Anna M. Ivanova

Книгата е посветена на проблема за обосноваността от класическата интерналистка гледна точка на епистемологията. Тя преразглежда традиционните проблеми в интерналистката рамка в по-широкия контекст на развитието в тази област през последните петдесет години.Централните проблеми в изследването се отнасят до условията на обосноваността като резултат от епистемичната оценка на вярванията с помощта на свидетелства и основания. Сред тях са проблемът за характера на свидетелствата и мястото им в процедурата на епистемична оценка, проблемите за добрите и достатъчни основания и проблемът за регреса на основанията.

What we know is decided in the framework of the linguistic norms for knowledge ascriptions. Such include not just epistemic conditions but also communicative ones. Knowledge in communicative context is conditioned on public agreement upon the question and the nature of the presented evidence, sincerity of testimony and responsibility in claiming. This distinction is used here to explain the puzzles surrounding the problem of the criterion. The disparity between the epistemic principles and the communicative conditions of knowledge ascriptions is presented here as a philosophically important question about the role of language in theoryconstruction.

In “On Certainty” Wittgenstein regards doubting as meaningful and reasonable only in a context providing language game where some background is taken for granted. Doubt, just as knowledge, should be backed up by an argument, only this time, one presenting reasons for uncertainty. Common sense propositions constitute part of the background for the arguments of doubting and because of their function and place within the system of language, they are regarded as indubitable. I discuss critically the idea of linguistically determined indubitability and advocate the possibility of a different kind of doubt, one that does not require its own justification and is still a reasonable epistemic attitude. Such doubt characterizes the states of affairs where the certainty of a proposition is not yet rationally established. I argue that, language does not limit us in doubting and in doubting reasonably.

A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a system of knowledge, perceptual beliefs seem to bear more importance than other members of the coherent set do. They are more stable in the face of confronting evidence, and may be preserved despite their degrading effect on the coherence properties of the system. This appears to be inconsistent with coherentism, according to which beliefs cannot possess independent credibility. In order to abide by the coherence theory, one must explain the stability of perceptual beliefs in belief revision in a manner that does not rely on foundationalist premises. A suggestion about the personal justification of perceptual beliefs in terms of coherence is presented in the paper to explain their stability in belief revision processes. The coherence of perceptual beliefs and a network account of knowledge are advocated in order to avoid weak foundationalism and to provide a new perspective to the normative problems of epistemic justification.

Discussions on the trustworthiness of science concern scientific objectivity. Scientific products, methods, and institutions are objective in three different senses. In each case, the notion of objectivity is applied to the outcomes of the scientific enterprise. This interpretation neglects the human side of objectivity. The trust in science is rational only when it is not grounded in an impersonal view of knowledge. Since trust is a value that connects people, society places its credence not in a system of propositions, a methodology, a tradition, or even—an institution, but rather in the living people that practice science today.

The article introduces theories of epistemic justification to the problems of understanding in communication. Two dominant approaches in contemporary epistemology — foundationalism and coherentism — are applied in intercultural discourse. Since the intended meaning of utterances in communication is reached through inference, beliefs about the intended meaning are justified with respect to the evidence of communicative behaviour and context. Tracing the difficulties of intercultural dialogue, the article argues that the coherentist method of justification is more useful than foundationalist one. Coherentism is consistent with the open-mindedness and unprejudiced reasoning, both of which are crucial parts of intercultural competency.