Ann Cudd

Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it is fundamentally social and aims at understanding and molding all facets of human psychological life, game theory takes rationality to be essentially located in individuals and to concern only the means to achieve predetermined ends. Thus, there are some thinkers who have made important contributions to this history who do not appear in the story of game theory at all, among them, Plato, Kant, and Hegel. There is, however, a clear trail to follow linking theories of instrumental rationality from Aristotle to the nineteenth-century marginalist economists and ultimately to von Neumann and Morgenstern and contemporary game theorists, that historically grounds game theory as a model of rational interaction.

The dissertation examines the concept and current theory of common knowledge, with special emphasis on its significance for interaction. I begin by examining the rational choice theory of interaction more broadly, arguing for specific desiderata of the model. I then discuss the current rational choice model of interaction, which is non-cooperative game theory, and argue that common knowledge is an essential assumption on which game theoretic explanations of interaction hinge. Game theory's account of common knowledge, which stems from Lewis' Convention, is that common knowledge among rational agents involves a potentially infinite series of implicitly held mutual beliefs: we all know x, we all know that we know x, we all know that we know that we know x,$\...$ This account I call 'common knowledge*.' ;I advance two main objections to common knowledge*. First, common knowledge* cannot be 'bootstrapped.' That is, it always takes common knowledge* to get further common knowledge*. Second, I show that this account of common knowledge relies on the assumption, which I argue is untenable, that rationality entails common knowledge* of the possible states of the world. ;The theory of common knowledge developed by Lewis and the game theorists is attractive because it allows us to explain conventions and solutions to noncooperative games as individually rational. Furthermore, this model of interaction is a deductive model; one can deduce the rational course of action given the required inputs. However, without the common knowledge* assumption, the model can no longer be deductive. I also argue that a type of frame problem inevitably arises in a deductive model of interaction. I sketch an alternative, commonsense theory of common knowledge, which takes conventional behavior as primitive in explaining common knowledge, thus turning Lewis' view on its head. I tell a story to illustrate how the commonsense theory can be bootstrapped. I then suggest a program for building an inductive model of rational interaction.

In international law, ‘humanitarian intervention’ refers to the use of military force by one nation or group of nations to stop genocide or other gross human rights violations in another sovereign nation. If humanitarian intervention is conceived as military in nature, it makes sense that only the most horrible, massive, and violent violations of human rights can justify intervention. Yet, that leaves many serious evils beyond the scope of legal intervention. In particular, violations of women's rights and freedoms often go unchecked. To address this problem, I begin from two basic questions: When are violations of human rights sufficiently serious to require an international response of some sort? What should that response be? By re-orienting the aim and justification of international law to focus on individual autonomy rather than on peace between nations, I argue that women's rights violations other than genocide and mass rape can warrant intervention. Military intervention is often counter-productive to the aim of achieving autonomy, however. I suggest a range of responses to human rights violations that includes military intervention as one end of the spectrum, and combine this with a greater understanding of the scope of human rights violations that require international response.

Postcolonial feminist scholars have described some Western feminist activism as imperialistic, drawing a comparison to the work of Christian missionaries from the West, who aided in the project of colonization and assimilation of non-Western cultures to Western ideas and practices. This comparison challenges feminists who advocate global human rights ideals or objective appraisals of social practices, in effect charging them with neocolonialism. This essay defends work on behalf of universal human rights, while granting that activists should recognize their limitations in local cultural knowledge.

Margaret Crouch offers a balanced, comprehensive introduction to the philosophical, legal, and empirical issues surrounding the vexed topic of sexual harassment. The book is divided into two parts. The first discusses the competing conceptual schemes under which sexual harassment has been defined, the history of case law surrounding sexual harassment claims, and empirical measures of the extent and common beliefs about sexual harassment. The second part of the book treats philosophical and legal questions surrounding sexual harassment, and a concluding chapter offers some suggestions for a political solution to the controversies.

Postcolonial feminist scholars have described some Western feminist activism as imperialistic, drawing a comparison to the work of Christian missionaries from the West, who aided in the project of colonization and assimilation of non-Western cultures to Western ideas and practices. This comparison challenges feminists who advocate global human rights ideals or objective appraisals of social practices, in effect charging them with neocolonialism. This essay defends work on behalf of universal human rights, while granting that activists should recognize their limitations in local cultural knowledge.

This article discusses explanatory theories of normative concepts and argues for a set of criteria of adequacy by which such theories may be evaluated. The criteria offered fall into four categories: ontological, theoretical, pragmatic, and moral. After defending the criteria and discussing their relative weighting, this article uses them to prune the set of available explanatory theories of oppression. Functionalist theories, including Hegelian recognition theory and Foucauldian social theory, are rejected, as are psychoanalytic theory and social dominance theory. Finally, the article defends structural rational choice theory as the most promising methodology for explaining oppression. Key Words: oppression • explanation • rational choice theory.