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13Recidivist Punishments: The Philosopher's View (edited book)Lexington Books. 2011.Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments
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30Retribution Reconsidered (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 238-241. 1996.Murphy tells us that he has published this collection of papers “with some personal reluctance;” and he has done so “mainly because many friends and colleagues have suggested that at least some of them deserve the wider circulation that only a book makes possible.” They “show [his] thinking in a period of transition”.
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93Punishment as Deterrence: Reply to SpraguePhilosophical Quarterly 55 (218). 2005.In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply …Read more
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483A deterrence theory of punishmentPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (212). 2003.I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describ…Read more
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98Rights and the Criminal LawAnalysis 54 (2). 1994.Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued that any acceptable-- and perhaps even imaginable-- legal system must assign to citizens certain rights not to be aggressed against. I argue that this is not so. Typical legal systems certain assign duties of non-aggression; but the criminal branches of those systems do not assign corresponding rights. The civil branches may, but not to an extent that supports Thomson's thesis
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87War crimes, punishment and the burden of proofRes Publica 16 (2): 181-196. 2010.This paper argues that there is a default presumption that punishment has some deterrent effect, and that the burden of proof is upon those who allege that the costs of any particular penal system are insufficient to offset its deterrent benefits. This burden of proof transmits to the discussion of international law, with the conclusion that it is those who oppose international jurisdiction, rather than their opponents, who must prove their position. This they have so far failed to do.
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Antony Duff, Sandra Marshall, Rebecca Emerson Dobash and Russell P. Dobash, Penal Theory and Practice: Tradition and innovation in criminal justiceJournal of Applied Philosophy 13 323-323. 1996.
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103Punishment and the Principle of Fair PlayUtilitas 9 (1): 81. 1997.What I call the Just Distribution theory of punishment holds that the justification of punishment is that it rectifies the social distribution of benefits and burdens which has been upset by the offender. I argue that a recent version of this theory is no more viable than earlier versions. Like them, it fails in its avowed intention to deliver fundamental intuitions about crime and punishment. The root problem is its foundation in Hart's Principle of Fair Play, a foundation which, I argue, is in…Read more
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2Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political principles and community valuesJournal of Applied Philosophy 13 323-324. 1996.
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24Recent Work on PunishmentPhilosophical Quarterly 45 (179). 1995.This article surveys some of the more important work in the philosophy of punishment in past ten years or so
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18Reviewed Work: Objectivity and Cultural Divergence by S. C. Brown (review)Philosophy 61 (236): 274-276. 1986.
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Violence, Reason and Justice: No Dogs or Philosophers AllowedDVD. forthcoming.Who gets to use force and when? How are we supposed to justify the use of violence in achieving political goals and establishing and maintaining political communities and structures? With Anthony Ellis , David Garren , and Scott Hibbard
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8War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing: A ReaderWiley-Blackwell. 2001.This timely volume addresses urgent questions about the nature of war crimes, nationalism, ethnic cleansing and collective responsibility from a variety of moral, political and legal perspectives.
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