Anish Chakravarty

What separates living things or more specifically Human beings from other things is the ability to do certain activities with an intention and to be conscious of what they do. This is why these other things are called dead or non living. This distinction between the living and the dead is of great philosophical interest. Humans are sentient, i.e. they are aware of what they do and what happens around them. By around I mean the surroundings and observance of nature which Humans as a spectator do. And this includes all the natural things as well as living things including plants, animals, insects etc. What separates Humans from others, for there do seems a difference between objects such as a rock table etc, organisms which includes animals, plants etc and Human beings on the one hand and my self. The point here is to understand and explore this distinction between the living and the dead. Or if I be more specific, the special feature or quality in Humans that separates them from every other thing in this nature, so what it is to be self and to be alive and how it is different from another thing which may not be alive? How are they different from each other? For if we fail to give an answer or reason for why we think like this, then though despite of noticing this distinction, we will fail to take it as a knowledge claim, and perhaps might just end up taking it to be like a folk psychological view. In the hope of describing such confused matters carefully and clearly, an attempt is bestowed in the form of conversation between two persons in order to deal with the philosophy of simplicity, where the first mind or character Q, due to his curiosity and desire to know is unaware and the other person P, whose basis of knowledge is his simple is a disciple of life as proposed by the other self. Here the oblivious person due to his unknowingness is inquisitive and thus he can only find solutions of his doubts by either asking these queries to himself or to any other being. On the other hand, the other person, who is also desperate knowledge seeker, plays a role of learned for the time being, yet they may change their roles at times and this is agreed by the acceptance of both the persons. A major thing pertains from the nature of both these fictitious characters, and that is the importance of questioning in our lives. Questioning is normally a verbal act which is probably used to collect an amount of data to clear your doubts. Questions are addressed in two ways, firstly to the self and secondly, by to people other than you. Both Q and P follow both the ways, however, generally, it is considered that a person involved into self-questioning is deeper by nature. But this is only true and such a situation arises only, when one really accepts or knows that he is aware of something. Greek philosopher Socrates (469-399 B.C.) always questioned others in order to reach understanding. This was because he firmly felt that he knows nothing so how can he obtain his answers by questioning himself. However, in my opinion for the refinement and to increase the range of mind, one has to contemplate and hence has to reason, which is the cause of questioning. Therefore, in addition to the contemplation, both the characters follow that a query shall be put-forwarded to both, i.e., to themselves as well as to others.

During the Post Vedic period, the ascetic tradtion of the Śramaṇa which comprosed of various sects and their particular philosophies emerged as a form of a movement against orthodoxy in ancient India. Śramaṇas were wanderers who lived a retired life and focussed in seeking truth and emancipation if there was any. The paper explores the tradition and discusses the orientation of the various denominations that existed at the time within the Śramaṇa movement. The paper attempts to compare and show relationship between the Śramaṇa and the Brāhamanas. Brāhmanas were people who adhered to the Vedic knowledge and paid importance in performing social, monetary and everyday life duties. The major concern of the paper is to present Ajñānavāda as a unique school within the Śramaṇa tradition in terms of their philosophical approach. The paper focusses on the Ajñāna thinker Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, and shows how the appraoch taken by him went at that time beyond the philosophies of the Śramaṇas and the Brāhamanas.

