Andrew Andrew

Axiomorphism designates a second-order theory of axiomatic governance on which axioms are construed as relationally stabilized inferential commitments whose utility is indexed to domain, temporal horizon, and modality. In real arguments, axioms usually show up already carrying presumptions never in fact scrutinized.. The central thesis is that what is ordinarily treated as a self-grounding primitive is, under more discriminating analysis, an operational invariant maintained by a field of constraints whose algebra is context-sensitive and whose force is profile-relative. This paper develops a dualist formulation of the axiomorphic thesis, alongside subsidiary monistic and trialist accommodations, in order to explain how a range of apparently incommensurable judgments may remain internally coherent once one specifies the relevant axiomatic matrix, the governing truth-conditions, and the profile of inferential salience governing any given agent or community. The resulting framework is framed in terms of relational axiomata, idiosyncratic profiles, selective invariance, and structured revision. The paper also introduces a thin formalism utilizing various schemata, contingent truth tables, and a rudimentary calculus of entailment-prescription, chiefly to clarify what is often left tacit in more common philosophical prose. [1]