Anna Pederneschi

It is particularly hard to write a critical response to an argument one overall agrees with. In “Hinge Epistemology: Why Choose?” (2025) Jordi Fairhurst shows his readers that hinge epistemology—a theory that holds that epistemic practices are based on unquestioned presuppositions called hinges—is stuck in a stalemate that prevents advancements. This paralysis, Fairhurst argues, is caused by a couple of assumption: a theoretical one that takes the presuppositions—hinges—to have some essentially common catachrestic and a methodological one that insists on building a global unified theory of hinges. How do we break free from the stalemate?

Philosophical literature has focused on the concept of trust, but often considers distrust merely as an afterthought. Distrust however, because of its pervasive role in our everyday lives, can be quite damaging. Thus, understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for understanding our testimonial practices. In this paper I analyze whether it is rational or irrational to distrust an informant on the basis of identity bias. My aim is to show that distrust is irrational when based on negative identity bias. First, I adopt Annalisa Coliva’s account of social hinge epistemology where it is rationally required to assume certain basic presuppositions, such that people are generally reliable informants, to obtain propositional justification and participate in the testimonial practice. Secondly, I show how distrust based on negative identity bias can spread across other domains of interaction and jeopardize the testimonial practice as we fail to assume that people are generally reliable informants. Thirdly, I argue that considering bias as a defeater is beneficial to maintain the claim that bias-based distrust is irrational, as it prevents the acquisition of propositional justification. Finally, I show that distrust is rational when based on evidence and reason that the speaker is not reliable or sincere.