This paper aims at an analytical explanation of the distinctive nature of music, as it has been formulated in perhaps one of the world's very first works on the subject, namely the ‘Sangeet Ratnakar’ of Pandit Sarangadeva, a 13th century musicologist of India. He, in the first chapter of the work defines music ('sangeet' in Sanskrit and Hindi) as a composite of singing or 'Gita', instrumental music or 'vadan' and dancing or ‘nrittam’. In addition, he also holds singing to be the most important component of music. These two ideas are not only unquestionably acceptable , as the analysis in the paper will show, but give to Indian music , in its difference from western music, its distinctively spiritual character, making it a path to liberation or Moksha (Muktidayakam na tu ranjakam). Sarangadeva's reason, here, is not rational but empirico-inductive. It is that mainly by virtue of its 'gitam’ (singing component), which, like the Yoga system of exercise, needing only one's body as its instrument, music too needing only one’s voice is as self-sufficient and autonomous as the ultimate Reality itself (Swayamev Rajate). In the hierarchy (a distinctively ancient Indian insistence) of arts, singing is the highest and unique because in spite of being heard by the auditory sense, it affects our 'reflective sensibility' and transports us to the virtual world of melodic and rhythmic forms. Forms, as against their particular illustrations, are abstract universals. Ultimate Reality is also a Form-all comprehensive and internally harmonious. However, pure Form, whether melodic or religious or even rational like that of triangularity, is almost impossible to concentrate on. Realizing this practical difficulty, Indian scriptures and the world's first Grammarian-linguist, Acharya Panini, framed a composite sound as the manifestation of the ultimate musical Form. This purely formal-because devoid of all meaning, sound is that of 'om', spelt, in Sanskrit as a conjunction (sandhi) of 'a'+'u'+'m'. For Indian musicologists and musicians, ‘om’ is the perfect manifestation of the Sound-God or ‘Nada-Brahman’ because, 1. Its composite nature resembles God, as a harmony of 'sat', 'chit', and 'ananda'; and 2. The composite sound is self-existent as its all three components-two vowels, i.e. ‘a’, ‘u’, and one consonant i.e. ‘m’, can be and are pronounced just as they originally are, -un-elongated and un-vitiated and therefore pure. This is the reason why every recital of Indian classical vocal music is begun with an elaborate rendering of 'om' as an invocation to Sound-God or ‘Nada-Brahman’. Scholarly and authentic, this ancient Indian approach to music, is undoubtedly the earliest and original. My observation is that its main contentions like Sharang Dev’s insistence that of the three components of music, ‘gitam’ or singing is the highest, have only been translated and never argued for. In this presentation my good intention is to provide much needed rational support for making these key statements in this unparalleled Indian text, indubitable and unquestionable.

This chapter aims to examine parallels between two ancient Indian philosophical schools, Jaina (Jainism) of Mahāvīra and Ajñāna (Unending Agnosticism) of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta. Jaina and Ajñāna traditions were a part of the Non-Vedic larger Śramaṇa movement of seventh to sixth-century BCE India, where Śramaṇa were monastics, who dwelled in forests and lived a retired life, focussing themselves in the search of discovering the knowledge of truth, reality and existence. Sañjaya and Mahāvīra were contemporaries and were a prominent and well-known Śramaṇa of their time. The chapter is broadly divided into two parts, with two sections each. The first part aims to discuss Sañjaya’s ajñānavāda (epistemological method) and Mahāvīra’s doctrine of anekāntavāda (metaphysical pluralism) and saptabhanginaya (sevenfold predication). The second part aims to explore the logical relationship and similarities between ajñānavāda and anekāntavāda and its metaphysical consequences, and conclusively the major part of the paper will discuss the claim first made by the German Jaina scholar Hermann Jacobi, about the possible influence that Sañjaya’s ajñānavāda had on the establishment of Mahāvīra’s anekāntavāda. In brief, the chapter intends to present and discuss the contemporary scholarship claims on Sañjaya and his possible influence it had on the development of the Jaina thought.

The title seems to suggest that God is neutral or indifferent to the universe that it permeates. Its neutrality being necessary for its immanence is acceptable but not its indifference. Following Spinoza’s monistic thinking we explore here the question as to how the ultimate reality, can or cannot be indifferent to its own self. Permeating the universe, God becomes a universal form or concept into which the human can imagine any version of thought-extension in accordance with the nature of his/her need. Indeed, Spinoza finds God formal it is the supreme substance which can and does inspire man’s polytheistic practices, as sustained by panentheistic faith. Moreover, for Spinoza relation between God and the universe is one of rational causality - God permeates the manifest universe, and the universe through its intelligibility illustrates God. The phrase in the title is not a denial of God’s desirability for man. Rather, it is a reaffirmation of God’s openness to the whole universe, by virtue of which it is one with Nature and vice versa. Each becomes explicable in terms of the other as both seep in rationality validating Spinoza’s ‘deus sive natura’.