Anna Georgiou

This paper is a philosophical analysis of educational justice in the formal learning of refugees in host countries. It particularly examines the way we can think about rights in regard to refugee education at the European and global level. The motivation for undertaking this analysis is the fact that the law fails to provide us with a comprehensive account of justice that corresponds to the needs of refugee students. Noticing the inadequacy of the legal approach in addressing refugee educational fairness, this paper draws on the philosophical tools of reasoning and argumentation to investigate i) what the rights of refugees in education are (‘what’ of justice), and ii) how to ensure processes to uphold such rights (‘how’ of justice). This is an under-researched issue, and for that, this study advances the knowledge in the field mainly on how to conceptualise refugee educational justice to foster methods of endorsing fair opportunities that combat the educational exclusion of refugee populations. The results provide evidence to suggest that an account of justice in refugee education appears to be multidimensional. Notably, it encompasses four dimensions: a) distributive, b) cultural, c) political, and d) overall healthcare (including both physical and mental health) justice. In achieving justice in refugee education, the factors of transformative redistribution, recognition, representation, and restoration schemes are encouraged in education policy.

Since the foundation of the Western modern university in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there has always been debate on the purpose and social or political utility of scientific knowledge. The question remains as to what we consider as ‘useful knowledge’ to be (Flexner, 1939; Gibbons et al., 1994). The purpose of this paper is to explore and propose an alternative conception of scientific knowledge usefulness, advocating for a balanced approach between direct and indirect utility of knowledge in higher education. To this end, the paper revisits Mill’s (1859) conception of epistemic utility as explained in his work On Liberty to present an idea of scientific knowledge usefulness which is utilitarian in a broader sense. Building on this foundation, the paper promotes a pluralistic conception of epistemic utility and suggests a typology by discerning between direct and indirect utility of knowledge. Overall, by revisiting Mill’s (1859) notion of utility, this paper aims to demonstrate that the notion of ‘utility’ is not only a function that serves the Idea of the University, but it is also linked to the notion of ‘self-development’—Bildung. In that sense, one can make the case for a broader and more complex scientific utilitarianism.

In an age of contested truths and rapid information circulation, epistemic authority has become increasingly fragile. This essay asks: how can epistemic authority be maintained ethically and effectively without reverting to coercion or technocracy? It argues for a “relational” and “performative” conception of epistemic authority grounded in trust, dialogue, and reciprocal recognition. To do this, the essay traces the theoretical foundations of epistemic authority and examines its erosion in contemporary crises. It then explores how authority is enacted through transparency, inclusivity, and relational trust. Attention is given to the historical, social, and technological contexts shaping contemporary knowledge practices. Finally, the discussion reframes expertise as an emergent, socially accountable practice, illuminating how epistemic authority can function more effectively under conditions of uncertainty.

In contemporary societies shaped by scientific advancement, economic rationalism, and market-driven education, the value of philosophy is frequently questioned, often dismissed as impractical or irrelevant. This paper examines the continuing significance of philosophy beyond narrowly instrumental considerations, drawing on Bertrand Russell’s (2001) work “The Value of Philosophy”, which defends the discipline as a source of the “goods of the mind”—intellectual cultivation, critical reflection, and secular spiritual enrichment. The central research question guiding this study is: “What is the value of philosophy in an age dominated by instrumental reasoning, and how does Russell’s account address or fall short of contemporary scepticism regarding the value, relevance, and practical significance of philosophy?” To answer this, the paper proceeds in two parts. First, it reconstructs Russell’s conception of philosophy, highlighting his distinction between the practical man, who values only material outcomes, and the contemplative man, who recognizes philosophy’s internal benefits. Second, it critically evaluates Russell’s account while developing an extended perspective that situates philosophy’s value in its broader capacity to cultivate a holistic worldview, foster normative reflection, and influence society through ethical, civic, and cultural engagement. The paper advances the thesis that philosophy’s significance extends beyond personal intellectual enrichment to include its contribution to societal understanding, ethical deliberation, and public life. Its enduring value lies in its capacity to cultivate the mind, integrate knowledge across domains, and foster critical reflection. In doing so, philosophy also challenges instrumentalist assumptions and informs collective reasoning and social action. By reconciling Russell’s insights with contemporary concerns about instrumentalism, this study demonstrates that philosophy remains a vital discipline, simultaneously enriching individual understanding and shaping the moral and intellectual orientation of society.