Annalisa Muscolo

The way we attribute ignorance to each other is often connected to normative considerations. Intuitively, attributions such as ‘S is ignorant that p’ sound odd when S is under no obligation to know that p. These linguistic intuitions about attributions of ignorance have been used to motivate the increasingly popular Normative Account of the nature of ignorance (Pritchard 2021 a, b; Meylan 2020, 2024) according to which ignorance is a lack of a positive epistemic standing which manifests a failure of inquiry. Here, I will argue that champions of the Normative Account who want to draw metaphysical and conceptual conclusions about ignorance from linguistic intuitions may be too quick to do so. In fact, the normative weigh of ignorance attributions can be explained on a pragmatic basis.

In this paper I identify a distinct form of epistemic injustice and oppression which I call ‘hermeneutical sabotage’. Hermeneutical sabotage occurs when dominantly situated knowers actively maintain or worsen the dominant hermeneutical resources for understanding the experiences or identities of marginalised groups. They do this through actively distorting the resistant hermeneutical resources developed by marginalised groups, and by introducing new, prejudiced hermeneutical resources. I develop a taxonomy of four forms hermeneutical sabotage can take, giving an example of each, and explain the difference between ‘hermeneutical sabotage’ and other types of epistemic injustice. I demonstrate the importance of having the concept of hermeneutical sabotage for recognising how it can be used, intentionally or unintentionally, to further the aims of harmful political movements. I give examples of hermeneutical sabotage which furthers the aims of transphobic, racist, and anti-immigrant political movements.