Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire

This paper proposes a new interpretation of Gadamer’s problematic appropriation of Platonic metaphysics. It argues that Gadamer, attempting to respond to the challenge posed by Heidegger’s interpretation of Platonic metaphysics and of its role in the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte), downplayed the transcendence of Platonic Forms. Gadamer achieves a reconfiguration of this transcendence and its transposition into what I call here a plane of immanence through two hermeneutic gestures: 1) interpreting Forms in light of Greek mathematics and especially in light of the structure of the sum-number; 2) introducing temporality and historicity in the Medieval doctrine of transcendentals by giving priority to the Beautiful over the Good. I contend that, Platonically speaking, this amounts to the rejection of νοήσις in favor of διάνοια, and that this raises issues concerning the problem of finitude and the potential limits of linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit).

Among the educative games of Plato’s Cretan city, choral performances have a prominent role. This paper examines the function of play (παιδιά) in the choral education in virtue in Plato’s Laws. I reconstruct the notion of play as it is elaborated throughout this dialogue, and then show how it contributes to solving the problem of virtue acquisition in the Athenian’s account of moral education through songs and dances. I argue that play in the Laws is best understood as an imitative activity that is intrinsically pleasurable, ordered by rules and patterns of repetition, and undertaken for its own sake by a player whose psychic condition is childish. Thus interpreted, we are in a better position to see why choruses must be engaged in playfully. Because the self-likening process (ὁμοίωσις) choral performances aim at requires pleasure and because pleasure normally obtains when there is a concordance between one’s character and the imitations, virtue acquisition is best secured if the imitations of virtue in choruses are performed or spectated playfully.

This paper examines Gerhard Krüger's interpretation of Plato in light of Martin Heidegger's Destruktion of the Greeks and critique of Platonism. I argue that Krüger's new reading of Plato should be understood as a critique of Heidegger's understanding of Platonism, and thereby as a broader critique of Heidegger's thoughts on Western metaphysics and the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte). The force and originality of Krüger's response to Heidegger consist in the fact that Krüger's Plato anticipates Heidegger's critique of Platonism. Krüger thus contends that Plato (1) does not allow the understanding of truth as correctness (Übereinstimmung) to supplant the understanding of truth as disclosedness (Unverborgenheit), (2) understands and displays philosophy's dependence upon prereflexive attunements (Stimmungen); (3) appreciates the intricate relation between Being and temporality. In sum, Krüger's Plato is not guilty of Seinsvergessenheit, and rather opens up new ways for an authentic meditation on Being and on the human way toward an understanding of Being.

This paper addresses the question of the function of genre in Gadamer’s hermeneutics by examining his treatment of Plato’s political writings in the context of the “utopian genre.” I argue that Gadamer’s reading of Plato informs us on the hermeneutics of genre, which is otherwise undiscussed in Truth and Method. First, I reconstruct the utopian genre as Gadamer treats it in a 1983 lecture hitherto neglected. Second, I expand Gadamer’s “logic of question and answer” by drawing on the notion of genre as articulated by E.D. Hirsch and show that attention to genre is not only compatible with Gadamerian hermeneutics, but also productive. Finally, I demonstrate that an application of this concept of genre to the case of Plato’s political philosophy reveals a problem in Gadamer’s interpretation, namely a certain confusion between dialogue and utopia, and propose two ways of explaining this confusion and thus of resolving the aporia.

This paper addresses the question of the function of genre in Gadamer’s hermeneutics by examining his treatment of Plato’s political writings in the context of the “utopian genre.” I argue that Gadamer’s reading of Plato informs us on the hermeneutics of genre, which is otherwise undiscussed in Truth and Method. First, I reconstruct the utopian genre as Gadamer treats it in a 1983 lecture hitherto neglected. Second, I expand Gadamer’s “logic of question and answer” by drawing on the notion of genre as articulated by E.D. Hirsch and show that attention to genre is not only compatible with Gadamerian hermeneutics, but also productive. Finally, I demonstrate that an application of this concept of genre to the case of Plato’s political philosophy reveals a problem in Gadamer’s interpretation, namely a certain confusion between dialogue and utopia, and propose two ways of explaining this confusion and thus of resolving the aporia.

Among the educative games of Plato’s Cretan city, choral performances have a prominent role. This paper examines the function of play (παιδιά) in the choral education in virtue in Plato’s Laws. I reconstruct the notion of play as it is elaborated throughout this dialogue, and then show how it contributes to solving the problem of virtue acquisition in the Athenian’s account of moral education through songs and dances. I argue that play in the Laws is best understood an imitative activity that is intrinsically pleasurable, ordered by rules and patterns of repetition, and undertaken for its own sake by a player whose psychic condition is childish. Thus interpreted, we are in a better position to see why choruses must be engaged in playfully. Because the self-likening (ὁμοίωσις) process choral performances aim at requires pleasure and because pleasure normally obtains when there is a concordance between one’s character and the imitations, virtue acquisition is best secured if the imitations of virtue in choruses are performed playfully.

This paper examines the role of love in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. I argue that an essential aspect of Cyrus’ knowledgeable rule is a specific understanding of eros and a corresponding strategy to cope with the power of love. Specifically, I contend that by exploiting a common Greek distinction between the beloved and the lover, he articulates the view that lovers are subjects or even slaves to their beloved who deceive themselves into thinking that their attraction and the ensuing behaviors are voluntary. Accordingly, Cyrus attempts to avoid falling in love and to rule as a universally beloved leader. Reflecting on the implications of this solution, I finally suggest that Xenophon wishes to show the limits of Cyrus’ solution.

