Aníbal M. Astobiza

Los recientes avances en neurociencia, y en las ciencias de la vida en general, han hecho posible no solo tratar y restaurar las funciones dañadas, sino la posibilidad de algún día mejorar las funciones en la población saludable. Las amplias aplicaciones de la biotecnología y medicación farmacológica se dirigen a los mecanismos próximos que se consideran deficitarios en los pacientes. Recientemente, se ha mostrado como algunas de estas medicaciones pueden afectar comportamientos complejos humanos, como la moral en personas saludables, lo cual abre la puerta para un entendimiento más profundo de la naturaleza humana. ¿Hasta que punto es éticamente permisible alterar la neuroquímica o modular una región cerebral para intervenir en el comportamiento moral?, ¿es intrínsecamente malo la biomejora moral?, ¿cómo podemos conocer los efectos adversos y cómo sopesarlos en un análisis coste/beneficio de una intervención?, ¿la biomejora moral supone una amenaza a la libertad? Considerando dos posturas opuestas, DeGrazia y Harris, sobre los retos éticos de la biomejora moral se sugiere que si los principios tradicionales de la bioética como la seguridad, efectividad y universalidad se cumplen no hay nada malo en la biomejora moral per se y, por consiguiente, es éticamente permisible.

Anna Smajdor’s proposal of whole body gestational donation (WBGD) states that female patients diagnosed as brain-dead should be considered for use as gestational donors. In this response, Smajdor’s proposal is rejected on four different accounts: (a) the debated acceptability of surrogacy despite women's autonomy, (b) the harm to dead women ́s interests, (c) the interests of the descendants, and (d) the symbolic value of the body and interests of relatives. The first part argues that WBGD rests on a particular conception of the instrumentalization of bodies that cannot be circumvented simply by the patient’s consent and relinquished autonomy. The second part argues the importance of avoiding any harm to dead women’s interests. The third part identifies the importance of the interest of the foetus in the light of Procreative-Beneficence principle that Smajdor overlooks. And finally, the fourth part considers the symbolic value of the human body and the interest of relatives. The main goal of this commentary is not to show that WBGD cannot be implemented; rather, it is to show that there are not any good arguments in favour of doing so.

Durante muchos años las enfermedades mentales han sido vetadas del análisis filosófico. Afortunadamente, las modas filosóficas y el interés académico hoy ha cambiado y reconocen la importancia de la enfermedad mental (como paradigma de la disrupción mental) para el estudio del funcionamiento normal de la mente. Por esta razón, cualquier teoría contemporánea en filosofía de la mente debe tener en consideración una imagen detallada de lo que significa la parcial o total disolución de la mente. En este escrito, revisamos el aparato conceptual básico usado hasta la fecha por los filósofos para analizar y comprender las psicopatologías.…

The development of assistive robotics and anthropomorphic AI allows machines to increasingly enter into the daily lives of human beings and gradually become part of their lives. Robots have made a strong entry in the field of assistive behaviour. In this chapter, we will ask to what extent technology can satisfy people’s personal needs and desires as compared to human agents in the field of care. The industry of assistive technology burst out of the gate at the beginning of the century with very strong innovation and development and is currently attracting large sources of public and private investment and public attention. We believe that a better-defined and more fundamental philosophical-ethical analysis of the values at stake in care robots is needed. To this end, we will focus on the current status of care robots (types of care robots, their functioning and their design) and we will provide a philosophical-ethical analysis that offers a solid framework for the debate surrounding the potential risks and benefits of implementing assistive robots in people’s daily lives.

Los recientes avances en neurociencia, y en las ciencias de la vida en general, han hecho posible no solo tratar y restaurar las funciones dañadas, sino la posibilidad de algún día mejorar las funciones en la población saludable. Las amplias aplicaciones de la biotecnología y medicación farmacológica se dirigen a los mecanismos próximos que se consideran deficitarios en los pacientes. Recientemente, se ha mostrado como algunas de estas medicaciones pueden afectar comportamientos complejos humanos, como la moral en personas saludables, lo cual abre la puerta para un entendimiento más profundo de la naturaleza humana. ¿Hasta que punto es éticamente permisible alterar la neuroquímica o modular una región cerebral para intervenir en el comportamiento moral?, ¿es intrínsecamente malo la biomejora moral?, ¿cómo podemos conocer los efectos adversos y cómo sopesarlos en un análisis coste/beneficio de una intervención?, ¿la biomejora moral supone una amenaza a la libertad? Considerando dos posturas opuestas, DeGrazia y Harris, sobre los retos éticos de la biomejora moral se sugiere que si los principios tradicionales de la bioética como la seguridad, efectividad y universalidad se cumplen no hay nada malo en la biomejora moral per se y, por consiguiente, es éticamente permisible.

The natural-artificial distinction is not only an abstract metaphysical question dedicated to classifying and differentiating between entities and phenomena that occur in nature from man-made objects. The distinction between the natural and the artificial is central to the philosophy of technology and an interesting heuristic to discuss important notions about the growing process of technologization in sport. For example, if one accepts the natural-artificial distinction, one is against any genetic intervention to improve sports performance because one would consider it unnatural. In this article, I present an argument against the natural-artificial distinction and defend the ethical permissibility of the technologization of sport.

Bioethicists involved in end‐of‐life debates routinely distinguish between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’. Meanwhile, previous work in cognitive science has revealed that when people characterize behaviour as either actively ‘doing’ or passively ‘allowing’, they do so not purely on descriptive grounds, but also as a function of the behaviour’s perceived morality. In the present report, we extend this line of research by examining how medical students and professionals (N = 184) and laypeople (N = 122) describe physicians’ behaviour in end‐of‐life scenarios. We show that the distinction between ‘ending’ a patient’s life and ‘allowing’ it to end arises from morally motivated causal selection. That is, when a patient wishes to die, her illness is treated as the cause of death and the doctor is seen as merely allowing her life to end. In contrast, when a patient does not wish to die, the doctor’s behaviour is treated as the cause of death and, consequently, the doctor is described as ending the patient’s life. This effect emerged regardless of whether the doctor’s behaviour was omissive (as in withholding treatment) or commissive (as in applying a lethal injection). In other words, patient consent shapes causal selection in end‐of‐life situations, and in turn determines whether physicians are seen as ‘killing’ patients, or merely as ‘enabling’ their death.

Frente a una narrativa distópica presente en los medios de comunicación y cultura popular que caracteriza el avance y desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial como una amenaza o riesgo existencial (e.g. desempleo tecnológico, sistemas de armas autónomas letales, robots asesinos, propaganda política computacional etc.) quiero valorar de manera crítica y constructiva el rol de la inteligencia artificial para el bien común (AI4SG). La tecnología digital también se puede aplicar para la solución de grandes problemas de la humanidad, como los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible y sus 169 metas de la agenda 2030. En este artículo, comentaré distintos casos de uso y aplicación de la inteligencia artificial y la robótica encaminados a conseguir los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible y qué principios éticos deben guiar su aplicación para que la inteligencia artificial consiga la ambiciosa agenda 2030. También comentaré el plan de acción de España y la estrategia nacional para cumplir la agenda 2030 y de qué manera incorpora las TIC.

Three interdependent factors are behind the current Covid-19 pandemic distorted narrative: (1) science´s culture of “publish or perish”, (2) misinformation spread by traditional media and social digital media and (3) distrust of technology for tracing contacts and its privacy-related issues. In this short paper, I wish to tackle how these three factors have added up to give rise to a negative public understanding of science in times of a health crisis, such as the current Covid-19 pandemic and finally, how to confront all these problems.

El uso de la tecnología para la creación artística ha sido recurrente a lo largo de la historia del arte. Artistas de todas las épocas han utilizado la tecnología como herramienta para nuevas formas de expresión. En este artículo, quiero diferenciar dos usos de la tecnología para ayudar a la creación artística: a) uso aumentativo y b) uso sustitutivo. Defiendo la idea de que la mayor parte de la relación histórica entre arte y tecnología ha sido enmarcada dentro de un uso aumentativo, es decir, la tecnología ha ayudado a los artistas en la creación, producción y distribución de su arte. Sin embargo, las tecnologías digitales (TICs) y en concreto el uso de sistemas de Inteligencia Artificial (IA) y algoritmos están provocando un cambio de paradigma de un uso aumentativo hacia un uso sustitutivo. El uso sustitutivo de ciertas tecnologías -sistemas de IA y algoritmos- supone una transformación radical en la naturaleza del arte, su valor y el papel del artista. Ahora, sistemas de IA y algoritmos pueden pintar, componer música y escribir textos de manera no-supervisada. En otras palabras, la creatividad o la creación de arte se pueden automatizar. Dicho esto, quiero reflexionar sobre las implicaciones filosóficas del progresivo uso sustitutivo de la tecnología en el arte para explorar cuestiones como: ¿Las maquinas pueden crear arte?, ¿Es posible hablar de creatividad de las máquinas?, ¿Puede una máquina exigir derechos de autor o propiedad intelectual de una obra?

To assess—from a qualitative perspective—the perceptions and attitudes of Spanish rehabilitation professionals (e.g. rehabilitation doctors, speech therapists, physical therapists) about Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology. A qualitative, exploratory and descriptive study was carried out by means of interviews and analysis of textual content with mixed generation of categories and segmentation into frequency of topics. We present the results of three in-depth interviews that were conducted with Spanish speaking individuals who had previously completed a survey as part of a larger, 3-country/language, survey on BCI perceptions. 11 out of 15 of these Spanish respondents (survey) either strongly or somewhat accept the use of BCI in rehabilitation therapy. However, the results of our three in-depth interviews show how, due to a strong inertia of attitudes and perceptions about BCI technology, most professionals feel reluctant to use BCI technology in their daily practice (interview).

