Anna Donise

Contemporary reflection on the concept of value oscillates between positions that advocate absolutist realism and positions that propose total relativism. The present paper aims to distance itself from these two ways of reading the topic, rejecting any monolithic conception, and proposing a stratified theory of value. Beginning with an analysis of values that differentiates them from both “goods” and “valuations,” the author outlines an understanding of value that must be investigated in its multiple, interconnected layers. The stratification starts from the role of the emotional sphere and comes down to a formal and absolute conception of the concept. The goal of the paper is to outline the different levels of validity of each proposed layer, which must be recognized and differentiated, with the aim of also capturing the difficulties and ambiguities that characterize the transition from one level to another.

This essay aims to explore the notion that the preventive measures and restrictions imposed during the pandemic exposed a significant aspect of our vulnerability. The pressure to maintain distance from objects and people and recognize their potential threat compelled us to adopt the behaviors of those afflicted with delusions, such as end-of-the-world hallucinations. With the virus being invisible, we have been required to act as though it was always present, in a way akin to a collective delusion. Consequently, this shift in our everyday actions has caused collective psychological distress and evident existential anguish: mimicking madness leads to pathological experiences. While recognizing the importance of preventive measures, this paper argues for the necessity of raising cultural awareness to comprehend the source of these distressing experiences and incorporate them into a more comprehensive concept of community. In conclusion, the paper advocates for the acquisition of cultural understanding to enhance our ability to respond to crises in a way that considers the well-being of all members of our community.

Within a general approach that implies the closely related survey of neurosciences and philosophical thought, the essays collected in the volume develop two main lines of research. The first one, thanks to the contributions of scientists and psychologists , psychoanalysists and bioengineers , allows to fix the attention on the neurobiological, psychological, psychoanalytical and physical remembering. The second one, more specifically philosophical, is declined in three different approaches. the first - with essays by Stefania Achella, Giuseppe D'Anna and Rosario Diana - points to the anlysis of the role played by the rememberance and the prefiguration in the processes of identity construction. The second - with contributions from Fiorella Battaglia, Anna Donise, Sabine Marienberg and Sara Fortuna - focuses on the role of remembering in anthropology and linguistics, as well as the identification of certain diseases of memory. The third, finally - with contributions from Gabriella Baptist, Chiara de Luzenberger and Marco Boninu - tends to define the regulatory function of memory

The present essay analyses Jasper’s concept of “Gehäuse”. The Gehäuse, “cases” or “shells”, are the forms that define subjectivity, which we work very hard to construct. When the subject experiences change or development, though, the “shell” can become too rigid and suffocating, so the subject feels the need to get out of that form, at the risk of ending up like “an oyster without the shell”. In Jaspers’ perspective these “casings” are unavoidable and their dismissal is a question of “metamorphosis” rather than veritable “destruction”: as soon as one form is rejected, another one is constructed. This paper intends to show the positive value of the Gehäuse: they shape us and reveal us to ourselves and others. I will rethink one of the established categorical antinomies of existentialism: that between “authentic” and “inauthentic”. In particular, I will question the implicit axiology that comes with it.