Andrew Russo

Mark Johnston (2016, 2017) has raised concerns that a worm-theoretic account of persistence through time is incompatible with ethical singularity: that within the life of any actual person, there is only one morally considerable being, namely that person. To deny ethical singularity is to deny a core feature of our ordinary ethical and prudential thinking. The worm theory, Johnston concludes, proves to be “disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook”. This paper defends the worm theory from Johnston’s argument. Though I agree that the worm theory must deny ethical singularity, it can nevertheless be squared with our ordinary ethical thinking by adopting a temporal counterpart analysis of temporal predication (‘x will be F’, ‘x was previously F’, etc.) for those morally considerable beings involved in a person’s life that are not the person.

According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal aggregates of stages that are nonetheless very much like persons. Their existence appears to make instances of prudential self-sacrifice morally problematic: the personites that exist at the time of the sacrifice but not at the time of the reward seem to be unfairly exploited. Instances of punishment appear to give rise to a similar problem. We argue that these impressions arise from a mistaken assumption about which beings are the primary bearers of properties such as suffering, receiving compensation (in the future) and having (previously) committed a crime. According to the worm theory, stages, rather than persons or personites, possess these properties. Persons and personites have these properties only in a derivative sense. As we show, once this clarification and related ones are made, the apparent moral problems raised by the existence of personites dissolve.

In celebration of the centenary of the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro’s birth (1911–1995), this paper investigates the essential theoretical traits that undergird the framework of Fabro’s 1941 texts, by comparing them with Franz Brentano’s (1838–1817) project of renewing Thomism through a new understanding of Aristotle. The secondary literature concerning the comparison of both these authors is almost nonexistent. Our goal is to clarify some of the central issues regarding the relation between Fabro and Brentano through direct textual analysis of unpublished letters exchanged between Fabro and Agostino Gemelli about Brentano and his pupil Carl Stumpf.

The burden of proof (BOP) fallacy is an informal fallacy involving the failure to recognize or properly assign the BOP in a persuasive reasoned dialogue, that is, an interchange between two or more parties whose aim is to prove or defend a position and, in doing so, persuade the other side of its truth or plausibility. In some such dialogues, the amount or strength of evidence required in order to accomplish this goal reasonably may differ for one of the parties involved. The BOP fallacy can occur in two ways. The first is when one side of the dialogue fails to recognize that its opponent incurs the BOP. The second way the BOP fallacy can occur is when one side of the dialogue assigns the BOP incorrectly. There are still some factors that play a role in determining which side of a dialogue incurs the BOP and this chapter discusses these factors.

La riscoperta del pensiero di Franz Brentano, in Italia e all’estero, stimola a verificare la centralità e la vitalità della sua presenza in una sempre più vasta cerchia di lettori e di discepoli. In quest’ottica rientra il confronto con l’insigne medievista, archivista e studioso di Lutero, Henrich-Suso Denifle. Tuttavia, ad eccezione di sporadici accenni, il problema del rapporto Denifle – Brentano è stato relegato nel dimenticatoio, anche se lo stesso Brentano a suo tempo aveva pubblicamente annoverato Denifle tra i suoi discepoli. Qui si utilizza per la prima un carteggio inedito intercorso tra i due autori per chiarire questo rapporto. Esso, dunque, costituisce una fonte documentaria, finora mai utilizzata, di fondamentale importanza per poter comprendere le posizioni iniziali di Denifle e nello stesso tempo poter integrare la conoscenza, finora non del tutto chiara, della produzione di Brentano fino al 1870. Si tratta di uno scambio epistolare che comprende l’arco di tempo racchiuso tra il 22 novembre 1867 e il 7 agosto del 1871. Le lettere sono tutte di argomento filosofico.