Andrew Brennan

Ecology - unlike astronomy, physics, or chemistry - is a science with an associated political and ethical movement: the Green Movement. As a result, the ecological position is often accompanied by appeals to holism, and by a mystical quasi-religious conception of the ecosystem. In this title, first published in 1988, Andrew Brennan argues that we can reduce much of the mysticism surrounding ecological discussions by placing them within a larger context, and illustrating that our individual interests are bound with larger, community interests. Using an interdisciplinary approach, which bridges the gap between the sciences, philosophy, and ethics, this is an accessible title, which will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of environmental science and ethics.

The search for 'ecological insights' in venerable Asian traditions of thought prompts questions about how such traditions understood humans in relation to nature. Answers which focus on philosophical and religious ideas may overlook culturally important understandings of people and places articulated within scientific and medical thinking. The paper tentatively explores the prospects for gleaning a form of ethics of place from the study of traditional Hindu and Chinese medical sources. Although there are serious problems with the idea that any unadulterated assimilation from other traditions can take place, these sources can be thought of as incorporating a place-centred ethic. By looking closely at Francis Zimmerman's study of Hindu medicine, it is argued that a poetics of place can be ascribed to Ayurvedic discourses on health and disease. It may be possible to associate a similar poetics with classical Chinese medical worldviews, these being reconcilable with-though not the same as-contemporary ecological understandings of humans in relation to the world. Although no pristine reconstruction of Asian traditions of medical thought can be made, the conclusion of the present paper is that it would be wrong to dismiss these traditions as 'antienvironmental', based purely on the study of philosophical and religious texts.

Attacks on ?closest continuer? and ?best candidate? theories of identity have something correct in them while still failing to discredit the theories they oppose. What follows from Noonan's and Wiggins's objections to such theories is that they need to be so formulated as not to deny the necessity of identity. The best metaphysics for best?candidate theories to adopt is one in which everyday objects are taken to transcend, in a certain sense, their life histories in given worlds. This metaphysics also has the potential for solving problems about contingent identity, transworld identity, and the issue of haecceitism or individual essence. To develop the metaphysics, it is only necessary to follow through the analogy between worlds and times suggested by writers like Plantinga and Schlesinger

This paper describes the general structure of an environmental philosophy. There can be many such philosophies, and those with their roots in economic theory have been extensively studied recently. Specific examples cited in the paper include the work of David Pearce and Robert Goodin. Economics-based philosophies can founder on the issue of externalities and a misplaced attempt to provide a comprehensive approach to valuing nature as a bundle of goods and services. It is argued that it is dangerously easy to slide from considering nature as a standing reserve of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires to the idea that it is nothing more than that. In general, the consequentialist basis of economics limits its usefulness in contributing to informed environmental decisions. But there is room for a sensitive use of institutional environmental economics as a partial guide for our reflections and choices. Any such development should take on board the existence of a plurality of perspectives on fundamental issues and the pluralism of values that can be found within moral theory itself.

This paper describes the general structure of an environmental philosophy. There can be many such philosophies, and those with their roots in economic theory have been extensively studied recently. Specific examples cited in the paper include the work of David Pearce and Robert Goodin. Economics-based philosophies can founder on the issue of externalities and a misplaced attempt to provide a comprehensive approach to valuing nature as a bundle of goods and services. It is argued that it is dangerously easy to slide from considering nature as a standing reserve of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires to the idea that it is nothing more than that. In general, the consequentialist basis of economics limits its usefulness in contributing to informed environmental decisions. But there is room for a sensitive use of institutional environmental economics as a partial guide for our reflections and choices. Any such development should take on board the existence of a plurality of perspectives on fundamental issues and the pluralism of values that can be found within moral theory itself.