Anthony Adler

Taking its departure from the historical intertwinement of the concepts of crisis and disease, this paper argues that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic model of philosophy, despite its seemingly ahistorical tendencies, develops around the concept of crisis; while philosophy itself, even in its dogmatic forms, can always be understood as a therapy for disease-prone life, Wittgenstein’s project addresses the cancerous tendency of metaphysics, originally itself a kind of therapy, to proliferate pseudo-answers to pseudo-questions. But in contrast to those critical philosophers who uphold a “criterion” such as possible experience (Kant) or falsifiability (Carnap), Wittgenstein, in later writings such as the Philosophical Investigations, confronts the crisis of the absence of such criteria; rather than elevating forms of life and language games to a new criterion, he calls us to renounce the need for criteria. This, in turn, suggests an analogy with the twelve-step approach to addiction, itself rooted in a conception of the radical non-hierarchical structure of early Christian communities as well as Augustine’s notions of faith as overcoming the fundamental incapacity of the will. Wittgenstein’s philosophical therapy is a self-therapy that originates in an experience of the crisis of criteria for critique – a crisis that itself arises from the failure of the ethics of moderation, the lack of the obscure yet concrete measure of communal life. The extreme experience of the failure of criteria to find a way out from crisis, as when the addict recognizes that will is powerless over addiction, becomes the springboard for a form of existence based on a new community, existing outside the dream of endless progress, in which new habits become again possible.

Agamben’s self-professed epigonism underwrites his entire project, serving as an even more fundamental methodological concept than the signature, paradigm, and archeology. In Infancy and History, Agamben maintains that transcendental experience is no longer a viable source of philosophical insight; philosophers go astray referring their thinking back to an authentic yet esoteric experience that, itself unspeakable, grounds positive philosophical assertions. Neither mysterious nor ineffable, the experience founding philosophy is the completely patent, non-latent, experience of language’s pure exteriority. Rather than “deconstructing” metaphysics by exposing its hidden contradictions, philosophy must “deconfabulate,” telling fables about philosophy to undo its enchantments, since it is through the fable that the spell of silence, which itself originates in fable, can be broken. This “epigonal” method, which follows after the tradition rather than seeking a new grounding, is itself justified through Agamben’s account, in The End of the Poem, of the Italian, as opposed to Germanic, physiognomy and of a specifically Italian relation to language going back to Dante. To be Italian is to embrace the “deadness” of one’s own language, rejecting the myth of the resurrection of the original potencies of a dead classical language through a living, modern language.

Rejecting the tendency to regard Fichte as merely a transitional figure in the development of German idealism, the following paper argues that, in the years following his dismissal from Jena, Fichte will come to map out a unique and compelling philosophical trajectory. This will be demonstrated, in particular, through a close reading of the Erlanger lectures Institutiones omnis philisophiae of 1805: in these texts, which undertake the pedagogical task of introducing his students to philosophy and indeed achieving a “transformation” of perspective, Fichte makes a fundamental philosophical breakthrough. This becomes possible precisely because his focus on the pedagogical task draws his attention to the most fundamental subjective or even “existential” conditions of philosophical insight, leading him, in turn, to a theorization of the capacity of understanding, by producing contradictions, to open up a space of negativity; a negativity that is itself the essence of human freedom, and through which truth is yielded rather than either discovered or produced. Whereas Hegel and Schelling regard Kant’s residual dualism as a philosophical scandal, Fichte, through this notion of a radical freedom born from the unresolved negativity of the understanding, will seek not to overcome dualism through a higher perspective but to recognize its absolutely binding character.

Taking its departure from The Differend’s analysis of Auschwitz as a sign for the evental character of history, I argue that the looming ecological disaster we now face reveals both the continuing relevance and limits of Lyotard’s thought. While the form of political agency of the catastrophe to come involves a differend, this differend cannot be attached to a proper name, however problematic its mode of signification. This, however, suggests the even greater relevance of Lyotard’s treatment, in the conclusion of The Differend, of capitalism in terms of temporal contradiction, as well as his theorization of oikos and ecology in subsequent works, where he distinguishes between the economic and the ecological. This distinction, I conclude, is rendered problematic by the catastrophe to come, as indeed is any attempt to draw an absolute distinction between “philosophical politics” and mere technocratic management or even to exclude speculation from the heart of philosophy.

