Anh-Quân Nguyen

In the face of a worsening climate crisis that continues to be neglected by governments, the climate movement faces major challenges. Many climate activists see civil disobedience as their moral duty to stop the climate crisis, while some activists and philosophers suggest that civil disobedience must be abandoned, and that violence must be included as a method (Malm 2021, Arridge 2023). This article explores this debate in a new way: How much can climate activism demand? Which forms of action are particularly morally demanding for individuals and groups? And at what point is climate activism morally overdemanding? Drawing on classic debates about moral overdemandingness, I show that civil disobedience, as practiced by climate groups such as Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil, can be both psychologically and physically overdemanding (Hooker 2009), integrity-violating and self-alienating (Williams 1973, Railton 1984), as well as unfair (Murphy 2003). However, I also show that moral overdemandingness can also occur within a duty to escalate the climate movement’s methods in a way that includes violence, which, given that most climate activists are pacifists, can corrupt the identity of the climate movement.

This paper explains the current disorientation climate activists, climate scientists and others struggling against climate breakdown as a loss of moral concepts. The climate movement's moral concepts are gradually becoming unintelligible, even if still used in moral deliberation with others. The paper articulates this loss of moral concepts by (1) showing a loss of embeddedness in moral practice, causing climate activists to be disoriented, and (2) a loss of comprehension through a narrowing of their moral horizons due to the climate crisis limiting the scope of their moral concepts. The paper argues that one way to escape this loss, the path of radical hope, is unavailable to climate activists and scientists, or anyone struggling against climate breakdown.

Both within the climate movement and in academic circles, it has become common advice to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis is the opposite of hope and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference. As our actions do make a difference, despair is not a fitting response to climate change). Further, we have pragmatic reasons to avoid despair as it leads to apathy and inaction about climate change. This chapter argues that despair is a rationally apt response to the climate crisis. Despair is a fitting response to the structural features of the climate crisis in terms of fragmentation of agency, making despair an accurate representation of a situation lacking agency. Despair is an important source of moral knowledge about the structure of the climate crisis, which is not automatically outweighed by pragmatic reasons and demanding to avoid despair can lead to affective injustice. The chapter closes with considerations of whether despair really does hinder moral imagination.

Joel’s choice to forgo a potential cure for the Cordyceps infection at the cost of Ellie’s life is the key moral decision the narrative in The Last of Us builds up to. The moment forces players/viewers to reflect on the responsibilities of love and care, on what we owe each other, and whether the world is still worth saving. I argue that we miss the moral depth of his decision if we don’t view it through the lens of philosophical pessimism. Philosophical pessimism does not necessarily ask us to expect the worst outcome. Instead, pessimist philosophers ask us to take seriously that for many, life is often not worth living due to pain and suffering (Van der Lugt 2021) and that we should reject false hope and narratives of progress, and learn to expect nothing (Dienstag 2006). Both the former value-oriented pessimism and the latter future-oriented pessimism allow us to situate Joel’s choice as a rejection of philosophical optimism that retains a false hope in the world of the Last of Us, choosing to protect Ellie from suffering instead. I first focus on value-oriented pessimism and whether humanity is worth saving. In the games, the narrative guides us through a world that has fallen not only to fungal infection, but also to authoritarianism, cannibalism s, cults and a general inhumanity of human survivors. The TV series (while also showing these) carefully departs from the games, contrasting these barbarisms with hints of meaningful life beyond mere survival (Bill & Frank, Jacksonville commune). This provides a differing moral background to Joel’s choice: In the games, Joel’s choice can be read as a pessimist evaluation of humanity having lost not only against Cordyceps but also in the struggle for a meaningful human existence not just based on survival. Based on this, Joel decides that humanity is less worth aving than Ellie, who he sees as something more than a means to survive in a world fallen to barbarism. In the TV series, this choice is more nuanced, given that Joel encounters meaningful existence several times in his journey with Ellie, and may not warrant a pessimistic conclusion to the same extend. Related to this, in terms of future-oriented pessimism, Joel’s choice can be seen as a rejection of a narrative of false hope: The Fireflies’ rely on a cure as a solution not only to Cordyceps but as a means to human redemption. However, with the backdrop of humanity already having lost itself, one can see the Fireflies’ hope for a cure as a desperate means to salvation – one that Joel rejects as he learned to not expect anything in a world that defies expectation. Overall, pessimism provides an ethics that can contextualise Joel’s choice not only as an act of care for Ellie, but as a rejection of a hope that has long faded from humanities horizon, acting to preserve of what humanity still has left.

Should climate activists be optimistic or pessimistic about the climate crisis and their efforts to confront it? This paper analyses common narratives in the climate movement through the lens of the philosophical traditions of optimism and pessimism, arguing for three points. Firstly, most dominant narratives within the climate movement resemble philosophical optimism through their commitment to political progress and inherent value of climate action. Secondly, optimistic narratives within the climate movement should be rejected, as climate optimism places an overwhelming mental burden on climate activists and drives the climate movement towards bad responses to the inefficacy problem. Finally, the paper sketches pessimism as a better framework that can act as a moral source for climate activists.

Philosoph:innen versuchen zunehmend zu erklären, warum die Struktur unseres Lebens normativ bedeutsam ist. Eine beliebte Erklärung, die von Dorsey (2015), Rosati (2013), Glasgow (2013), Kauppinnen (2012) und Velleman (1991) vertreten wird, ist die Narrativitäts-These: Was der Struktur unseres Lebens normative Bedeutung verleiht, sind die narrativen Relationen zwischen Lebensabschnitten, die verschiedene Teile des Lebens einer Person zu etwas Sinnhaftem verbinden. Sie fügen einem Leben einen Wert hinzu, der nicht auf momentanes Wohlbefinden reduziert werden kann. Da die narrative Lebensstruktur normative Bedeutung hat, ist ein Leben mit narrativen Relationen wertvoller als ein Leben ohne diese Beziehungen, da es mehr Sinnhaftigkeit erlangt. Mit anderen Worten: Unter sonst gleichen Bedingungen sollten wir unser Leben als Geschichte leben. In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass die Narrativitäts-These falsch ist. Weder ist ein Leben besser, wenn es eine Geschichte erzählt, noch müssen wir unser Leben als eine Geschichte leben. Ich zeige drei Fälle, in denen wir intuitiv nicht der Narrativitäts-These folgen sollten, und gebe anschließend eine systematische Erklärung, warum narrative Beziehungen zwischen Lebensabschnitten normativ nicht bedeutsam sind: Es ist rational, uns von unserer Vergangenheit abzukoppeln und vergangenen Ereignissen und Lebensabschnitten keine normative Bedeutung beizumessen. Ich schließe mit einer Diskussion über Verdrängung und narrative Fehlschlüsse über wichtige Teile unserer Vergangenheit und wie wir uns vor beidem schützen können.

Proponents of temporal neutrality have challenged the intuitive appeal of future-bias: The intuitive appeal of future-bias is limited to a set of isolated cases that involve only hedonic and self-regarding goods and harms. They suggest that we should treat future-bias as irrational in self-regarding hedonic cases too, or at least not treat the intuitive appeal as evidence for future-bias's permissibility, since hedonic and non-hedonic cases are relevantly similar. This paper defends the rationality of future-bias against this concern. Firstly, hedonic goods and harms mostly concern well-being at a time, while the proposed non-hedonic goods concern lifetime goodness. This is a relevant structural difference between hedonic and non-hedonic goods and harms that warrant different attitude patterns, including the applicability of future-bias. Secondly, the degree of idealisation required to make intuitions favour temporal neutrality obscures the weight of intuitions to a level that makes it unreliable as evidence against the permissibility of future-bias. As temporal neutralists need this degree of idealisation of their cases, the argument fails. In summary, we can keep using intuitive support as evidence for future-bias's rationality, at least when it comes to hedonic goods, but to some extent for its general permissibility.