•  18
    ‘True’ as Polysemous
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4): 542-569. 2021.
    In this paper, I propose that 'true’ is polysemous, and thus ambiguous. I suggest that the semantic paradoxes both motivates taking 'true’ to be polysemous and shows that the concept truth is indefinitely extensible. In doing so, I explain that 'true’ is polysemous between the meanings corresponding to the subconcepts of the concept truth generated by such indefinite extensibility. I conclude that the proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes.
  • Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists
    In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, . pp. 407-427. 2018.
    There have been few attempts to answer the challenges for alethic pluralists to maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and of logical consequence in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. This chapter presents a pluralist account of logic and semantics that answers these challenges. The chapter also shows how to accommodate logical pluralism and ontological pluralism within an extension of the framework.
  •  58
    Normativity for Alethic-Logical Pluralists
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-21. 2017.
    Differences among scientific, mathematical, and ethical subject matters motivate a pluralism where distinct domains of subject matter are associated with distinct truth properties and logics. However, it is unclear how such pluralism might accommodate potentially attractive epistemic norms, such as that one ought to believe only what is true, and that one ought to believe what is logically true. In this paper, I show how such pluralism can accommodate such norms by supplementing the account deve…Read more
  •  79
    Fragmented Truth
    Dissertation, University of Oxford. 2016.
    This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing pri…Read more
  •  48
    A Modal Account of Propositions
    Dialectica 71 (4): 463-488. 2017.
    In this paper, I motivate a modal account of propositions on the basis of an iterative conception of propositions. As an application, I suggest that the account provides a satisfying solution to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The account is in the spirit of recently developed modal accounts of sets motivated on the basis of the iterative conception of sets.
  •  91
    Logic for Alethic Pluralists
    Journal of Philosophy 114 (6). 2017.
    There have been few attempts to answer the twin challenges for alethic pluralists to maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and of logical consequence in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. In this paper, I propose an account of logic and semantics on behalf of pluralists that answers both challenges in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. Crucially, the account accommodates mixed atomics, and its first-order extension also accommodates quantified sentences. Accordingly…Read more
  •  65
    Can Alethic Pluralists Maintain Compositionality?
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268). 2017.
    The challenge for alethic pluralists to maintain a standard, truth-functional account of the logical operators has received some attention. In this paper, I consider a related but more fundamental challenge, to maintain a compositional account of the logical operators, which has received much less attention. I argue that, given natural assumptions, pluralists cannot answer this challenge.
  •  72
    Epistemic Modals and Sensitivity to Contextually‐Salient Partitions
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2): 134-146. 2016.
    Expressivists and relativists about epistemic modals often motivate their view by arguing against contextualist treatments of certain cases. However, I argue that even expressivists and relativists should consider being a kind of contextualist. Specifically, data involving mixed disjunctions motivate taking epistemic modals to be sensitive to contextually-salient partitions, and thus context-sensitive.