highlight the causal roles played by extra-bodily material flows in human practices, the term “material agency” does not sufficiently distinguish cases in which these flows are part of an agentive engagement from cases in which they are not. We propose an operational criterion to effect such a distinction. We claim this criterion is organizational, i.e., systemic, and not causal. In the enactive account, agency requires three organizational conditions: self-individuation, interactional asymmetry, and normativity. These conditions can have organic, sensorimotor, and sociomaterial realizations. The dance of human productive practices is indeed spread between brains, bodies, and the world, as MET claims, but it is distributed in an organized manner that involves constraints and norms at various scales. We put forward a relational and non-anthropocentric perspective toward an enactive approach to productive practices. We discuss some aspects of agentive ensembles rendered more intelligible by our proposal, including incorporation, soft assembly and non-decomposability, and the grounding of teleology normative processes at multiple scales. In this manner, we seek to continue the dialog between MET and enactive theory, beginning with the view that a situated system must realize certain minimal organizational conditions to be called an _agent_.

Este trabajo presenta el esquema básico de una “teoría de los realizadores”, una propuesta programática que busca establecer una alternativa al modelo dominante en los debates actuales sobre la ontología de los artefactos. Nuestra posición es que podemos comprender mejor el mundo artificial si nos acercamos a los artefactos en términos de "realizadores" y sus correspondientes "realizaciones" en lugar de como objetos esencialmente "funcionales". Con este objetivo en mente, el artículo desarrolla en primer lugar la caracterización de los artefactos como "realizadores" y, en segundo lugar, defiende esa idea en el contexto de la ontología de los artefactos y otras discusiones en filosofía de la tecnología. La última sección reconstruye a nuestros adversarios intelectuales: una serie de dualismos que estructuran los debates actuales tales como materialidad-función, material-simbólico, estructura-función. Sostenemos que la teoría de los realizadores / realizaciones puede superar estos dualismos dominantes y ofrecer una versión mucho más rica de la vida de los artefactos.

Jacques Lafitte occupies an odd place in the philosophy of technology. He was a French engineer who made a significant and conceptually innovative contribution to this field, yet his influence has been elusive and largely ignored until relatively recently. Many of Lafitte’s ideas find echoes in the work of later philosophers, yet, notably in the case of Simondon, apparently without any direct line of influence. Lafitte placed the machine at the centre of his thinking about technology and articulated various layers of analysis around it; for example, he considered machines in the broader context of an artificial world or “mechanosphere”, which encompassed certain aspects of philosophical anthropology. In this work we seek to reconstruct Lafitte’s ideas and briefly trace some of their later impact. We identify three dimensions in Lafitte’s analysis: epistemological, ontological and anthropological. We argue that the most remarkable fact about Lafitte’s thought is the way it inaugurates, and anticipates, the approach of later currents, not just in the “French tradition”, who also made an effort to integrate machine theory into broader philosophical, anthropological and political aspects, in terms that echo Lafitte’s. In particular, we will focus on Gilbert Simondon and cybernetics.

In this article I respond to Yuk Hui by revisiting the crossroads in the philosophy of technology as represented by the philosophies of Stiegler and Ihde. Whereas Hui proposes the concept of cosmotechnics as an integrating perspective, I conceive of the crossroads in other terms, namely from the perspective of substantivism. I characterize our present situation, what a philosophy of technology should address and then examine Hui’s notion of cosmotechnics from this alternative perspective. My main concern is to show future paths of development for cosmotechnical thought.

El presente artículo pretende evaluar las consecuencias de la tesis de la cognición extendida para la antropología filosófica. Dicha interrogación se enmarca en lo que denominamos el “giro tecnológico” en las ciencias sociales y humanas, un fenómeno relativamente reciente que produce una reorientación en clave posthumanista de la pregunta antropológica. De acuerdo con este giro, la tecnología adquiere una importancia central para la comprensión de lo humano, tanto en su dimensión ontológica como en su presente condición histórica. A su vez este giro tecnológico tiende a rechazar la idea misma de una naturaleza humana ahistórica e inviolable, y postula en su lugar a la figura del “humano distribuido”, íntimamente constituido por su relación con los artefactos y la cultura material. En este contexto, el principal objetivo de este trabajo es rastrear la evolución de la tesis de la cognición extendida a lo largo de cuatro “olas” que marcan su despliegue con el objeto de ofrecer una cierta reinterpretación de esta tesis en el ámbito de la pregunta antropológica.

En este artículo evaluamos las fortalezas y limitaciones de dos enfoques que privilegian dimensiones materiales de la tecnología en sus respectivas teorías de la agencia técnica: la teoría ecológica de Tim Ingold y la teoría de la agencia material de Lambros Malafouris. Ambos autores rechazan la intencionalidad centralizada de enfoques clásicos a favor del externalismo, lo cual los lleva a sostener que los affordances ecológicos y materiales son los principales impulsores de la acción y los determinantes de la forma final de los artefactos. Aquí argumentamos que estos enfoques tienen dificultades significativas para dar cuenta de algunas de las características claves de la agencia técnica ampliamente reconocidas en los debates en la filosofía de la tecnología, a saber, de sus aspectos normativos y teleológicos.

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument, the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of “directed evolution.” In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and the reasons themselves. I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement.

En este artículo evaluamos las fortalezas y limitaciones de dos enfoques que privilegian dimensiones materiales de la tecnología en sus respectivas teorías de la agencia técnica: la teoría ecológica de Tim Ingold y la teoría de la agencia material de Lambros Malafouris. Ambos autores rechazan la intencionalidad centralizada de enfoques clásicos a favor del externalismo, lo cual los lleva a sostener que los affordances ecológicos y materiales son los principales impulsores de la acción y los determinantes de la forma final de los artefactos. Aquí argumentamos que estos enfoques tienen dificultades significativas para dar cuenta de algunas de las características claves de la agencia técnica ampliamente reconocidas en los debates en la filosofía de la tecnología, a saber, de sus aspectos normativos y teleológicos.

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings.

This paper is an enquiry into the philosophical fault-line that leads from mechanicism to posthumanism. I focus on a central aspect of posthumanism: the erosion of the distinction between organism and machine, nature and art, and the biological and engineering sciences. I claim that this shift can be placed in the seventeenth century, in Descartes’s biology. The Cartesian fusion of the natural and technological opened the door to distinctly posthuman understandings of the living body, its relation to technological extensions, and the possibility of its drastic alteration. Descartes’s mechanicism demanded a reconceptualization of bodily boundaries, organismic unity, natural finality, causation, and bio/technological instrumentality; all of which Descartes boldly theorized in terms of the wondrous technologies of his day. This radical proposal obscured the possibility of thinking the human as ontologically unique, or as having an ideal unity. This paper will examine the posthuman ramifications of these aspects of Descartes’s philosophy.

This paper is an enquiry into the philosophical fault-line that leads from mechanicism to posthumanism. I focus on a central aspect of posthumanism: the erosion of the distinction between organism and machine, nature and art, and the biological and engineering sciences. I claim that this shift can be placed in the seventeenth century, in Descartes’s biology. The Cartesian fusion of the natural and technological opened the door to distinctly posthuman understandings of the living body, its relation to technological extensions, and the possibility of its drastic alteration. Descartes’s mechanicism demanded a reconceptualization of bodily boundaries, organismic unity, natural finality, causation, and bio/technological instrumentality; all of which Descartes boldly theorized in terms of the wondrous technologies of his day. This radical proposal obscured the possibility of thinking the human as ontologically unique, or as having an ideal unity. This paper will examine the posthuman ramifications of these aspects of Descartes’s philosophy.

This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory