•  49
    Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. forthcoming.
    It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis-à-vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorganised g…Read more
  •  173
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know an…Read more
  •  162
    Making sense of collective moral obligations: A comparison of existing approaches
    In Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski & Tracy Isaacs (eds.), Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice, Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 109-132. 2018.
    We can often achieve together what we could not have achieved on our own. Many times these outcomes and actions will be morally valuable; sometimes they may be of substantial moral value. However, when can we be under an obligation to perform some morally valuable action together with others, or to jointly produce a morally significant outcome? Can there be collective moral obligations, and if so, under what circumstances do we acquire them? These are questions to which philosophers are increasi…Read more
  •  118
    Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the pe…Read more
  •  170
    Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?
    Environmental Values 28 (4): 405-427. 2019.
    Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than ant…Read more
  •  11
    Gemeinsame Hilfspflichten, Weltarmut und kumulative Handlungen
    Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 4 (1): 123-150. 2017.
    Pflichten der Armutsbekämpfung werden häufig als kollektive oder gemeinsame Hilfspflichten dargestellt. Auf den ersten Blick ist diese Idee überzeugend: Da Weltarmut ein Problem ist, das sich nur durch eine gemeinsame Anstrengung erfolgreich lösen lässt, sollte dessen Bekämpfung als kollektive Pflicht vieler angesehen werden. Was aber kann mit einer kollektiven Pflicht genau gemeint sein? Dieser Aufsatz führt eine Unterscheidung von genuinen und kumulativen kollektiven Handlungen ein. Genuin koo…Read more
  •  169
    Without doubt, the global challenges we are currently facing—above all world poverty and climate change—require collective solutions: states, national and international organizations, firms and business corporations as well as individuals must work together in order to remedy these problems. In this chapter, I discuss climate change mitigation as a collective action problem from the perspective of moral philosophy. In particular, I address and refute three arguments suggesting that business firm…Read more
  •  214
    Terrorism, jus post bellum and the Prospect of Peace
    In Florian Demont-Biaggi (ed.), The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 123-140. 2017.
    Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – state or…Read more
  •  84
    Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2012.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- PART I: DEFINING 'TERRORISM' -- On The Current Debate On Defining Terrorism -- What Is Terrorism? -- PART II: ETHICS OF TERRORISM OR CAN TERRORISM EVER BE PERMISSIBLE? -- Innocents and Non-Innocents -- Terrorism Against Non-Innocents -- Terrorism Against Innocents -- Collateral Damage -- Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index.
  •  204
    This essay investigates the possibilities and limits of interdisciplinary research into terrorism. It is shown that approaches that combine philosophy and international law are necessary, and when such an approach needs to be adopted. However, it is also important not to underestimate how much of a challenge is posed by the absence of agreement concerning the definition of terrorism, and also by the structural differences in the way the two disciplines address the problem and formulate the issue…Read more
  •  198
    Bridging The Emissions Gap: A Plea For Taking Up The Slack
    Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (1): 273-301. 2013.
    With the existing commitments to climate change mitigation, global warming is likely to exceed 2°C and to trigger irreversible and harmful threshold effects. The difference between the reductions necessary to keep the 2°C limit and those reductions countries have currently committed to is called the ‘emissions gap’. I argue that capable states not only have a moral duty to make voluntary contributions to bridge that gap, but that complying states ought to make up for the failures of some other s…Read more
  •  160
    Polycentric Systems and the Integrity Approach
    In Hugh Breakey, Vesselin Popovski & Rowena Maguire (eds.), Ethical Values and the Integrity of the Climate Change Regime, Ashgate. pp. 131-138. 2015.
    The starting point of this chapter is the observation that at the global level the climate system is failing to produce the outcomes it was set up to produce and as such is lacking consistency integrity. That is, it is failing to act in accordance with its public institutional justification and the values embodied in it. However, emerging so-called polycentric systems are increasingly successful at addressing the challenges of global climatic change, according to economist Elinor Ostrom. The aim…Read more
  •  28
    If individual moral agents do wrong they usually deserve and are liable to some kind of punishment. But how can states be punished for failing to comply with moral duties without therewith also punishing their citizens who are not necessarily deserving of any punishment?
  •  327
    Local opposition to infrastructure projects implementing renewable energy (RE) such as wind farms is often strong even if state-wide support for RE is strikingly high. The slogan “Not In My BackYard” (NIMBY) has become synonymous for this kind of protest. This paper revisits the question of what is wrong with NIMBYs about RE projects and how to best address them. I will argue that local opponents to wind farm (and other RE) developments do not necessarily fail to contribute their fair share to p…Read more
  •  710
    Collateral Damage and the Principle of Due Care
    Journal of Military Ethics 13 (1): 94-105. 2014.
    This article focuses on the ethical implications of so-called ‘collateral damage’. It develops a moral typology of collateral harm to innocents, which occurs as a side effect of military or quasi-military action. Distinguishing between accidental and incidental collateral damage, it introduces four categories of such damage: negligent, oblivious, knowing and reckless collateral damage. Objecting mainstream versions of the doctrine of double effect, the article argues that in order for any collat…Read more
  •  263
    How to Punish Collective Agents
    Ethics and International Affairs. 2011.
    Assuming that states can hold moral duties, it can easily be seen that states—just like any other moral agent—can sometimes fail to discharge those moral duties. In the context of climate change examples of states that do not meet their emission reduction targets abound. If individual moral agents do wrong they usually deserve and are liable to some kind of punishment. But how can states be punished for failing to comply with moral duties without therewith also punishing their citizens who are n…Read more
  •  60
    In Benjamin Hale & Andrew Light (eds.), Routledge Companion to Environmental Ethics, Routledge. forthcoming.
    There exist overwhelming – and morally compelling – reasons for shifting to renewable energy (RE), because only that will enable us to timely mitigate dangerous global warming. In addition, several other morally weighty reasons speak in favor of the shift: considerable public health benefits, broader environmental benefits, the potential for sustainable and equitable economic development and equitable energy access, and, finally, long-term energy security. Furthermore, it appears that the transi…Read more
  •  397
    Terrorism, Supreme Emergency and Killing the Innocent
    Perspectives - The Review of International Affairs 17 (1): 105-126. 2009.
    Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a…Read more
  •  534
    Moral obligations of states
    In Applied Ethics Series, Centre For Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University. pp. 86-93. 2011.
    The starting point of the paper is the frequent ascription of moral duties to states, especially in the context of problems of global justice. It is widely assumed that industrialized or wealthy countries in particular have a moral obligation or duties of justice to shoulder burdens of poverty reduction or climate change adaptation and mitigation. But can collectives such as states actually hold moral duties? If answering this affirmatively: what does it actually mean to say that a state has mor…Read more
  •  578
    Defining Terrorism
    In Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 7-47. 2012.
    Without doubt, terrorism is one of the most vehemently debated subjects in current political affairs as well as in academic discourse. Yet, although it constitutes an issue of general socio-political interest, neither in everyday language nor in professional (political, legal, or academic) contexts does there exist a generally accepted definition of terrorism. The question of how it should be defined has been answered countless times, with as much variety as quantity in the answers. In academic …Read more
  •  610
    Is there an obligation to reduce one’s individual carbon footprint?
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (2): 168-188. 2014.
    Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gases. This paper focuses on the question of whether i…Read more
  •  587
    Rethinking legitimate authority
    In Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas Evans & Adam Henschke (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in the 21st Century, Routledge. 2013.
    The just war-criterion of legitimate authority – as it is traditionally framed – restricts the right to wage war to state actors. However, agents engaged in violent conflicts are often sub-state or non-state actors. Former liberation movements and their leaders have in the past become internationally recognized as legitimate political forces and legitimate leaders. But what makes it appropriate to consider particular violent non-state actors to legitimate violent agents and others not? This arti…Read more
  •  94
    Killing in War
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2). 2011.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 376-377, June 2011.
  •  809
    Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations
    Ratio 26 (3): 310-328. 2013.
    In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people which – while not constituting a collective agent – a…Read more
  •  737
    Joint Moral Duties
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1): 58-74. 2014.
    There are countless circumstances under which random individuals COULD act together to prevent something morally bad from happening or to remedy a morally bad situation. But when OUGHT individuals to act together in order to bring about a morally important outcome? Building on Philip Pettit’s and David Schweikard’s account of joint action, I will put forward the notion of joint duties: duties to perform an action together that individuals in so-called random or unstructured groups can jointly ho…Read more