Andrew Pavelich

Epicurus wrote that death cannot be bad for a person who dies, since when someone dies they no longer exist to be the subject of harm. But his conclusion also applies in the converse: Death cannot be good for someone, since after their death they will not exist to be the subject of benefit. This conclusion is troubling when it is brought to bear on the question of physician assisted suicide. If Epicurus is right, as I think he is, then it means that even when someone is dying of a long and painful illness, we cannot say that they would be better off dead. I defend this conclusion by first presenting Epicurus’s argument, and defending it against some of its more important contemporary critics. I then re-examine the conclusion that someone cannot be better off dead by looking at the issue of mercy killing and euthanasia. Drawing on the work of philosophers who examine the ethics of animal euthanasia, I argue that killing someone who is suffering severe agony can be good, but it cannot be good for the person who suffers – it is just good in itself. This, I think, is why we have the intuitions that we do around physician assisted suicide: we are mistaken about the idea that someone can be better off dead, but we can be correct in thinking that sometimes someone’s death is good.

Many theists believe that God is continuously acting to sustain the universe in existence. One way of understanding this act of sustenance is to see God as actually creating the universe anew at each moment. This paper argues against the coherence of this view by drawing out some of its consequences. I argue that the re-creationist must deny the causal efficacy of created f things, as well as the identity of things across time. Most problematically, I argue that re-creationism ultimately denies the reality of time itself.

Plagiarism detection service like Turnitin can be powerful tools to help faculty evaluate whether a student’s paper is plagiarized. But there’s another side to Turnitin: The service promotes itself as a way to help teach students how to avoid plagiarism. I argue that the use of plagiarism detection services as learning tools actually contributes to the problem of plagiarism, by encouraging the idea that original papers are the goal of a class, instead of instruments to assess a student’s ability to understand the class material. In addition, giving students access to the very tool that professors use to evaluate the authenticity of a paper allows students to use the tool to intentionally plagiarize in a way that passes the test. While plagiarism-detection services can help professors investigate suspected acts of plagiarism, they should not be used as a tool to teach students how to write papers.

Mounce presents this book as a general introduction to Hume, not as a scholarly interpretation of Hume that is intended to engage other scholars in interpretive debate. He does, nonetheless, bring an interpretation to bear on Hume's writings. Mounce's focus is not limited to Hume's naturalism, as his title suggests; it is rather the relationship between Hume's naturalism and his empiricism. His claim is that Hume is both a naturalist and an empiricist, and that these two positions cannot sit easily with each other. Mounce does not present Hume as attempting to reconcile the two positions. Instead, he sees Hume as saddled with internal tensions of which he is often unaware. This, at least, is where Mounce begins, but he also goes further. After some introductory moves, he focuses each chapter on a particular issue in Hume, exposing the naturalist and the empiricist interpretations. He consistently decides that the naturalist Hume is entirely correct and the empiricist Hume is entirely wrong. Ultimately, the book fails to find its place as an introduction to Hume.