Anne Schwenkenbecher

Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science-policy interface. We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.

Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because they focus on “what works,” or because they “follow the rules.” We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy.

When evidence‑based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence‑based policymaking, which we call transparency of reasoning. Such transparency is critical to the success of the evidence‑based policy movement, as without it, we will be unable to tell whether in any instance a policy was in fact based on evidence.

Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choosing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy‐making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value‐based considerations.

Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence-based—cannot be decided without appeal to value-based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy-making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choos¬ing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy-making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value-based considerations.

Terrorist actors often hold extreme beliefs. Such beliefs may concern – more narrowly – the legitimacy of their actions (including the moral status of the victims of direct violence), their prospects of success, and whether violence is their last resort, or – more broadly – socio-political matters in general. I discuss in what sense violent actors can hold collective responsibility for extreme beliefs. Doxastic involuntariness – the view that we do not typically choose what to believe – seems to suggest that we cannot usually be responsible for our beliefs. However, even if we accept doxastic involuntariness, this does not yet settle the question of our epistemic obligations. We can voluntarily engage in actions that preserve or improve our epistemic position. Having said that, our opportunities for improving our epistemic position will be curtailed when we find ourselves in epistemically impoverished environments. Individual epistemic agents are not usually in a position to significantly change those environments on their own – this requires a collective effort. Consequently, I suggest that responsibility for extreme beliefs – including in terrorist groups – is in some cases better understood as a shared epistemic responsibility and in others as a form of epistemic complicity.

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense.

Determining appropriate mechanisms for transferring and translating research into policy has become a major concern for researchers (knowledge producers) and policymakers (knowledge users) worldwide. This has led to the emergence of a new function of brokering between researchers and policymakers, and a new type of agent called Knowledge Broker. Understanding these complex multi-agent interactions is critical for an efficient knowledge brokering practice during any given policymaking process. Here, we present (1) the current diversity of knowledge broker groups working in the field of biosecurity and environmental management; (2) the incentives linking the different agents involved in the process (knowledge producers, knowledge brokers and knowledge users); and (3) the gaps, needs and challenges to better understand this social ecosystem. We also propose alternatives aimed at improving transparency and efficiency, including future scenarios where the role of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies may become predominant in knowledge-brokering activities.

Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because they focus on “what works,” or because they “follow the rules.” We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy.

There seems to be a striking parallel between the features of psychopaths and those of agential groups, including states and corporations. Psychopaths are often thought to lack some of the capacities that are constitutive of moral agency. Two features of psychopaths are commonly identified as grounds for limiting their moral responsibility: (i) their lack of relevant emotional capacities and (ii) their flawed rational capacities. Roughly, the first argument is that the lack of moral emotions such as sympathy, guilt, or shame negatively impacts moral perception and therewith an agent's capacity for moral reasoning. The second argument is that psychopaths are diminished in their agency as such, not just in their moral agency; they are erratic and impulsive and show other significant failures of rationality. Using the 2020 Juukan Gorge disaster in Western Australia as a case study, I conclude that deliberate or reckless corporate irrationality cannot be grounds for diminished corporate moral responsibility. Corporate agents are chiefly responsible for core aspects of their moral agency, including their internal epistemic structures and decision-making processes. They have obligations to establish or maintain internal epistemic integrity and consistency.

In order to make sense of collective doxastic reasons we need an account of group belief. Once we arrive at a more nuanced understanding of group belief it turns out that for some group beliefs we need not invoke collective epistemic reasons. However, we do need them for better understanding how and why different social identity groups will hold beliefs whose evidence-base is irreducibly social and tied to them being that kind of group. This short article is a commentary on Veli Mitova's 2022 article "The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups".

When evidence-based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence-based policymaking, which we call transparency of reasoning. Such transparency is critical to the success of the evidence-based policy movement, as without it, we will be unable to tell whether in any instance a policy was in fact based on evidence.

What is it that makes us as citizens liable for the actions – including the wrongdoings – of our state? Answering this question is part of the larger debate on the nature of complicity and collective action. When are we connected to joint endeavours and collective outcomes in a way that makes us (on some level) responsible for them? Of particular interest within this debate is the normative relationship of citizens to their state. For instance, when states pay reparations for past crimes the costs are – one way or another – borne by their citizens. In Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States (OUP 2021), Avia Pasternak examines with admirable clarity and circumspection if states are justified in imposing the cost of their past wrongdoings on all of their citizens, including those who played no obvious part in those crimes.

Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view appears to work well with regard to – you guessed it – ‘simple’ scenarios but it is riddled with further questions and problems. In this chapter, we raise five problems for the Simple View: (a) We suggest that one cannot develop a view concerning the citizenry’s duty to promote just institutions in isolation from a conception of the ontological relationship between the state and its citizens; (b) We argue that it is not obvious that the citizenry is the right entity to be attributed duties in the first place; (c) We show that a plausible account of collective duties to promote just institutions must not remain silent on the complexities and difficulties amorphous, unorganized group face in vis-à-vis collective action; (d) We contend that without allocation principles for contributory duties amongst the citizenry, or – alternatively – a method for practical deliberation that is action-guiding in collective action contexts, the claim that the citizens have a collective duty to promote just institutions remains moot; and, finally, (e) We demonstrate that the problem of reasonable disagreement is a serious threat to a collective duty to promote or create just institutions – it potentially undermines such a duty altogether and allows for conflicting contributory duties amongst the citizenry. We hope that our discussion will ultimately help improve existing theories and conceptual frameworks with a view to better understanding citizens’ obligations to promote justice under non-ideal conditions.

Twenty years after September 11, the definition of terrorism remains a contentious issue. How to understand or not to understand ‘terrorism’ is by no means a purely academic exercise. The term has a history of being used to denounce certain types of political violence and their perpetrators as being wrongful per se. Like Tony Coady, I believe that it is not just possible but, in fact, crucial to separate the descriptive from the evaluative component if the concept is to be informative at all and if we aspire to an open-ended inquiry into its distinctive wrongness. In The Meaning of Terrorism, Coady revisits and refines the themes of his writing on the topic over the past decades while providing in-depth discussions of many of the key figures in the debate on the ethics of war and terrorism.

Marine ecosystems are under increasing pressure from human activity, yet successful management relies on knowledge. The evidence-based policy (EBP) approach has been promoted on the grounds that it provides greater transparency and consistency by relying on ‘high quality’ information. However, EBP also creates epistemic responsibilities. Decision-making where limited or no empirical evidence exists, such as is often the case in marine systems, creates epistemic obligations for new information acquisition. We argue that philosophical approaches can inform the science-policy interface. Using marine biosecurity examples, we specifically examine the epistemic challenges in the acquisition and acceptance of evidence to inform policy, discussing epistemic due care and biases in consideration of evidence.

This commentary is part of a symposium on my book 'Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations' (Routledge, 2021). Here, I respond to the members of the North American Society for Social Philosophy’s 2022 Book Award Committee. I discuss whether most moral theory is individualistic, arguing that “traditional ethical theories” - meaning the traditions of Virtue Ethics, Kantian ethics as well as consequentialist ethics - certainly are. All of these focus on what individual agents ought to do or how they ought to be. The commentators wonder whether any substantive moral theory can accommodate the idea of collective obligations? I suggest that one of my conditions for collective moral obligations is incompatible with objectivist versions of act-utilitarianism, which require moral agents to choose the option that actually maximises utility. Having said that, core elements of my account of collective moral obligations can be used with any substantive theory. Further, the theory—in its entirety—can be used with several substantive theories, including versions of all the major types of moral theory. How common are collective obligations? On my understanding, as fundamentally social thinkers, we are fairly flexible at switching between the we-mode and the I-mode, and will regularly respond to contextual cues for framing collective action scenarios. As such, I am not worried that there would be too few circumstances under which we have all-out collective obligations. What is more, we can generate such obligations by providing contextual cues for others that prompt them to frame situations as opportunities for joint action and to perform contributory actions. Another question raised by the commentators was if for having collective obligations it is crucial that we believe others will contribute? My answer is that such obligations do not necessarily depend on having positive evidence that concrete others are or will be contributing. Having said that, where we have positive evidence that others will not contribute and in particular where we know that their failure to contribute will unilaterally undermine the possibility of success of any collective action (as in strict joint necessity cases) this may undermine collective obligations. On my theory, what happens if people disagree on what is morally best? On my view, where such divergence between moral positions comes as a result of disagreement between morally motivated, reasonable, and well-informed people it undermines their collective obligation. Finally, are there “negative” collective duties? Yes, in fact collective harm cases can be conceived of as generating “negative” duties to collectively refrain from generating these kinds of harms, including our obligations to mitigate climate change through reducing greenhouse emissions.

The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings from all the things we did not do when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, collective inaction and omission have not yet received much attention in the literature. collective inaction, I argue, can be attributed to a group of agents where a collective action x that the agents did not perform was collectively feasible at time t where each agent in that group had sufficient reason to contribute to performing x or others had a reasonable expectation that they would perform x. I show that, perhaps surprisingly, we can speak of collective inaction even where only one member of the group fails to act. However, where large and dispersed groups of agents are concerned, there is often no meaningful way of attributing collective failings. Still, I contend that the failure to close the global emissions gap and—in some cases—to generate herd immunity are indeed on us.

Die Frage nach der Verantwortung für globale Armut laesst sich auf mindestens zwei Weisen stellen – als Frage nach der (retrospektiven) Verantwortung für das Auftreten dieses Problems oder als Frage nach der (prospektiven) Verantwortung für dessen Behebung. Dieses Kapitel wird sich vor allem auf die zweite Frage konzentrieren: Inwiefern sollte die Verantwortung, Armut zu bekaempfen, als kollektive Verantwortung verstanden werden? Für viele von uns werden diese Pflichten nur im weiten (schwachen) Sinne kollektiv sein, naemlich in dem Sinne, dass die kollektive Ebene für die Entscheidungsfindung und die Handlungsbewertung primaer ist. Kollektivitaet von Verantwortung im engen Sinn erfordert hingegen staerkere epistemische Verknüpfungen der Gruppenmitglieder sowie eine Bekenntnis zum gemeinsamen Ziel. Wo diese bereits bestehen, da koennen wir von kollektiver Verantwortung in diesem starken Sinn sprechen und entsprechend von den Mitgliedern dieser Gruppen einen groesseren Einsatz für das Endresultat erwarten.

Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations concern not just our own knowledge and beliefs but those of others, too and (2) that our epistemic obligations can be held collectively where the epistemic tasks cannot be performed by individuals acting in isolation, for example, when we are required to produce joint epistemic goods.

Our moral obligations can sometimes be collective in nature: They can jointly attach to two or more agents in that neither agent has that obligation on their own, but they – in some sense – share it or have it in common. In order for two or more agents to jointly hold an obligation to address some joint necessity problem they must have joint ability to address that problem. Joint ability is highly context-dependent and particularly sensitive to shared (or even common) beliefs. As such, joint ability can be deliberately generated in a given collection of agents by providing information related to collective goals and contributory actions. As moral agents, we regularly face problems wherein the outcome of our actions depends on how others choose. There are two ways of deliberating about our own choices in such cases. We can either think of our choices as best responses to others’ choices (I-mode reasoning). Or we can think of our own choices as contributions to the collectively best option (even when we do not know how others are (likely) to choose) (we-mode reasoning). In deliberating about the right (individual) course of action vis-à-vis collective action problems, agents regularly we-frame the case at hand, that is, they include options in their deliberation that are only collectively available, and they we-reason with regard to their individual contributory actions. It is a necessary condition for collective obligations that potential collaborators facing a joint necessity case have grounds to privilege we-reasoning over reasoning in I-mode.

In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.

This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by themselves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful.

WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 Together we can often achieve things that are impossible to do on our own. We can prevent something bad from happening or we can produce something good, even if none of us could do it by herself. But when are we morally required to do something of moral importance together with others? This book develops an original theory of collective moral obligations. These are obligations that individual moral agents hold jointly, but not as unified collective agents. To think of some of our obligations as joint or collective is the best way of making sense of our intuitions regarding collective moral action problems. Where we have reason to believe that our efforts are most efficient as part of a collective endeavor we may incur collective obligations together with others who are similarly placed as long as we are able to establish compossible individual contributory strategies towards that goal. The book concludes with a discussion of “massively shared obligations” to large-scale moral problems such as global poverty.

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations visà- vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense.