• Maximality and microphysical supervenience
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1): 139-149. 2003.
    A property, F, is maximal i?, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic
  • Welfare Invariabilism
    Ethics 128 (2): 320-345. 2018.
    Invariabilism is the view that the same theory of welfare is true of every welfare subject. Variabilism is the view that invariabilism is false. In light of how many welfare subjects there are and how greatly they differ in their natures and capacities, it is natural to suppose that variabilism is true. I argue that these considerations do not support variabilism and, indeed, that we should accept invariabilism. This has important implications: it eliminates many of the going theories of welfare…Read more
  • Consciousness in a space-time world
    Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
  • Two Conceptions of the Physical
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 253-281. 2001.
    The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object-based concept…Read more
  • Is matter conscious?
    Nautilus 47 90-96. 2017.
    Why the central problem in neuroscience is mirrored in physics.