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12Legal proof: why knowledge matters and knowing does notAsian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 1-22. 2024.I discuss the knowledge account of legal proof in Moss (2023) and develop an alternative. The unifying thread throughout this article are reflections on the beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) standard of proof. In Section 1, I will introduce the details of Moss’s account and how she motivates it via the BRD standard. In Section 2, I will argue that there are important disanalogies between BRD and knowledge that undermine Moss’s argument. There is however another motivation for the knowledge account: …Read more
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6Précis zu: Beings of Thought and ActionZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (1): 54-58. 2023.
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19A Potential Perspective for Potential Perspectivism—Reply to FassioEthics 133 (1): 122-132. 2022.This discussion article replies to a challenge for potential perspectivism raised by Davide Fassio in this journal. Potential Perspectivism holds that what one ought to do depends on facts that are potentially accessible. Fassio argues against potential perspectivism based on cases of conjunction agglomeration failure of facts that are potentially accessible. I offer a refined account of potential perspectivism that handles cases of conjunction agglomeration failure by spelling out the notion of…Read more
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23Beings of Thought and Action: Epistemic and Practical RationalityCambridge University Press. 2021.In this book, Andy Mueller examines the ways in which epistemic and practical rationality are intertwined. In the first part, he presents an overview of the contemporary debates about epistemic norms for practical reasoning, and defends the thesis that epistemic rationality can make one practically irrational. Mueller proposes a contextualist account of epistemic norms for practical reasoning and introduces novel epistemic norms pertaining to ends and hope. In the second part Mueller considers c…Read more
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31The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoningSynthese 199 (1-2): 5395-5414. 2021.I will argue for a novel variant of the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. In Sect. 2, I will look at current variations of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning and I will provide reasons to doubt these proposals. In Sects. 3 and 4, I develop my own proposal according to which knowledge is the norm of apt practical reasoning. Section 5 considers objections. Finally, Sect. 6 concerns the normativity of my proposed knowledge norm and its significance.
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21Wissenszuschreibungen und asymmetrische Verluste: (k)ein Irrtum? Kommentar zu Knowledge, Stakes and Error von Alexander DingesZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (1): 109-113. 2020.
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46Hopeless practical deliberation – reply to BobierAnalysis 79 (4): 629-631. 2019.Bobier argued that hope is necessary for practical deliberation. I will demonstrate that Bobier’s argument for this thesis fails. The problem is that one of its main premisses rests on a sufficient condition for hoping that is subject to counterexamples. I consider two ways to save the argument, but show that they are unsuccessful in doing so.
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51Two questions, one answer: Unambiguous rationalityEpisteme 18 (1): 111-121. 2021.ABSTRACTTimothy Williamson recently argued that the notion of epistemic rationality is ambiguous between a Content-oriented schema and a Disposition-oriented schema. I argue that the Disposition-oriented schema suggested by Williamson is not faithful to the main idea behind it and that it should be replaced with the Disposition-Manifestation schema. This replacement suffices for avoiding Williamson's ambiguity thesis.
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34Pragmatic or Pascalian Encroachment?Logos and Episteme 8 (2): 235-241. 2017.I argue against Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder's explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for an objectionable form of Pascalian encroachment or it fails to be a fully general explanation of pragmatic en…Read more
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60How Does Epistemic Rationality Constrain Practical Rationality?Analytic Philosophy 58 (2): 139-155. 2017.
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Goethe University FrankfurtNon tenure-track faculty
Goethe University Frankfurt
PhD, 2016
Frankfurt am Main, Hessen, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Practical and Theoretical Reasoning |
Reasons |
Reasons and Rationality |
Practical Reason |