Anna Milioni

The contemporary conditions of migration and transnational mobility raise important questions regarding linguistic justice. Immigrants and national populations claim to have multiple and often conflicting linguistic entitlements. In this paper, we account for a fair allocation of linguistic rights in this migratory context. First, we distinguish between instrumental and non-instrumental language interests, and we argue against the position that linguistic rights can be waived upon migration. Then, we examine two popular approaches of linguistic justice: the linguistic territoriality approach and the linguistic personality approach. As we demonstrate, these approaches present shortcomings when dealing with the linguistic claims of immigrants, failing to accommodate important aspects of their interests. We argue that the fair accommodation of these interests requires the recognition of English as an official national language, by virtue of its role as the global lingua franca. We then try to dispel some objections that could be raised against our approach.

This paper explores the ‘puzzle of the nomads’ in the Metaphysics of Morals: the apparent tension between Kant’s argument about the duty to leave the state of nature and his insistence that European colonizers cannot permissibly force nomads to enter a civil union. Arguing that the puzzle is twofold, I suggest that the answer lies in the relationship between the state and territory in Kant’s work. After showing the shortcomings of an approach which suggests that nomadic peoples cannot enter the civil state without settling, I defend an alternative interpretation, which conceives the territoriality of the state as contingent.

Why is it important to live in a democratic state? A common response pictures democracy as an ideal of equal freedom: in a democratic state, individuals are free to determine under which rules they want to live. However, Niko Kolodny recently argued that freedom-based justifications of the democratic state are implausible. These justifications, characterised by Kolodny as _Kantian-Republican_, appeal to an ideal of non-domination which is self-defeating: far from being free from domination, individuals who live under the democratic state are dominated by the state itself. As the democratic state cannot be justified on the grounds of freedom, Kolodny defends a justification solely on the grounds of equality. This paper vindicates freedom as a ground of the democratic state. First, I summarise Kolodny’s critique, as well as his alternative, egalitarian justification. Then, I highlight the cost of justifying democracy only on egalitarian grounds: the egalitarian justification cannot justify important elements of democracy, nor can it defend democracy over other egalitarian regimes. I argue that we do not have to bear this cost, as Kolodny’s critique fails to undermine the Kantian strand of the Kantian-Republican justification of democracy. I show that in the Kantian approach, the state plays a necessary role in making non-domination possible, and that the fact that, empirically, it can become a source of domination does not undermine its normative necessity. I also suggest that the subjection of the people to the democratic will of the state does not raise problems for the Kantian approach.

Methodological nationalism is a cognitive bias that construes states as the natural and necessary form of contemporary social organisation. This gives rise to a state-centred view which naturalises national communities, exaggerates the differences between citizens and migrants, and exceptionalises international migration. In this paper, I argue that methodological nationalism is not only empirically inaccurate, but also normatively problematic, because its assumptions prevent migration ethicists from properly theorising about discrimination. I begin by briefly presenting methodological nationalism and clarifying some misconceptions. I also identify some features that would make a policy discriminatory and show that many contemporary migration policies are discriminatory. Looking at three variants of methodological nationalism (naturalisation, territorialisation, and ignorance), I argue that methodological nationalism marginalises concerns about discrimination in migration ethics and prevents migration ethicists from developing accounts that would be able to counter xenophobic arguments. Last, I consider the implications of my argument for migration ethics.

Our world is mobile. People move, either within the state or from one state to another, to access opportunities, to improve their living conditions, or to start afresh. Yet, we usually assume that migration is an exceptional activity that leads to permanent settlement. In this paper, I invite us to reconsider this assumption. First, I analyse several ways in which people experience mobility in contemporary societies. Then, I turn to migration, as a specific form of mobility. I distinguish between a legal/administrative, a social, and a self-identification-based approach to migration, demonstrating that they lead to divergent definitions of who is a migrant. I proceed by introducing the concept of mobile migration and by developing a typology of mobile migrants. I conclude that, in order to devise migration policies that treat migrants fairly, a careful consideration of the claims and interests of the different types of mobile migrants is necessary.

This paper employs Paul Ricœur’s insights to examine how European states should approach their colonial past. First, I explore the significance of historical knowledge for people from formerly colonized countries through the views of several anti-colonial thinkers. Then, referring to Ricoeur’s analyses in History and Truth, Time and Narrative and Memory, History, Forgetting, I examine the grounds and the legitimacy, of a historiography of colonization. I argue that European states should make the history of colonization part of their school curricula, as an expression of Europeans’ debt to the victims of the colonial past, and as a way to prevent the repetition of the colonial crimes.