Angelica Mezzadri

This paper fills a gap in the existing metaphilosophical research on paradoxes byfocusing on the role of scenarios. Typical philosophical paradoxes contain a scenariodescription whose contribution to paradoxes remains unexplored. I argue that sce-narios are examples or instantiations of the abstract schema of paradoxes. As such,scenarios contribute to paradoxes on two levels. First, they make the argument moreconcrete, thus enhancing the dialectical force of paradoxes and facilitating their under-standing, especially for non-experts. This function is external to the paradox itself, buthas important practical implications for the use of paradoxes and their effect on philo-sophical debates, and it contributes to explaining why philosophical paradoxes areusually introduced by a scenario. Second, and more crucially, scenarios are essentialto the epistemic dimension of paradoxes. By definition, paradoxes have two neces-sary components: the argumentative structure and the plausibility/implausibility ofthe premises/conclusion. By providing examples of the abstract schema, scenarioscontribute to making the premises plausible. In particular, scenarios are the source ofplausibility and justification for those premises that contain an empirically groundedassertion of existence. Examples of such paradoxes are the Sorites paradox, the Lot-tery paradox, and the Grue paradox. Contrary to the dialectical role, the epistemicfunction of scenarios is indispensable, as it connects paradoxes to the real world andunderscores their significance in specific debates.