Anna Brożek

Encyklopedia jest jednym z owoców kilkudziesięciu lat studiów nad Szkołą Lwowsko-Warszawską – formacją intelektualną wyjątkową w kulturze polskiej i ogólniej: europejskiej. Tomy I–II obejmują blisko 300 haseł poświęconych Kazimierzowi Twardowskiemu, a więc założycielowi Szkoły, wszystkim przedstawicielom jej pierwszej i drugiej, a także wybranym przedstawicielom trzeciej generacji dydaktycznej. Poszczególne hasła zawierają portrety, dane biograficzne omówionych postaci (oparte tam, gdzie to było możliwe, na dokumentach źródłowych), ogólną charakterystykę ich twórczości oraz (na ogół pełne) bibliografie przedmiotowe i podmiotowe.

This article examines the impact of World War II on the activity of the Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS), situating its wartime experience of the School’s members within the broader devastation suffered by Polish science and culture. It first outlines the condition of the School in the 1930s, before the outbreak of war, to contextualize subsequent losses. The paper then traces the human and institutional destruction inflicted on Polish scientific philosophy. Particular attention is given to the forms of resistance undertaken by Poles and the active role played by LWS members in civic and intellectual opposition. The central parts of the paper analyze the organization of clandestine education and the teaching activities of LWS philosophers during the occupation – first in Warsaw, then in Lwów and Wilno – alongside their scholarly output under wartime conditions. The article concludes with an assessment of underground education and a reflection on how the academic ethos of the LWS shaped the wartime conduct and intellectual resilience of its members.

The paper aimed to reconstruct Twardowski's approach to the problem of free will and his analyses of the consequences of various solutions to this problem in ethics and criminal law. According to Twardowski, if we understand ‘free will’ as the possibility of making resolutions other than actually made, then (most probably) nobody has free will. Our resolutions are determined by a set of mental dispositions (character) and incentives that activate these dispositions. However, the existence of freedom of will such understood is not a necessary condition for the correct functioning of ethical systems or criminal law. On the contrary, ethical systems and criminal law seem to assume that at least some of our resolutions are determined by our relatively stable dispositions. Only then can these resolutions and the actions that follow them be ascribed to certain agents. Twardowski's views on free will are presented here in the context of the metaphilosophical positions of the Lvov–Warsaw School, the central European branch of analytic philosophy. His position is also juxtaposed with Brentano's view of free will and Łukasiewicz's approach to the determinism/indeterminism debate. This juxtaposition illustrates the variety of philosophical positions and the diversity of the metaphilosophical toolkit applied in early analytic philosophy.

Kazimierz Twardowski – einer der berühmtesten Schüler des Philosophen Franz Brentano und Gründer der philosophischen Lemberg-Warschauer Schule – verbrachte die ersten 30 Jahre seines Lebens in Wien. In dem Buch wird die prägende Wiener Periode (1866 – 1895) rekonstruiert und dabei der Versuch unternommen, die kulturelle und intellektuelle Atmosphäre der Jugendjahre Twardowskis lebendig werden zu lassen. Ferner werden seine Arbeiten der Wiener Jahre analysiert und untersucht, welchen Einfluss sie auf die reife Philosophie Twardowskis hatten.

In this chapter, it is assumed that two kinds of relations are essential to any philosophical school. Firstly, there are interpersonal relations between members of the school, including teacher–student relations. Secondly, there are intertextual relations between elements of output the school, namely between problems, conceptual schemes, methods or theories accepted by various representatives. The chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the conceptual scheme for analysis of various types of interpersonal and intertextual relations is provided. It is claimed that contact between philosophers (oral or written, unilateral or bilateral) is a necessary but not sufficient element of influence of one philosopher on another. The influence takes place if the contact between philosophers results in some actions or convictions of one of them. The influence may be positive or negative. It is also the case that one may be more or less aware of being influenced by someone else. The second part of the chapter provides some examples of interpersonal and intertextual relations in the Lvov-Warsaw School. In particular, the contact between Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the school, and his direct students, is characterised. Further, some examples of Twardowski’s influence on the first generation of the LWS are given and the way that the influences were revealed is described. Also, the important characterological and theoretical differences between various Twardowski’s students are presented. In the conclusion a hypothesis is issued that the peculiarities of interpersonal and intertextual relations in the LWS are caused by Twardowski’s methodological attitude as well as his interdisciplinary approach to philosophical problems.

