•  9
    A moral freedom to which we might aspire
    Philosophical Explorations 27 (1): 1-20. 2023.
    Reflection on free agency has largely been motivated by perceived threats to its very existence, which, in turn, has driven the philosophical conversation to focus on the question of whether we have the freedom required for moral responsibility. The Stoics were early participants in this conversation, but they were also concerned about an ideal of inner moral freedom, a freedom over and above that required for responsibility, and one to which we might aspire over the course of our lives. Though …Read more
  •  1
    Worthy of Praise: Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency
    with Andrew Eshleman
    Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 2 216-241. 2014.
    Much recent work on moral responsibility has focused on responsibility as accountability—a type of responsibility associated with the blame-oriented reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. The preoccupation with this admittedly important form of responsibility fosters a truncated portrait of our moral lives by largely ignoring responsibility for actions that merit praise and emulation. Through an examination of what is presupposed in the attitudes of gratitude and esteem, thi…Read more
  • Being is not Believing: Fischer and Ravizza on Taking Responsibility
    with Andrew S. Eshleman
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 4 (79): 479-490. 2001.
    In recent discussions of moral responsibility, two claims have generated considerable attention: 1) a complete account of responsibility cannot ignore the agent’s personal history prior to the time of action; and 2) an agent’s responsibility is not determined solely by whether certain objective facts about the agent obtain (e.g., whether he/she was free of physical coercion) but also by whether, subjectively, the agent views him/herself in a particular way. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza…Read more
  •  13
    Responsibility and moral bricolage
    Dissertatio 38 157-179. 2013.
    Na longa disputa sobre o tipo de liberdade requerida para a responsabilidade, os participantes tenderam a assumir que estavam concernidos com um conceito de responsabilidade moral compartilhado. Esta assunção foi questionada recentemente. Uma visível divisão entre ‘Lumpers’ e ‘Splitters’ surgiu. Os Lumpers defendem a suposição tradicional que há um conceito unificado de responsabilidade, enquanto os Splitters sustentam que há dois ou mais conceitos de responsabilidade moral. Aqui, eu ofereço um …Read more
  •  52
    Being is not believing: Fischer and Ravizza on taking responsibility
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4). 2001.
    In recent discussions of moral responsibility, two claims have generated considerable attention: 1) a complete account of responsibility cannot ignore the agent’s personal history prior to the time of action; and 2) an agent’s responsibility is not determined solely by whether certain objective facts about the agent obtain (e.g., whether he/she was free of physical coercion) but also by whether, subjectively, the agent views him/herself in a particular way. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza…Read more
  •  426
    Moral responsibility
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for help. To regard such agents as worth…Read more
  •  60
    Religious fictionalism defended: Reply to Cordry: Andrew Eshleman
    Religious Studies 46 (1): 91-96. 2010.
    In his paper, ‘A critique of religious fictionalism’, Benjamin Cordry raises a series of objections to a fictionalist form of religious non-realism that I proposed in my earlier paper, ‘Can an atheist believe in God?’. They fall into two main categories: those alleging that an atheist would be unjustified in adopting fictionalism, and those alleging that fictionalism could not be successfully implemented, or practised communally. I argue that these objections can be met
  •  103
    Alternative possibilities and the free will defence
    Religious Studies 33 (3): 267-286. 1997.
    The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes …Read more
  •  36
    Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2008.
    Through a diverse collection of carefully chosen selections, _Readings in Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West_ offers an enlightening array of perspectives on Western and non-Western religious thought that makes more meaningful trans-cultural connections possible within philosophy of religion. Includes a substantial selection of non-Western religious perspectives that are accessible to both students and instructors Provides further clarity with comprehensive chapter introductions to orient r…Read more
  •  184
    Can an Atheist Believe in God?
    Religious Studies 41 (2). 2005.
    Some have proposed that it is reasonable for an atheist to pursue a form of life shaped by engagement with theistic religious language and practice, once language and belief in God are interpreted in the appropriate non-realist manner. My aim is to defend this proposal in the face of several objections that have been raised against it. First, I engage in some conceptual spadework to distinguish more clearly some varieties of religious non-realism. Then, in response to two central objections, I s…Read more
  •  81
    Responsibility for Character
    Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2): 65-94. 2004.
    In this work I argue that an agent assumes responsibility for her traits of character by making them her own during the process of their formation. One makes a character trait one's own by identifying oneself with its constitutive desires, or in the case of a particular kind of vice, by failing to identify oneself with desires to act in the corresponding virtuous manner. Unlike the view traditionally attributed to Aristotle, this view does not require that an agent be the original knowing author…Read more
  •  37
    Arguing for Atheism (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 16 (2): 272-276. 1999.
  •  63
    The afterlife: beyond belief
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2): 163-183. 2016.
    When a Christian refers to the future full realization of the kingdom of God in an afterlife, it is typically assumed that she is expressing beliefs about the existence and activity of God in conjunction with supernatural beliefs about an otherworldly realm and the possibility of one’s personal survival after bodily death. In other words, the religious language is interpreted in a realist fashion and the religious person here is construed as a religious believer. A corollary of this widely-held …Read more
  •  9
    God and Realism (review)
    Religious Studies 41 (3): 347-352. 2005.
  •  82
    Religious fictionalism defended: Reply to Cordry
    Religious Studies 46 (1): 91-96. 2010.
    In his paper, 'A critique of religious fictionalism', Benjamin Cordry raises a series of objections to a fictionalist form of religious non-realism that I proposed in my earlier paper, 'Can an atheist believe in God?'. They fall into two main categories: those alleging that an atheist would be unjustified in adopting fictionalism, and those alleging that fictionalism could not be successfully implemented, or practised communally. I argue that these objections can be met
  •  7
    Arguing for Atheism (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 16 (2): 272-276. 1999.