Angel Garcia

The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge to be met, the paper considers both the conceptualist and nonconceptualist strategies used to meet it; and concludes that conceptualism is a more satisfying option

En este artículo el autor analiza la encíclica Caritas in veritate de Benedicto XVI teniendo como clave de lectura el mercado, el Estado y la sociedad civil, los cuales forman una unión osmótica en la que la persona, libre y responsable, puede expresarse en términos de desarrollo integral. El mercado pasa por el contrato, el Estado por las leyes justas y la sociedad civil por el don y la gratuidad. En este contexto, la sociedad civil es esencial para no encerrar al hombre entre el mercado y el Estado. In this article I discuss the encyclical Caritas in veritate, Benedict XVI having as key to reading the market, the state and civil society, which form a union in which the osmotic person, free and responsible, can be expressed in terms of development. The market goes through the contract, the State by just laws and civil society for the gift and gratuity. In this context, civil society is essential to not close man between the market and the state

Contemporary literature distinguishes two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations: one, cognition involves representation-hungry tasks; two, cognition involves a complex form of informational covariation between subcomponents of a system with an adaptive function. Each of these conceptions involves a different notion of representation, and promotes a particular view of the architecture of cognition. But despite the differences, each of them aims to support the claim that cognition is a matter of representations on architectural constraints. The objective of this article is twofold: one, it is argued that architectural constraints do not entail either of those two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations; two, it is claimed that both notions of representation share an objectionable common element – namely, the idea of a model that grounds the representational reading– that must be abandoned, in favor of a more economical explanation in terms of causal relations, in order to get a clear view of cognition.

The logic of (commutative integral bounded) residuated lattices is known under different names in the literature: monoidal logic [26], intuitionistic logic without contraction [1], H BCK [36] (nowadays called by Ono), etc. In this paper we study the -fragment and the -fragment of the logical systems associated with residuated lattices, both from the perspective of Gentzen systems and from that of deductive systems. We stress that our notion of fragment considers the full consequence relation admitting hypotheses. It results that this notion of fragment is axiomatized by the rules of the sequent calculus for the connectives involved. We also prove that these deductive systems are non-protoalgebraic, while the Gentzen systems are algebraizable with equivalent algebraic semantics the varieties of pseudocomplemented (commutative integral bounded) semilatticed and latticed monoids, respectively. All the logical systems considered are decidable

Questions like “Do you believe that p?” can be meant deliberatively (i.e., the question whether to believe that p) or self‐ascriptively (i.e., the question whether the addressee already believes that p). Therefore, an utterance of “I believe that p” can be a proper answer either to a deliberative or to a self‐ascriptive question. In the latter case, an utterance of “I believe that p” is a self‐ascription of belief, but in the former case, it is not. Instead, it is an episode of the belief formed by deliberation. In failing to make these distinctions, contemporary discussions of the transparency of belief mistakenly assume that a proper answer to questions like “Do you believe that p?” is always a self‐ascription of belief. Adhering to the distinctions results in a better account of the transparency of belief.

The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge to be met, the paper considers both the conceptualist and nonconceptualist strategies used to meet it; and concludes that conceptualism is a more satisfying option.

An obstacle for the attribution of self-consciousness to animals is that they lack the linguistic ability to use the first-person pronoun. To overcome the obstacle, current tests rely on the availability of behavioural measures of self-consciousness in the absence of language. However, this is not sufficient, for unless a distinction is drawn between epistemic and expressive varieties of self-consciousness, further puzzles threaten the validity of the research. This paper defends the distinction and shows how to re-evaluate current research into animal self-consciousness in its light, so as to improve conceptual clarity in this area.

Los valores cristianos son ahora más relevantes debido a que las empresas no se preocupan solo del beneficio. mediante una muestra de 176 empresas de la zona 4 de Ecuador, se ha estudiado la aplicación de los valores de solidaridad, honestidad, humildad y responsabilidad en los procesos productivos y de contratación de personal. El objetivo es averiguar si estos valores son relevantes en la gestión. Como resultado se encontró que existen pocas empresas que tengan en cuenta estos valores declarados como tal. La ausencia de estos valores indica que las empresas deben incorporarlos para tener mayor sostenibilidad y responsabilidad social.

Resumen El autor distribuye este trabajo en los siguientes apartados: plantea la diferencia entre el concepto de desarrollo y de progreso, consciente de que después de estos cincuenta años, con la evolución tanto de la economía como de las ideologías, y después de una gran crisis social y financiera, es necesario distinguir conceptual-mente y en la praxis estos dos términos; situamos la reflexión en el horizonte de la agenda 2030. Desde esta perspectiva estudia la propuesta de PP sobre el desarrollo y la evolución y dinamismo de este pensamiento a través de las encíclicas sociales posteriores hasta nuestros días dedicando un apartado especial a su relación con la ecología integral. Finalmente, a modo de conclusión, presenta los principios que fundamentan la gradualidad del desarrollo.The author distributes this work in the following sections: he points out the difference between the concept of development and progress, aware that after these fifty years, with the evolution of both economy and ideologies, and after a great social crisis and financial, it is necessary to distinguish conceptually and praxis these two terms; we place the reflection on the horizon of the 2030 agenda. From this perspective, he studies the proposal of Populorum progressio on the development and evolution and dynamism of this thought through the social encyclicals that have been up until now, devoting a special section to its relation with integral ecology. Finally, by way of conclusion, it presents the principles underlying the gradual development.