Anna Klieber

This chapter explores how deadnaming, the practice of calling a trans person by a name they have discarded, can be harmful. Using resources due to Ishani Maitra and Talia Mae Bettcher (and others), we argue that deadnaming functions to subordinate its targets. We explore how the practice can both cause and constitute this subordination, and argue that it often distinctively draws its ability to do so from broader societal transphobia. We enrich our view by highlighting some important differences between deadnaming and misgendering.

The widespread use of English in the field of philosophy facilitates international collaboration but may also pose significant challenges in understanding, analyzing, or producing information for both native (NES) and non-native English speakers (NNES). These challenges have not yet been systematically investigated. We conducted an international survey of philosophers (_N_ = 1,615), comparing NES and NNES, while controlling for their academic position (e.g., student, staff, etc.) and other relevant variables. Responses indicated that NNES needed up to twice as long as NES to read English articles and nearly twice as long to prepare English presentations. Additionally, even NNES with the highest English proficiency reported significantly more English manuscript rejections, greater avoidance of attending or asking questions at philosophy events in English, and more frequent feelings of ridicule for their English use. No statistically significant difference was observed in the reported time required to complete an English draft, but NNES tended to report shorter times, possibly reflecting greater reliance on external assistance to detect linguistic errors. Finally, while extensive use of English may help NNES overcome difficulties with English, 88% of NNES respondents reported that it also reduced their ability to discuss philosophy in their native language. This study provides the first systematic, quantitative evidence of English-related epistemic challenges that many NNES may face in philosophy, highlighting significant linguistic inequities.

The widespread use of English in the field of philosophy facilitates international collaboration but may also pose significant challenges in understanding, analyzing, or producing information for both native (NES) and non-native English speakers (NNES). These challenges have not yet been systematically investigated. We conducted an international survey of philosophers (N = 1,615), comparing NES and NNES, while controlling for their academic position (e.g., student, staff, etc.) and other relevant variables. Responses indicated that NNES needed up to twice as long as NES to read English articles and nearly twice as long to prepare English presentations. Additionally, even NNES with the highest English proficiency reported significantly more English manuscript rejections, greater avoidance of attending or asking questions at philosophy events in English, and more frequent feelings of ridicule for their English use. No statistically significant difference was observed in the reported time required to complete an English draft, but NNES tended to report shorter times, possibly reflecting greater reliance on external assistance to detect linguistic errors. Finally, while extensive use of English may help NNES overcome difficulties with English, 88% of NNES respondents reported that it also reduced their ability to discuss philosophy in their native language. This study provides the first systematic, quantitative evidence of English-related epistemic challenges that many NNES may face in philosophy, highlighting significant linguistic inequities.

In ‘Conversational Pressure. Normativity in Speech Exchanges’ (2020), Sanford Goldberg discusses the significance of conversational silence, arguing that, absent certain defeating conditions, we have a general entitlement to assume that somebody who remains silent in a conversation doesn't reject what was said. Call this ‘No‐Silent‐Rejection’ (NSR). I reconsider Goldberg's account of conversational silence by arguing that silence cannot be explained via a universal claim like NSR: I show that there are at least some examples where, absent defeating conditions, silence doesn't communicate assent—argue that my account of silent conversational implicature can meet and better capture the complexity of silences.

The aim of this paper is to explore some trans and feminist concerns about the gendered aspects of languages beyond English, focusing in particular on Spanish, Italian, and German. Historically, discussions about gendered language have often challenged the ways in which language can make women (in)visible by addressing the implicit and explicit androcentrism and sexism in our language. We call this the visibility project. Recently, questions surrounding trans-inclusiveness and the possibility of avoiding gender markers altogether have become more prominent, often highlighting the issue of pronouns (e.g. the singular "they*). We call this the gender-neutrality project. However, anglophone philosophy offers a very limited discussion on how either gender-neutrality or visibility strategies could be applied to languages more gendered than English. To address this, we start by showing how gender expresses itself in the grammatical structure of our three sample languages, and identifying some of the specific visibility and neutrality strategies that could be (or are already) applied to them. This leads us to articulate an "innovative project which constructs nuanced and novel ways to transform gendered grammatical structures. Depending on their application, these strategies can fulfil gender-neutrality goals in some cases and visibility goals in others. This highlights, among other things, the ways in which genderqueer people have attempted to shape their linguistic resources in different linguistic contexts, while also opening up avenues for new research when it comes to discussions of gender and language.

This paper aims to extend the discussion of silencing beyond the realm of speech and to the domain of conversational silences – that is, silences that have communicative functions in our conversational exchanges. I argue that, insofar as we can use silences to communicate, we can also be prevented from doing things with these silences. Alongside a three- fold taxonomy I show the different ways in which this can happen, utilizing and extending Maitra’s (2009) account of silencing to illustrate the wrong happening in these cases. This discussion not only highlights a new domain of silencing that has, so far, been underexplored, but also uncovers just how deep linguistic injustices can run.

Trigger warnings have been the flashpoints of many discussions in recent years. A prominent claim among those arguing against trigger warnings is what I will call the “coddling argument”, according to which trigger warnings coddle by allowing people to avoid ideas that they disagree with or find difficult. In this paper, I try to both make sense of and refute the coddling argument from a vice epistemological perspective. As I argue, CA is best understood as an expression of concern about the encouragement of epistemic vices, specifically in higher education, which lead to people avoiding and closing themselves off from difficult or challenging topics. I argue that this is misguided: trigger warnings exist for people who need to be warned about certain contents because they already know about these issues. Demands for such warnings are usually made by those who have themselves experienced the difficult things defenders of CA purport they are trying to hide from. We do, however, need to take into account that trigger warnings might be misused by those who really do need to learn about topics that might be a trigger for others, and I will discuss how this issue could be addressed.