Aneta Karageorgieva

The text aims to formulate the position in the philosophy of consciousness known as physicalism in a way that does not repeat the shortcomings of existing formulations and yet retains the essential features of the physical as the basis of the mental. It explains why the word „materialism“ is outdated and should be replaced by „physicalism“ despite the existence of usages that treat them as interchangeable. The assumption is defended that physicalism is not only a metaphysical position, as is usually claimed, but is a hybrid – metaphysical and at the same time scientific – hypothesis. It is shown where to seek support for physicalism beyond the famous philosophical arguments from causal closure, from prior explanatory successes, and from mind-brain correlations, namely in the realm of the empirical. The best way to connect the mental and the physical is defended as „grounding,“ which shows the mental as a broadly physical fact, based on narrowly physical facts, in contrast to supervenience and realization. The advantages of physicalism as a strategy for studying consciousness are briefly described.

J. L. Austin’s article ‘Truth’ is a remarkable example of his method of ordinary language analysis by which he investigates the notoriously recalcitrant philosophical concept of truth. This paper attempts to specify the character of Austin’s truth conception, defending the view that despite his opinion of it being a semantic one, it is actually of a mixed nature. Correspondence is what determines the truth or falsity of a statement, but semantics delineates the segment of the world to which our statements correspond. An explication of the notions of demonstrative and descriptive conventions is given in order to add flash to the outlinegiven by Austin.