I am the author, most recently, of Phenomenal Properties and the Intuition of Distinctness: The View from the Inside (OUP, 2025), in which I try to explain why we might find it impossible to believe that phenomenal conscious is purely physical, even if in fact it is. An earlier book, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (CUP, 2003), sought to formulate a comprehensive thesis of physicalism (or materialism) in terms of a carefully-defined relation of realization, to explore the implications of physicalism for various reductionist theses, to defend its consistency with causal claims made in the special sciences and everyday li…
I am the author, most recently, of Phenomenal Properties and the Intuition of Distinctness: The View from the Inside (OUP, 2025), in which I try to explain why we might find it impossible to believe that phenomenal conscious is purely physical, even if in fact it is. An earlier book, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (CUP, 2003), sought to formulate a comprehensive thesis of physicalism (or materialism) in terms of a carefully-defined relation of realization, to explore the implications of physicalism for various reductionist theses, to defend its consistency with causal claims made in the special sciences and everyday life, and to display empirical evidence that it is true.
But I'm interested in all aspects of the philosophy of mind and in many aspects of general philosophy of science and of metaphysics. I've also written about naturalism, philosophical methodology, and (a little bit) the philosophy of language.
I'm a professor of philosophy in (and a former chair of) the Philosophy Department at the University of Missouri. I was born in London, England, and educated at St.Paul’s School, London, and Oxford University, where I studied philosophy as an undergraduate under C.C.W. Taylor and Jennifer Hornsby, and as a graduate student under Jennifer Hornsby again, Jonathan Barnes, Michael Dummett, Michael Woods, and Bill Newton-Smith.