In this paper, we present a comprehensive case study analysis of a specific legal order issued by the Court of First Instance Number 6 of Santiago de Compostela on March 21, 2023. The focal point of the case study is the utilization of Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT), a specific neurotechnology, in an emergency clinical situation. The objective of this article is to examine the legal and bioethical dimensions surrounding the use of ECT, shedding light on the ethical implications and decision‐making processes involved in such cases. The analysis delves into the legal aspects of the case, considering relevant laws and regulations governing the use of ECT. The examination includes an exploration of the court's interpretation of the legal framework within the context of emergency situations, highlighting the specific legal arguments presented in the court judgment. Additionally, the article provides an in‐depth bioethical analysis, exploring the ethical principles that come into play when making decisions about ECT in emergency clinical scenarios. The examination considers the delicate balance between respecting patient autonomy and promoting beneficence, while also addressing potential harms and adverse effects associated with ECT. We also consider the moral issues created by the court judgment, specifically those involving patient autonomy and the invasive nature of the process, particularly in cases of mental illness.

In this article, I explored the application of large language models (LLMs) in analysing linguistic colexification and ambiguity within bioethical scenarios. By employing word embeddings derived from LLMs, I constructed semantic distance matrices that provide insight into the relationships between key terms in bioethical vignettes. These matrices were used to quantify and visualize the degree of linguistic ambiguity and specificity across different versions of each vignette—those with high colexification (ambiguous language) and those with low colexification (specific language). The approach taken involves encoding words according to their semantic adjacency and representing these relationships geometrically through distance matrices. The resulting matrices reflect the nuanced differences in how concepts are related within bioethical contexts, offering a quantitative method for analysing language use. The study demonstrates that LLMs, by facilitating geometric representations of language, can enhance our understanding of complex ethical dilemmas by systematically addressing linguistic ambiguity. Ultimately, this research contributes to the field of bioethics by providing a computational approach to improving clarity in ethical communication, highlighting the potential of LLMs to inform both ethical decision-making and discourse analysis. LLMs, while not capable of performing speech acts in the full philosophical sense—as human beings do—still serve as powerful tools to analyse and understand bioethical language. This distinction—between performing speech acts and analysing their linguistic features—highlights the unique contribution of LLMs as analytical tools rather than ethical agents.

This chapter presents a philosophical and ethical exploration of death in the digital age. It applies an epistemological and normative approach to investigate the changing social mores surrounding loss and bereavement in the presence of digital technology. Every aspect of human social life, including death, has been changed by the presence of digital technology. The relationship between the living and death is not the same as a result of digital technologies. Understanding how digital technologies transform our understanding of death can help people have a more practical knowledge of how to deal with death and grief in our modern technological societies.

En este artículo exploramos la naturaleza relacional de la confianza en los sistemas de inteligencia artificial aplicados al ámbito médico. Frente a los enfoques que tienden a localizar la confianza en propiedades individuales —ya sea del sujeto que confía o del objeto en quien se confía—, proponemos comprenderla como un fenómeno emergente que solo puede desplegarse plenamente en la interacción entre humanos y tecnologías. Analizamos críticamente algunos de los conceptos clave del debate actual —como la responsabilidad, la rendición de cuentas, el antropomorfismo y la alineación de valores—, mostrando que todos ellos resisten ser atribuidos unívocamente a uno de los polos de la relación. Sostenemos que una comprensión adecuada de estos constructos exige situarlos en una perspectiva relacional, donde la confianza no se deriva simplemente de cualidades técnicas o actitudes subjetivas, sino de estructuras compartidas de sentido, prácticas de corresponsabilidad y marcos institucionales adecuados. Este enfoque permite afrontar con mayor precisión los desafíos éticos de la IA médica y orienta el diseño de sistemas que no solo sean eficientes, sino también dignos de confianza en un sentido robusto.

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare is growing quickly and offers big improvements in medical diagnostics, treatment planning, and patient care. However, people often don’t trust AI systems, which prevents them from being widely used. This article looks at both the philosophical and practical issues of trust in healthcare AI systems. First, we provide an overview of the current state of AI in healthcare. Then, we review existing research on trust in technology. Based on our findings, we identify three main factors that affect trust in AI: Technology-Related Factors (transparency, reliability, safety), Healthcare Context Factors (how well AI fits into healthcare settings, proper training for professionals), and Individual User Factors (user experience and attitudes toward AI). Our results show that continuous human oversight, strong regulations, and ethical considerations are essential. Addressing these areas is key to making sure AI systems in healthcare are reliable, transparent, and trusted by both healthcare professionals and patients.