The Unspeakable Girl is more important for Agamben’s thought than its short length, antiquarianism, and belletristic format suggest. In discussing ancient initiation rites through an analysis of the figure of the Kore – the unspeakable girl – it suggests how we might conceive of initiation into form-of-life, thus addressing a pressing question that emerges from Agamben’s Homo Sacer project: if Agamben’s thought aims at the demystification of philosophy, yet mystery is the essence of philosophical initiation as traditionally conceived and philosophy needs some kind of initiation, how could one conceive of an initiation into that which is without mystery – into the profane. Yet by insisting on an opposition between “authentic” interior gestures and their vulgar betrayal, Agamben undermines his own most radical insight. Such a distinction can never be drawn, and hence a different kind of initiation must be envisioned: not into the critical spectatorship of the dance, but into the dance itself.

The inquiry into the nature of truth plays an important role in Fichte's thought, especially following his departure from Jena, and indeed in the WL-1804-ii the doctrine of truth emerges as the centerpiece of the WL. The following paper argues that the conception of truth evolves significantly after the WL-1804-ii, and that, in such texts as the Erlanger Metaphysik, the Spekulation zu Koppenhagen, and the 1812 WL, Fichte, building on the account of the hiatus in the WL-1804-ii while moving away from its notion of absolute truth, seeks to understand truth in terms of freedom, or indeed, as what »yields to freedom«, wherein freedom, through the negativity of the concept, produces an emptiness, a clearing, that is »fulfilled« with truth. Anticipating the phenomenological account of truth yet without abandoning a strong sense of normativity, Fichte’s alethology remains a compelling alternative to contemporary positions.

This paper attempts a philosophically rigorous interpretation of H.C. Andersen’s tales. Through a radically conceived sentimentality – the unmediated juxtaposition of the abjection of things, conceived as a paradoxical “desire for desire” having no place in the world, with a cruel, apathetic gaze – Andersen challenges the existence of the soul or subjectivity as what, by combining the theoretical gaze with contemplative pleasure, grants coherence to experience. Thus undermining not only Romantic self-reflection, and its suturing of philosophy to criticism, but Plato’s erotic psychology, Andersen inaugurates a new philosophical literature: a writing for children cultivating an openness.

The following paper seeks to show, through a close reading of lines 604-612 from the second book of the Aeneid, that Virgil develops an understanding of truth opposed to the dominant understanding of truth of the philosophical tradition. Whereas philosophy (as exemplified in the “cave analogy” of Plato’s Republic)regards truth as a power over deception, Virgil comes to understand truth instead as the effect of a deception that cannot be “disillusioned,” and that in turn summons us towards an obedience to a power that deceives us. This way of understanding the truth, I further suggest, stands in a close relation to literature, and suggests a way to think of the possibilities of literature outside the perspective of philosophy.

The following paper argues that J.G. Fichte, despite his apparent philosophical neglect of art and aesthetics, does develop a strong, original, and coherent account of art, which not only allows the theorization of modern, non-representative art forms, but indeed anticipates Nietzsche and Heidegger in conceiving of truth in terms of art rather than scientific rationality. While the basis of Fichte’s philosophy of art is presented in the essay “On Spirit and Letter in Philosophy,” it is not developed systematically either in this text or anywhere else in his writings, but must be reconstructed through a broad consideration of all his works, including, above all, his political and economic writings. For Fichte, the art-work does not exist as an object possessing “aesthetic value” and which can, in turn, be possessed, consumed, and enjoyed through the subjective act of aesthetic experience. Rather, it involves a mode of praxis which, grounded in a radical and original power of imagination, creatively discloses possibilities for future forms of existence, experience, and political community that cannot be theoretically anticipated. While Fichte cannot himself theorize specific forms of art, since the art that concerns him belongs to the future, we can, however, retrospectively try to understand non-representational painting and non-mimetic dance as concrete realizations of Fichte’s art-work of the future. In this way, Fichte’s philosophy of art ultimately suggests an alternative to Heidegger’s understanding of the work of art as a projective institution of truth. Fichte suggests that the human body, rather than human language, is the fundamental medium of art.