Cette étude cherche à rendre compte d’un trait particulier et pratiquement inobservé dans la fondation gadamérienne de l’herméneutique philosophique. Si l’on connaît bien le rôle du platonisme — et plus spécifiquement du dialogue platonicien — parmi les sources au sein desquelles Gadamer a puisé pour formuler le caractère dialogique du comprendre, on a rarement noté que la phénoménologie du dialogue sur laquelle s’appuie une telle fondation s’inscrivait en faux par rapport à son modèle sur un point bien précis : l’ironie, qu’elle soit socratique ou platonicienne. Nous proposons ici que pour bien expliquer la relation trouble que la fondation dialogique de l’herméneutique gadamérienne entretient avec l’ironie socratico-platonicienne, il faille concevoir le platonisme de Gadamer à la lumière d’une certaine forme d’aristotélisation, par laquelle la philia et la phronêsis aristotéliciennes sont en quelque sorte projetées sur le modèle platonicien du dialogue.

Résumé Cet article cherche à poser à nouveau l’épineuse question de l’« antimodernisme » dans la philosophie politique contemporaine. Nous proposons à cette fin d’expliquer la critique que fait le philosophe français Alain Renaut d’un des plus grands pionniers du renouveau contemporain de la philosophie politique, Leo Strauss, et d’exposer par la suite une réplique possible à cette critique, reconstituant ainsi un dialogue qui ne put véritablement avoir lieu. Nous cherchons à montrer qu’à terme, la critique de Renaut est en bonne partie injuste et, conséquemment, que la posture « antimoderne » de Strauss n’est peut-être pas aussi « intenable » qu’il le laisse entendre. Abstract This article aims to recover the thorny question of « antimodernism » in contemporary political philosophy. For this purpose, we propose to explain French philosopher Alain Renaut’s critique of one of the greatest pioneers of the contemporary recovery of political philosophy—Leo Strauss—and to expose a possible reply to this critique, aiming thus at the reconstitution of a dialogue that could not really have taken place. We try to show that, ultimately, Renaut’s critique is to a great extent unfair and then, that Strauss’s « antimodernist » stance is not as « untenable » as it is believed to be.

Cette étude tâche de dégager la double signification de la philosophie socratique comprise comme philosophie politique à l’aide d’une interprétation des Amoureux rivaux. Le refus d’accorder à ce court dialogue socratique une affiliation au corpus platonicien a jeté injustement de l’ombre sur la pertinence de son contenu : le discrédit des Amoureux rivaux a quelques limites qu’il est bon de montrer. La structure soignée du dialogue, qu’il est possible de mettre en lumière au moyen du Phèdre, invite à une interprétation attentive de cette architecture. Une telle lecture permet d’expliciter la parenté entre la philosophie et la politique dans la philosophie socratique. Les Amoureux rivaux présente deux dimensions politiques de la philosophie : une philosophie qui s’oppose à la philosophie physiologique en constituant plutôt un questionnement sur l’homme qui s’exprime dans un mode de vie réflexif, de même qu’une politique du dialogue, c’est-à-dire une bonne gouverne de la communauté dialectique

This paper aims at showing how Gadamer understood the impossibility of any properly unpolitical stance for philosophy by examining the relation of philosophy and politics in his interpretation of Plato’s Republic. I argue that Gadamer’s rejection of the possibility of the ἄπολις (as presented by Aristotle) was prompted by the thoughts of his friend and interlocutor Leo Strauss on the question of the relation of the theoretical life and political life in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. I then turn to Gadamer’s reading of the Republic and focus on three aspects of his interpretation: philosophical education in the context of utopian thinking, the Forms and the Idea of the Good, and philosophical knowledge. Tied together, these three elements convene a picture of philosophy that is by no means above or against politics, but rather exists in a harmonious and mutually influencing relation with the political community. I finally suggest that the interpretive conditions of this harmony are not without consequence on how we conceive of philosophy itself, its nature and its task.

This paper aims to show how Heidegger and Arendt’s reappropriations of Aristotle’s thought are structured around a reinterpretation of the double definition of man as a practical being, that is, aszôon logon echonandzôon politikon. I argue that by interpreting the notions that compose and circumscribe this definition — those of life (zôê),logos, production (poiêsis), action (praxis) and contemplation (theôria), Heidegger and Arendt find the main characteristic of human beings by developing upon two distinct possibilities contained in the ambivalent Aristotelian concept ofpraxis. However, they both blur the distinction between activity (energeia) and motion (kinêsis), which expose their critique oftheôriato two difficulties — one concerning the praxical character oftheôria, the other its temporality.

Résumé Cet article vise à expliquer comment Shakespeare articule une philosophie de la nature dans Le Conte d’hiver. Nous suggérons que la spécificité dramatique de la pièce ainsi que son schéma narratif expriment cette philosophie. D’une part, l’histoire racontée par la plume de Shakespeare peut montrer d’abord un éloignement de la nature pour laisser suivre une redécouverte et une renaissance de la nature – d’abord par son acception simple, brute, puis dans la compréhension téléologique de celle-ci. D’autre part, la succession de la tragédie, la comédie et la romance illustre ces trois étapes. Le triomphe de la romance indique le triomphe d’une philosophie de la nature dont les causes les plus importantes sont d’ordres téléologique. Abstract This article aims to explain how Shakespeare shows a philosophy of nature in The Winter’s Tale. We suggest that both the dramatic and narrative specificities of the play express this philosophy. On one hand, the story told by Shakespeare’s writing can show a remoteness from nature which is to be followed by a rediscovery and a rebirth of nature – first with its rawest meaning and finally in its teleological understanding. On the other hand, the succession of tragedy, comedy and romance illustrates those three steps. The triumph of romance indicates the triumph of a philosophy of nature in which the most important causes are the teleological ones.