Annamaria Lossi

“Classic” can be said in many ways. In general, it defines that which conforms to Greek and Roman models in literature or arts; or, as the first meaning of the Oxford Dictionary suggests, ‘classic’ is “judged over a period of time to be of the highest quality and outstanding of its kind.”² In this sense, in philosophy, “classical” is the adjective that outlines a philosophical period or a thinker who lived during antiquity, or the time after antiquity, revealing a model either for the present or for the time to come. This specification shows the hermeneutical connotation of a method through which the scientific approach towards ages and thinkers can be understood. Western thought in its all is believed to be a long story of spiritual and cultural development which departs from one golden and past moment-the classical period, when the first philosophical questions arose.³ And it proceeds with other transformations whose value is measured up. The aim of this article is to show some aspects of Nietzsche’s way of writing and conceiving philosophy as a (self)description, to contribute to Nietzsche’s rediscovery as an ‘anticlassic’ and-in this-as a ‘classic’ sui generis. The article explores how Nietzsche became a classic and which aesthetic features outline his philosophy as intimal net of thinking and poetics.

Nietzsche presents a challenging conception of aesthetics. One of the most well-known discussions on this issue is presented by Heidegger in Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (1936/37). In discussing Nietzsche’s aesthetic theory, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s reception of Kantian aesthetics is only ever indirect and necessarily mediated by Schopenhauer. His conclusion hinges on what he considers to be a widespread misinterpretation of Kant’s theory of the beautiful, a misinterpretation that begins with Schopenhauer but characterizes all of Kant’s followers, especially Nietzsche. In this paper, I will consider Nietzsche’s position toward aesthetics from a different perspective, namely in the space between Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s position. The argumentation departs from Nietzsche’s early critique of teleology; his first approaches to aesthetics in Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872); and his position on the concept of causality and morality. As a careful interpretation of GM III 6 will make clear, Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche misinterprets Kant is made questionable by the fact that Nietzsche here distinguishes Kant (especially his emphasis on universalism and impersonality as central features of aesthetic judgments) from Schopenhauer’s approach and proposes an artist-based aesthetics in which it is rather Stendhal’s idea of beauty as “une promesse de bonheur” which expresses the human need for illusions in Nietzsche’s conception of aesthetics.

The author sets out to present the Nothing of nihilism as the driving force behind the history of Western thought referred to as “metaphysics”. The starting points for clarifying the thesis are found in two interpretations of nihilism in the more recent scholarly literature: the understanding of nihilism as “differentiation” and as “overcoming”. The understanding of nihilism as overcoming calls for a broader examination of Nietzsche‘s interpretation of nihilism. On the one hand, the author relies on Heidegger‘s understanding of nihilism and metaphysics, according to which nihilism cannot be separated from metaphysics. At the same time, she seeks to re-formulate the question about Nothing: to what extent can Nothing be phenomenologically understood as the destructive process that reflects metaphysics in its continuously changing guises as metaphysics, i.e. as the interpretative structure that continues to emerge throughout history. The Nothing thereby shows itself as a metaphysical “prerequisite” for man‘s creative power and reality as such.Die Absicht der Autorin ist es, das Nichts des Nihilismus als Antrieb der „Metaphysik“ genannten Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens aufzuzeigen. Um diese These zu erläutern, werden zwei Nihilismusdeutungen der neueren Fachliteratur, seine Auffassung als „Differenz“ und als „Überwindung“, zum Ausgangspunkt genommen. Die Auffassung des Nihilismus als Überwindung gibt Anlass zu einer umfassenderen Erläuterung von Nietzsches Nihilismusinterpretation. Sie stützt sich einerseits auf Heideggers Nihilismusund Metaphysikauffassung, wonach der Nihilismus nicht von der Metaphysik abgetrennt werden kann. Andererseits versucht sie die Frage nach dem Nichts neu zu formulieren: Inwiefern kann das Nichts phänomenologisch als derjenige Destruktionsprozess verstanden werden, der die Metaphysik in ihren immer wechselnden Masken als Metaphysik, d. h. als in der Geschichte stets zum Zuge kommende Interpretationsstruktur erweist? Das Nichts zeigt sich dabei als metaphysische „Voraussetzung“ der Schöpferkraft des Menschen und der Wirklichkeit überhaupt.Namjera autorice je pokazati ono ništa nihilizma kao pokretačku silu “metafizikom” nazvane povijesti zapadnjačkog mišljenja. U svrhu razjašnjenja te teze za polazišne točke uzimaju se dva tumačenja nihilizma u novijoj stručnoj literaturi: shvaćanje nihilizma kao “diferencije” i kao “prevladavanja”. Shvaćanje nihilizma kao prevladavanja daje povoda za obuhvatnije razjašnjenje Nietzscheove interpretacije nihilizma. Autorica se oslanja s jedne strane na Heideggerovo shvaćanje nihilizma i metafizike, prema kojemu se nihilizam ne može odijeliti od metafizike. Ujedno pokušava iznova formulirati pitanje o ničemu: u kojoj mjeri se ništa može fenomenološki razumjeti kao onaj destruktivni proces, koji metafiziku u njezinim stalno se izmjenjujućim maskama očituje kao metafiziku, tj. kao interpretativnu strukturu koja stalno izlazi na vidjelo u povijesti. Ništa se pritom pokazuje kao metafizička “pretpostavka” stvaralačke snage čovjeka i stvarnosti uopće

Nietzsche’s lectures on rhetoric. The so called “Basel Lectures” have been object of study for decades. The sources as well as their philological content have been described and accurately documented. However, the specific relevance of their aesthetic content and linguistic originality is still hidden under the pure quotations of the sources. The aim of this paper is to show up that these lectures should be seen as a relevant part of Nietzsche’s workshop for his later philosophical and aesthetical reflections, which emerge on the basis of a reconsideration of the origin of rhetoric from the artistic “naturality” of language.