My research focuses on epistemology and rationality, with close connections to metaethics and the philosophy of mind and action. A central concern throughout my work is what it means to conduct our intellectual lives responsibly: what we should believe, when we should suspend judgement, and which questions we should pursue.
My recent work centres on the nature and norms of inquiry. I investigate what it is to ask oneself a question, what obligations arise from doing so, and how the requirements of inquiry relate to the norms governing belief. Closely connected to these questions is my work on suspension of judgement: what suspending judgemen…
My research focuses on epistemology and rationality, with close connections to metaethics and the philosophy of mind and action. A central concern throughout my work is what it means to conduct our intellectual lives responsibly: what we should believe, when we should suspend judgement, and which questions we should pursue.
My recent work centres on the nature and norms of inquiry. I investigate what it is to ask oneself a question, what obligations arise from doing so, and how the requirements of inquiry relate to the norms governing belief. Closely connected to these questions is my work on suspension of judgement: what suspending judgement consists in, how it relates to our agency as thinkers, and when it is appropriate. I also defend a normative account of ignorance and examine the relations between ignorance and suspension of judgement.
These interests develop out of my longstanding work on epistemic responsibility, justification, and the value of knowledge. Under what conditions are we responsible for our beliefs, and when are intellectual praise and blame appropriate? How do epistemic reasons relate to practical reasons, and can practical considerations legitimately influence what we should believe? My work on these issues also addresses self-deception and the rationality and blameworthiness of conspiracy and fundamentalist beliefs.
I lead ZEGRa, the Zurich Epistemology Group on Rationality, at the University of Zurich. My research has been supported by SNSF projects on cognitive irrationality, suspension of judgement, evidence, knowledge and understanding, and the varieties of inquiry.