The paper aimed to reconstruct Twardowski's approach to the problem of free will and his analyses of the consequences of various solutions to this problem in ethics and criminal law. According to Twardowski, if we understand ‘free will’ as the possibility of making resolutions other than actually made, then (most probably) nobody has free will. Our resolutions are determined by a set of mental dispositions (character) and incentives that activate these dispositions. However, the existence of freedom of will such understood is not a necessary condition for the correct functioning of ethical systems or criminal law. On the contrary, ethical systems and criminal law seem to assume that at least some of our resolutions are determined by our relatively stable dispositions. Only then can these resolutions and the actions that follow them be ascribed to certain agents. Twardowski's views on free will are presented here in the context of the metaphilosophical positions of the Lvov–Warsaw School, the central European branch of analytic philosophy. His position is also juxtaposed with Brentano's view of free will and Łukasiewicz's approach to the determinism/indeterminism debate. This juxtaposition illustrates the variety of philosophical positions and the diversity of the metaphilosophical toolkit applied in early analytic philosophy.

Słownik języka polskiego PWN odnotowuje m.in. trzy znaczenia słowa „fenomen”: (1) rzadkie, niezwykłe zjawisko; (2) osoba wyjątkowa, niezwykle uzdolniona; (3) fakt empiryczny będący punktem wyjścia badań naukowych. W tytule nie chodzi o „fenomen” w sensie drugim, chociaż do Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej należało wiele osób wyjątkowych i niezwykle uzdolnionych, do których z powodzeniem można odnosić słowo „fenomen” w tym sensie. Tytułowy zwrot „Fenomen Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej” sygnalizuje natomiast, z jednej strony, że książka zdaje sprawę z badań naukowych nad pewnym złożonym „faktem empirycznym” – nad pewną formacją intelektualną wraz z jej dorobkiem. Z drugiej strony tytuł wskazuje na rzadkość i niezwykłość Szkoły: to, że była ona fenomenem nie tylko w dziejach Polski, lecz także w dziejach kultury in toto. Oto kilka faktów, które się na fenomen Szkoły – w tym drugim sensie – składają. Za początek Szkoły przyjmuje się rok 1895, kiedy jej założyciel, Kazimierz Twardowski, przybył z Wiednia do Lwowa i już wkrótce wypromował pierwszych doktorów. Wśród wychowanków (doktorantów) Twardowskiego było ponad dwudziestu przyszłych profesorów tytularnych, którzy w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym zajęli większość katedr filozofii, logiki i psychologii, ale oddziałali także na inne dyscypliny – takie jak literaturoznawstwo, muzykologia, filologia klasyczna etc. Twardowski zmarł w 1938 roku, a za koniec Szkoły niektórzy przyjmują rok 1939 – istotnie II wojna światowa spowodowała spustoszenie w szeregach przedstawicieli Szkoły, a jeszcze silniejszy cios stanowił dla niej okres stalinizmu. Jednakże Kilka wybitnych postaci Szkoły – takich jak Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąmbska, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Stefan Swieżawski czy Władysław Tatarkiewicz – działało jeszcze wiele lat po wojnie, wychowując kolejne pokolenia w duchu właściwego Szkole antyirracjonalizmu. Wielu spośród autorów tekstów do niniejszego tomu to przedstawiciele młodszych pokoleń Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej sensu largo. Spoiwem Szkoły był nie pewien zespół idei, który wyznawaliby jej członkowie, lecz pewne postulaty metodologiczne oraz pewien zestaw wartości, które były w Szkole akceptowane przez kolejne pokolenia. O tych postulatach metodologicznych i o tym zestawie wartości mówią szczegółowo autorzy tekstów tu zamieszczonych. Ogromnemu wpływowi Szkoły na kulturę polską towarzyszyła recepcja wyników osiąganych przez jej członków za granicą. Naszym „towarem eksportowym” była szeroko rozumiana logika (logiki wielowartościowe i metalogika Łukasiewicza, gramatyka kategorialna Ajdukiewicza, koncepcja prawdy Tarskiego). Wiele osiągnięć członków Szkoły w innych dziedzinach zagranica odkrywa dla siebie dopiero dziś i wyniki te budzą podziw u tych, którzy się z nimi stykają. Ideą stojącą za powstaniem „Fenomenu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej” była chęć ukazania Szkoły w jak najszerszej perspektywie, także przez pryzmat mniej znanych, choć ważnych postaci i osiągnięć. Ze wstępu Książkę można zamówić tutaj: https://ksiegarnia.academicon.pl/glowna/187-fenomen-szkoly-lwowsko-warszawskiej-miekka-oprawa--9788362475193.html.

