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Andrew Mathias

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  • All publications (12)
  • Set Theory: Techniques and Applications
    with Carlos Augusto Di Prisco, Jean A. Larson, and Joan Bagaria
    Studia Logica 66 (3): 426-428. 2000.
  •  23
    Review: Ulrich Felgner, Mengenlehre (review)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1): 345-348. 1991.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  79
    Mengenlehre, edited by Ulrich Feigner, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt1979, vii + 331 pp (review)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1): 345-348. 1991.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  •  112
    Happy families
    Annals of Mathematical Logic 12 (1): 59. 1977.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicEthics
  •  220
    On the existence of large p-ideals
    with Winfried Just, Karel Prikry, and Petr Simon
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (2): 457-465. 1990.
    We prove the existence of p-ideals that are nonmeagre subsets of P(ω) under various set-theoretic assumptions
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  28
    Cambridge Summer School in Mathematical Logic (edited book)
    with Hartley Rogers
    Springer Verlag. 1973.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousLogic and Philosophy of Log…Read more
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  •  101
    Robert Vaught. Descriptive set theory in Lω,1ω, Cambridge summer school in mathematical logic, held in Cambridge/England, August 1–21, 1971, edited by A.R.D. Mathias and H. Rogers, Lecture notes in mathematics, vol. 337, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York, 1973, pp. 574–598. - Robert Vaught. Invariant sets in topology and logic. Fundamenta mathematicae, vol. 82 no. 3, pp. 269–294 (review)
    with Robert Vaught and H. Rogers
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1): 217-218. 1982.
    Model TheorySet TheoryMathematical Logic
  •  148
    The strength of Mac Lane set theory
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 110 (1-3): 107-234. 2001.
    Saunders Mac Lane has drawn attention many times, particularly in his book Mathematics: Form and Function, to the system of set theory of which the axioms are Extensionality, Null Set, Pairing, Union, Infinity, Power Set, Restricted Separation, Foundation, and Choice, to which system, afforced by the principle, , of Transitive Containment, we shall refer as . His system is naturally related to systems derived from topos-theoretic notions concerning the category of sets, and is, as Mac Lane empha…Read more
    Saunders Mac Lane has drawn attention many times, particularly in his book Mathematics: Form and Function, to the system of set theory of which the axioms are Extensionality, Null Set, Pairing, Union, Infinity, Power Set, Restricted Separation, Foundation, and Choice, to which system, afforced by the principle, , of Transitive Containment, we shall refer as . His system is naturally related to systems derived from topos-theoretic notions concerning the category of sets, and is, as Mac Lane emphasises, one that is adequate for much of mathematics. In this paper we show that the consistency strength of Mac Lane's system is not increased by adding the axioms of Kripke–Platek set theory and even the Axiom of Constructibility to Mac Lane's axioms; our method requires a close study of Axiom H, which was proposed by Mitchell; we digress to apply these methods to subsystems of Zermelo set theory , and obtain an apparently new proof that is not finitely axiomatisable; we study Friedman's strengthening of , and the Forster–Kaye subsystem of , and use forcing over ill-founded models and forcing to establish independence results concerning and ; we show, again using ill-founded models, that proves the consistency of ; turning to systems that are type-theoretic in spirit or in fact, we show by arguments of Coret and Boffa that proves a weak form of Stratified Collection, and that is a conservative extension of for stratified sentences, from which we deduce that proves a strong stratified version of ; we analyse the known equiconsistency of with the simple theory of types and give Lake's proof that an instance of Mathematical Induction is unprovable in Mac Lane's system; we study a simple set theoretic assertion—namely that there exists an infinite set of infinite sets, no two of which have the same cardinal—and use it to establish the failure of the full schema of Stratified Collection in ; and we determine the point of failure of various other schemata in . The paper closes with some philosophical remarks
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  203
    Slim models of zermelo set theory
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (2): 487-496. 2001.
    Working in Z + KP, we give a new proof that the class of hereditarily finite sets cannot be proved to be a set in Zermelo set theory, extend the method to establish other failures of replacement, and exhibit a formula Φ(λ, a) such that for any sequence $\langle A_{\lambda} \mid \lambda \text{a limit ordinal} \rangle$ where for each $\lambda, A_{\lambda} \subseteq ^{\lambda}2$ , there is a supertransitive inner model of Zermelo containing all ordinals in which for every λ A λ = {α ∣Φ(λ, a)}
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  82
    Rudimentary Recursion, Gentle Functions and Provident Sets
    with N. J. Bowler
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1): 3-60. 2015.
    This paper, a contribution to “micro set theory”, is the study promised by the first author in [M4], as improved and extended by work of the second. We use the rudimentarily recursive functions and the slightly larger collection of gentle functions to initiate the study of provident sets, which are transitive models of $\mathsf{PROVI}$, a subsystem of $\mathsf{KP}$ whose minimal model is Jensen’s $J_{\omega}$. $\mathsf{PROVI}$ supports familiar definitions, such as rank, transitive closure and o…Read more
    This paper, a contribution to “micro set theory”, is the study promised by the first author in [M4], as improved and extended by work of the second. We use the rudimentarily recursive functions and the slightly larger collection of gentle functions to initiate the study of provident sets, which are transitive models of $\mathsf{PROVI}$, a subsystem of $\mathsf{KP}$ whose minimal model is Jensen’s $J_{\omega}$. $\mathsf{PROVI}$ supports familiar definitions, such as rank, transitive closure and ordinal addition—though not ordinal multiplication—and Shoenfield’s unramified forcing. Providence is preserved under directed unions. An arbitrary set has a provident closure, and the extension of a provident $M$ by a set-generic $\mathcal{G}$ is the provident closure of $M\cup\{\mathcal{G}\}$. The improvidence of many models of $\mathsf{Z}$ is shown. The final section uses similar but simpler recursions to show, in the weak system $\mathsf{MW}$, that the truth predicate for $\dot{\varDelta}_{0}$ formulæ is $\Delta_{1}$
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  142
    A term of length 4 523 659 424 929
    Synthese 133 (1). 2002.
    Bourbaki suggest that their definition of the number 1 runs to some tens of thousands of symbols. We show that that is a considerable under-estimate, the true number of symbols being that in the title, not counting 1 179 618 517 981 links between symbols that are needed to disambiguate the whole expression.
    Areas of Mathematics
  •  68
    A note on the schemes of replacement and collection
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (1): 43-50. 2007.
    We derive the schemes of from certain weak forms of the same
    Philosophy of Mathematics, General Works
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