Angela M. Coventry

Tito Magri’s Hume’s Imagination explores the faculty of imagination in Book 1 of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. Magri argues the central function of the imagination is to complete “cognitive gaps” that arise from our ideas that represent sensible objects or from the understanding (7).1 These imaginative processes generate new ideas and cognitive shifts that can be explained through natural empirical means. Unlike perception, which directly represents objects, Magri argues that Hume’s imagination “operates inferentially,” to expand and alter our thinking patterns by making “transitions among ideas” (9). The imagination allows us to move from one idea to another, creating new connections and possibilities in our... Read More.

In this paper, we examine the authorship of the first review of Hume’s _Treatise of Human Nature_ (1739–40), published anonymously in the _History of the Works of the Learned_ in late 1739. We believe that William Warburton is the author of the review, as attested by various clues, partly dependent on the testimony of the editor of the _History of the Works of the Learned_, Jacob Robinson. Robinson states in 1742 that the author of Hume’s review is the same as the one who sent him the review of Morgan’s _Physico-Theology_, and he describes this author in words similar to those he had already used to describe another anonymous writing by Warburton. Many other pieces of evidence, philosophical, phraseological, literary, and stylistic, amply support the attribution.

This paper provides a brief history of some critical responses and expansions of Hume on external objects, with a particular emphasis on the relevance of developmental psychology. First, Hume’s contribution on objects is situated within all three books of the "Treatise of Human Nature." Next, early interpretations of Hume on objects in the eighteenth century, including skeptical critiques by Reid and Shepherd, and Smith’s integration of developmental insights into a Humean framework are presented. The discussion then shifts to twentieth and twenty-first-century approaches, highlighting how perspectives from perception, cognitive science, and developmental psychology address gaps in Hume’s theory. The paper defends in particular the relevance of developmental psychology to supplement Hume’s account of external objects. The conclusion considers the broader implications of Hume and Smith’s theories on external objects, emphasizing their role in understanding sympathy and moral sentiments. By linking historical and contemporary perspectives, the paper underscores the enduring philosophical significance of Hume’s exploration of external objects.

Much of Hume’s "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" is spent debating the experimental design argument for the existence of God. A change of scene occurs in the ninth part of the "Dialogues" when the character of Demea presents an a priori cosmological argument that purports to demonstrate God’s necessary existence. The argument is then criticized by the characters of Cleanthes and Philo. The conversation in the ninth part of the dialogue has occasioned a mixed legacy. For some scholars, the objections raised by Cleanthes and Philo to the cosmological argument in Part 9 are persuasive and inspiring, whereas for others the objections are ineffective and overrated. This paper critically assesses the mixed legacy of Hume against the cosmological argument, in particular, one of Cleanthes’s famous objections to do with a collection of twenty particles of matter. This objection has had a lasting impact in the philosophy of religion literature in the form of the much disputed, ‘Hume-Edwards Principle’ (HEP). However, I claim that the HEP misrepresents the text on two counts, and that via the spokesperson of Cleanthes, Hume’s point against the cosmological argument has yet to be fully appreciated by critics.

In his autobiography, David Hume famously noted that _A Treatise of Human Nature_ “fell dead-born from the press.” Yet it is now widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works written in the English language. Within, Hume offers an empirically informed account of human nature, addressing a range of topics such as space, time, causality, the external world, personal identity, passions, freedom, necessity, virtue, and vice. This edition includes not only the full text of the Treatise but also Hume’s summarizing _Abstract_, as well as selections drawn from critical book reviews which showcase the work’s reception in Hume’s own time. Angela Coventry’s expert introduction and annotations serve to contextualize the book’s themes and arguments for modern readers.

At the level of the individual, current research suggests that most of our daily actions are done out of habit. At the same time, individuals are part of larger social units, and their behavior gives rise to customs and institutions. Hume recognized the indispensable role of custom and habit in human life in his science of the mind, a science which aims to form the most general principles possible. Custom and habit are singled out by Hume as particularly potent general principles of human nature, describing them as the “great guide of life” and essential to human affairs. The aim of this paper is to explore the role custom and habit play in Hume’s work, especially as it concerns his political philosophy and experimental method, while considering intersections with contemporary discussions in political science.

In his autobiography, David Hume famously noted that A Treatise of Human Nature “fell dead-born from the press.” Yet it is now widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works written in the English language. Within, Hume offers an empirically informed account of human nature, addressing a range of topics such as space, time, causality, the external world, personal identity, passions, freedom, necessity, virtue, and vice. This edition includes not only the full text of the Treatise but also Hume’s summarizing Abstract, as well as selections drawn from critical book reviews which showcase the work’s reception in Hume’s own time. Angela Coventry’s expert introduction and annotations serve to contextualize the book’s themes and arguments for modern readers.

The Humean Mind aims to be the most comprehensive anthology available on Hume’s thought with essays spanning the full scope of Hume’s philosophy, as well as placing Hume in his own time and tracing his impact on the field from the 18th century up until today. Our goal is to represent the Humean mind’s place in the philosophical tradition and in contemporary philosophy. It covers all of the major topics on Hume, showcases the latest trends in Hume scholarship, and reflects how current research continues to take inspiration from Hume.

This paper is about Hume on the impact of space and time on probability judgements and the passions. Hume's approach to probability judgements in space-time may be considered a precursor to recent work on the cognitive psychology of decision-making. When it comes to the passions, Hume’s observations on the effect of distance in time in particular can be compared to discussions of temporal discounting, central in disciplines such as behavioral economics, neuroscience, psychology, environmental policy, and recent debates in experimental psychology and philosophy over future bias.

Hume’s account of the origin and nature of our ideas of space and time is generally thought to be the least satisfactory part of his empiricist system of philosophy. The main reason is internal in that the account is judged to be inconsistent with Hume’s fundamental principle for the relationship between senses and cognition, the copy principle. This paper defends Hume against the inconsistency objection by offering a new systematic interpretation of Hume on space and time and illuminating more generally the role of the copy principle in his philosophy. Humes Theorie des Wesens und des Ursprungs unserer Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit wird generell zu den am wenigsten befriedigenden Teilen seiner empiristischen Philosophie gezählt. Der Hauptgrund dafür ist werkimmanent: Die Raum- Zeit-Theorie einerseits und Humes „copy principle“ andererseits – d.h. dasjenige Fundamental-Prinzip, das die Relation zwischen unseren Sinnen und unserem Denken regelt – werden als miteinander inkonsistent erachtet. Dieser Beitrag bietet eine neue, systematische Interpretation der Raum-Zeit-Lehre Humes und eine umfassendere Darstellung der Rolle des „copy principles“ in seiner Philosophie an. Auf diese Weise wird Hume gegen den Vorwurf der Inkonsistenz verteidigt.