Ajdukiewicz called his article Problemat idealizmu transcendentalnego w sformułowaniu semantycznym [The Semantic Version of Transcendental Idealism], published in “Przegląd Filozoficzny” in 1937, a “turning point” of his philosophical development. The aim of the paper is to present various aspects of this turn. Firstly, the historical and philosophical background of the 1937 paper is sketched. It includes the metaphilosophical position of the Lvov‑Warsaw School, and the development of methods applied in this group. Secondly, Ajdukiewicz’s ideas up to 1937 are outlined in order to present what the semantic turn consisted in. Next, the program of the semantic theory of knowledge is sketched, and the steps of Ajdukiewicz’s argumentation against transcendental idealism, with an emphasis on the use of metalogical and semantic results, are presented. Finally, Ajdukiewicz’s proposal is discussed from the methodological point of view.

It is hard to imagine our life without questions. They facilitate orientation in our environment, enable interpersonal communication and make the acquisition of knowledge possible. Questions direct scientific research, are used as research tools and are an important medium of transferring knowledge in teaching. The book is intended as a par excellence philosophical monograph of the theory of questions, presenting the most important erotetic problems, their general background and selected practical applications. It is prepared in all fairness to results acquired in the framework of the logical theories of questions but goes beyond this framework.

Problems of the philosophy of music may be divided into three domain: ontological, epistemological and axiological one. In the ontological domain, the ontological status of such objects as sounds and wholes composed of them, especially of musical compositions, is a leading problem. In the epistemological domain, the problem of how to obtain the adequate cognition of music plays a similar role. Finely, in the axiological domain, one finds the problem of what is the general value of musical composition which is based on partial values of different kinds as a crucial problem. In the paper, I analyze these problems from the point of view of traditional music and describe how the perspective changes if we take new music into considerations.

Let us assume that the expression A is a segment of the expression B. Now, let us assume that we try to transform the expression B into the expression B', removing A from B or replacing A with another expression, say A'. When shall we say that A is irremovable or occurs in B essentially? We shall do it, if we can neither remove A from B nor replace A with A', not influencing upon important properties of B. On the other hand, when shall we say that the occurrence A in B is essential? We shall do it, if we can transform B into B' changing no properties of B. Let us say it more precisely. Let us assume - as concerns expressions x, y, x' and y' - that: (a) x occurs in y; (b) the only structural difference between y and y' is that x does not occur in y', or x' occurs in y instead of x. Then: x occurs in y inessentially-with-respect-to-w of y, iff y' is the same as y with respect to p. Correspondingly: x occurs in y essentially-with-respect-to-w of y, iff y' is different as y with respect to p. The occurrence x in y may be essential or inessential with respect to syntactic, semantic or pragmatic properties of y. In my paper, I discuss a variety of detailed concepts of the (in)essential occurrence of expressions in another expressions with respect to semantic properties of these expressions, i.e. with respect to semantic category, logical value, denotation and connotation. I also discuss some philosophical and methodological implications of presented solutions of the problem.

The article contains the results of the analysis of concepts connected with semantic functions of names. The conception of Jacek Jadacki, exposed in his "Spór o granice jezyka" ("Controversy on the limits of language"), is the point of departure of this analysis. The following theses are formulated and argued for. (1) There are two basic semantic functions of names: the referential and the descriptive one. The first function consists in indicating some objects; the second one consists in ascribing properties to some objects. (2) The concepts of indicating and ascribing are primitive ones. (3) The referential function of denotation and the descriptive function of connotation are mutually independent. The term "connotation" can be defined without using the term "denotation" and vice versa. (4) Names perform not only the function of designating, i.e. referring to particular objects, but also the function of denominating, i.e. referring to universal ( resp. postulated) objects. (5) The connotation of a given name is genetically or conventionally connected with the pragmatic function of ascribing properties to respective objects. (6) In sciences, such connotations of names are sought after, which are, at the same time, essences of designates of these names.