Andrew Woodhall

Within our chapter, we consider the divide between theorists and activists within the nonhuman animal movement. We consider the recent reflections on the successes and failures of the movement before arguing that instead of a methodological reason that perhaps the source of the movement’s overall lack of success is the result of this theory/practice gulf. In the first part of the chapter we consider how both theory and practice must be linked together in order for the nonhuman movement to become more effective, and argue that activists ought to ground their action more than currently occurs while theorists must focus more on actual, practical ways to aid nonhuman animals while also actively partake in action themselves. In the second part we consider this approach in regard to anthropocentrism and the poorly explored intersection between interspecies ethics and the ethics of war and self-defence. We argue that with the former, anthropocentrism when understood correctly not only results in problems for the movement that need to be confronted but that rejecting anthropocentrism has important implications on theoretical and practical issues, such as intervention. With the latter, we argue that questions concerning direct action and the moral permissibility of using violence to protect nonhuman animals from human oppression cannot be answered within interspecies ethics alone. It is necessary to make use of a more sophisticated and accurate terminology, which can only be found in the ethics of war and self-defence literature.

Within current political, social, and ethical debates – both in academia and society – activism and how individuals should approach issues facing nonhuman animals, have become increasingly important, ‘hot’ issues. Individuals, groups, advocacy agencies, and governments have all espoused competing ideas for how we should approach nonhuman use and exploitation. Ought we proceed through liberation? Abolition? Segregation? Integration? As nonhuman liberation, welfare, and rights’ groups increasingly interconnect and identify with other ‘social justice movements’, resolutions to these questions have become increasingly entangled with questions of what justice and our ethical commitments demand on this issue, and the topic has become increasingly significant and divisive. The book considers how this question, and contemporary issues facing nonhumans (such as experimentation, hunting, and factory farming) should be answered by drawing on both theory and practice in order to provide grounded, yet actionable, ways forward. Indicatively, the book covers topics such as: • The intersection between interspecies ethics and the ethics of war and self-defence • Nonhuman animals as political subjects and acting agents • Whether we should intervene for nonhuman animals in cases of natural disaster • Various explorations of why the nonhuman movement may not be succeeding as well as it could be • Comparisons between the nonhuman movement and other social movement • Arguments for and against intervening to help or save nonhumans, and how far we may go • What intervention could ultimately mean for nonhumans The book is therefore intended not only to provide new and interesting insight into the area and important contemporary discussions, but also to constructively aid the nonhuman movement and unite theory and practice on the crucial issues. With the nonhuman movement and its past approaches currently being questioned as a success, more nonhumans than ever being harmed and exploited, and a growing gulf between activists and scholars, this book will not only be a timely addition to the literature, but an attempt to bridge these gaps and move both theory and practice – and thus the movement and field – forward.

In this thesis I put forward a new definition of anthropocentrism based on a thorough overview of use in the literature and via analogy with other centrisms, such as androcentrism. I argue that thus clarified anthropocentrism is unjustified and results in problems for nonhuman animals and that any nonhuman ethic should wish to avoid. I then demonstrate how important nonhuman ethics theories are anthropocentric on this definition, and do not address anthropocentrism, in a way that results in these problems for nonhumans. I therefore propose a nonhuman ethic that aims to be less anthropocentric. I do this by first considering morality in light of evolution and second by looking at nonhuman moral codes. I draw upon both of these to set out a less anthropocentric nonhuman ethic and show why this account is at least as viable as, and less problematic than, the current theories as well as outlining its beneficial implications for nonhuman animals and the field. I conclude that anthropocentrism and approaching nonhuman ethics in the manner I have is therefore important for considering nonhuman issues, and that the theory I have put forward is advantageous

Within ‘animal ethics’, and indeed with most debates concerning nonhumans, speciesism is often cited as the prejudice which most human-people (often unknowingly) hold and which ultimately lies as the underlying justification for (i) all of the arguments in support of factory farming, experimentation, hunting, and so on, and (ii) the lesser status and consideration that is given to nonhuman animals in ethical, political, legal, and social deliberations. Despite this, scholars have increasingly argued that ‘human chauvinism’, not speciesism in general, is a more accurate description of this prejudice, as speciesism can apply to any arbitrary species-preference whereas human chauvinism applies specifically to arbitrary preferences in favour of humans. Whichever term one uses, the aim of identifying whether a position rests solely on speciesism or human chauvinism is to see whether the argument put forward has a justifiable basis or is founded merely on a prejudice. The intention of this is usually an aim to demonstrate that the underlying problem that gives rise to the issues in ‘animal ethics’ is speciesism or human chauvinism, and thus that it is either of these that we must understand and eradicate before approaching the issues. In this paper I argue that while this attempt to resolve the issues has generally been a correct philosophical strategy, and largely convincing, it is anthropocentrism that is not only a greater problem for nonhuman animals but that is also the ultimate cause of most of the issues arising in ‘animal ethics’. I begin by considering what anthropocentrism is and how it is distinct from, yet related to, speciesism and human chauvinism. I argue that anthropocentrism is similar to androcentrism, in that it can include a chauvinism but can also involve unintentional world-views and systems of belief that goes beyond this. These additional elements, I argue, bias investigation and any positions put forward in the debates, while also creating new – and often unnoticed – difficulties for nonhumans. I explain why anthropocentrism as thus-defined is problematic for nonhuman animals, emphasizing the additional ways in which anthropocentrism raises difficulties for them, before explaining how anthropocentrism is related to (and likely causes) most of the issues relating to nonhumans; such as questions relating to culture, afterlife, property, intervention, hunting, entertainment, experimentation, consumption, activism, and so on. I finally point out how anthropocentrism is even involved within ‘animal ethics’, including those positions that reject speciesism and human chauvinism, and thus conclude that even while attempting to aid nonhumans these positions do not, and perhaps cannot, do as much as they could due to their implicit anthropocentrism. I then attempt to show how this situation may be resolved by recognizing, and removing (or at least limiting) as much anthropocentrism as possible when approaching the issues. I argue that this can be achieved by (truly) considering humans just as another animal that is no more special than any other, and attempting to consider all nonhuman points of view as of equal relevance in any issue. This, I claim, would have a profound effect not only for nonhumans and for the proposed resolutions made for each issue, but also for ‘animal ethics’, and more importantly for humanity and human society at large.

This book offers ethical and political approaches to issues that nonhuman animals face. The recent 'political turn' in interspecies ethics, from ethical to political approaches, has arisen due to the apparent lack of success of the nonhuman animal movement and dissatisfaction with traditional approaches. Current works largely present general positions rather than address specific issues and principally rely on mainstream approaches. This book offers alternative positions such as cosmopolitan, libertarian, and left humanist thought, as well as applying ethical and political thought to specific issues, such as experimentation, factory farming, nonhuman political agency, and intervention. Presenting work by theorists and activists, insights are offered from both ethics and politics that impact theory and practice and offer essential considerations for those engaging in interspecies ethics within the political turn era.