Annalisa Costella

If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences.

We often encounter situations in which an undesirable outcome is brought about through a series or collection of seemingly inconsequen-tial actions. This phenomenon, referred to as the inefficacy paradox, oc-curs both intrapersonally and collectively. Paradoxically, while we have good reason to avoid such patterns of action, there appears to be no com-pelling reason to abstain from any of the individual actions constituting such a pattern given its trivial impact. This paper scrutinizes Chrisoula Andreou's prominent endeavor to resolve the inefficacy paradox in both the intrapersonal and the collective context by utilizing their structural similarity. While her approach may prove successful in intrapersonal cases, the applicability of the proposed solution to collective cases is, I argue, ultimately limited. This is due to a fundamental dissimilarity be-tween these two kinds of cases, which I lay out in the paper. This insight may also shed light on the transferability of other proposed solutions to the inefficacy paradox from the intrapersonal to the collective context.

I propose a novel view on hard choices. It broadens the concept to include not only ‘classic’ hard choices but also transformative and aspirational choices. I argue that a choice is hard when an individual does not have an all-things-considered reason to choose one option over another and the objects of choice are ultimate ends. Construing hard choices in this way supports and explains the widely held assumption that, when faced with hard choices, it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily. More specifically, it shows that it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily by plumping, and yet legitimate to do so by picking. Understanding hard choices in the way I propose sheds light on the fact that there are moral and agential constraints that limit the space of permissible decision-making procedures when confronted with ‘classic’ hard, transformative, and aspirational choices. Delineating these constraints, in turn, can provide guidance to critically appraise current theories of practical rationality.

Oftentimes many individual acts lead to a significantly (dis-)valuable outcome though the performance of each act makes no valuative difference to that outcome. Such cases give rise to a dilemma. For it seemingly doesn’t matter whether one performs an act (or not) if it doesn’t make a difference. Yet it matters a great deal when many of these acts are performed, provided they bring about a significant outcome. One might think, therefore, that at least some reason favours the performance of such acts. But in the absence of a valuative difference, it is difficult to say what that reason is, exactly. The above dilemma arises in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases. For instance, in the intrapersonal case, it seemingly makes little difference to my goal of running the marathon whether I skip a single workout. Yet it makes a significant difference to my goal of running the marathon if I skip all of my workouts. And, in the interpersonal case, it seemingly makes no difference to the bad effects of climate change if I choose to be a vegan or not. Yet it makes a significant difference to the bad effects of climate change if we all choose to be vegans. This dilemma has generated a substantial body of literature in both ethics and rational choice. Surprisingly, however, there has been little crossover between the two fields of study. The motivation for the special issue was to offer an avenue to explore new solutions or perspectives on the dilemma through the lens of one, or both of these fields.