Andrew Dell'Olio

Foundations of Moral Selfhood addresses the general issue of ethics and religion by examining the connection between the natural and theological virtues in the moral thought of Thomas Aquinas. While Aquinas is often invoked in contemporary discussions of virtue ethics, the interpenetration of the secular and religious dimensions of his thought is not often appreciated. Andrew J. Dell'Olio shows how Aquinas's metaphysics of goodness allows him to harmonize secular and religious virtues within the individual so as not to compromise the unity of the moral self. Aquinas is seen as presenting a theory of self-perfection that requires both self-development and self-abnegation, depicting each as ways of participating in the divine. The significance for contemporary virtue ethics of what Dell'Olio calls a «deep conception of the good» is also explored. Foundations of Moral Selfhood is relevant to the revival of Neo-Aristotelianism and Thomism in ethics, as well as to recent attempts to articulate forms of ethical Platonism and religious morality in a pluralistic society.

This dissertation aims to situate Aquinas' conception of the virtues within the theological framework of his thought by examining the relationship between the natural and the theological virtues in the Summa Theologiae. My thesis is that the frequent attempt at abstracting Aquinas' ethics from its theological context risks a failure to appreciate the richness of his doctrine of the virtues. An overview of Aquinas' doctrine of the virtues is presented in terms of the perfection or complete development of the self, a perfection that requires both natural and theological virtues. The problem of how Aquinas can include two separate orders of virtue, natural and supernatural, within his ethical theory without producing a fragmented moral self arises as a challenge his doctrine of the virtues must meet. It is suggested that Aquinas connects these two orders of virtue through a theologically rich enough conception of the good to allow for both a "natural" fulfillment of the ultimate end of the human being as well as a "supernatural" fulfillment, with the natural end nested within, and subordinated to, the supernatural end. Under this interpretation, the ultimate end of the human being is one, namely the divine goodness, which the human being realizes in a twofold form of participation: "remotely" through his or her natural abilities; and "directly" or "intimately" through divine grace. The complete perfection of the human being would then require the theological or infused virtues, principally the virtue of charity, as well as the naturally acquired virtues, principally prudence. Yet it is charity that is primary in the life of virtue since it enables the self to participate most fully in the divine goodness, and directs all the other virtues, including the natural virtues of the person in the state of grace, to this ultimate end. Concluding reflections suggest that Aquinas' metaphysically robust account of the virtues, or something very much like it, fares better than more recent metaphysically austere attempts to retrieve an ethics of virtue since such an account satisfies what Charles Taylor has argued is required of a coherent notion of the self, namely, an orientation to what may be called a "deep" conception of the good.

The twelfth-century Neo-Confucian philosopher, Zhu Xi, has often been compared to the thirteenth-century Christian philosopher, Thomas Aquinas. In this essay, I explore the similarities between these two thinkers, focusing on their respective accounts of the metaphysical foundations of moral self-cultivation. I suggestthat both philosophers play similar roles within their respective traditions and share similar aims. In general, both philosophers seek to appropriate ideas of rivalintellectual traditions in order to extend the moral vision of their home traditions, and both hope to achieve their goals without denying the primary orientationsof those traditions. Zhu Xi and Aquinas are shown to employ similar strategies, and to make use of similar metaphysical principles, to unite the humanistic andspiritual dimensions of moral self-cultivation into one synthetic vision. I will conclude by offering some reflections on the following questions: (1) what can the Neo-Confucian and the Thomist ethical traditions learn from one another? And (2) what can those of us engaged in inter-cultural philosophical and religiousdialogue learn from the masters of these traditions?

Cheng Man-ch’ing (1901–1975) is as responsible as anyone for the wide popularity of taijiquan in the West. While his stature as a master and teacher of taijiquan is legendary, he is less well-known as a philosopher. Yet Cheng wrote a number of philosophical commentaries on Chinese classics that shed light on his understanding of taijiquan. In this paper I propose that a consideration of Cheng’s philosophical reflections shows him to be a twentieth century Neo-Confucian who saw taijiquan as a key component of the overall aim of moral self-cultivation. In transmitting taijiquan to his fellow Chinese and to the West, Cheng was attempting to convey traditional Chinese thought and action as expressed in Neo-Confucian moral ideals. For Cheng, taijiquan was more than a martial art or physical exercise; it was a way of life.

One motivation for the recent interest in virtue ethics in contemporary moral thought is the view that deontological or duty-based ethics requires the notion of God as absolute law giver. It has been claimed by Elizabeth Anscombe, for example, that there could be no coherent moral obligation, no moral ought, independent of divine command, and that, in the absence of belief in God, moral philosophy best pursue an ethic of character or virtue over an ethic of obligation or duty. The underlying assumption here is that an ethics of virtue, unlike an ethics of duty, is best developed independently of a conception of God. In this paper I argue that this view is misleading and obscures the need of virtue ethics for the concept of God. In making my philosophical point, I look to the work of Charles Taylor and suggest that any contemporary ethics of virtue, in order to meet its own desired aim of retrieving a viable moral self, requires a “deep” conception of the good, and that the most viable source for this conception is the theistic notion of God. On this account, the ethics of virtue turns out to be no more independent of the concept of God than an ethics of duty or obligation.

This essay considers recent criticism of the use of inclusive language within Christian discourse, particularly the reference to God as “Mother.” The author argues that these criticisms fail to establish that the supplemental usage of “God the Mother,” in addition to the traditional usage of “God the Father,” is inappropriate for Christian God-talk. Some positive reasons for referring to God as “Mother” are also offered, not the least of which is its helpfulness in overcoming overly restrictive conceptions of God.

In this paper I suggest that near-death experiences (NDEs) provide a rational basis for belief in life after death. My argument is a simple one and is modeled on the argument from religious experience for the existence of God. But unlike the proponents of the argument from religious experience, I stop short of claiming that NDEs prove the existence of life after death. Like the argument from religious experience, however, my argument turns on whether or not there is good reason to believe that NDEs are authentic or veridical. I argue that there is good reason to believe that NDEs are veridical and that therefore it is reasonable to believe in the existence of what they seem to be experiences of, namely, a continued state of consciousness after the death of the body. I will then offer some comments on the philosophical import of NDEs, as well as reflections on the current state of contemporary philosophy in light of the neglect of this phenomenon.

As the perfect companion to introduction to ethics courses, Dell'Olio and Simon's reader includes the most influential ethical theories without overwhelming the beginning student. It contains a variety of readings encompassing contemporary and classic philosophers, male and female perspectives of both western and non-western ethical traditions, and readings in both theoretical and applied ethics as well as a section on 'living the good life.' Useful introduction with thought provoking study questions and suggestions for further readings accompany each chapter which make it easier for students to understand and appreciate their reading.