Forty some years ago, W. V. Quine introduced the notion of referential opacity and offered two criteria for opacity. In my dissertation, I offer a critical account of Quine's two criteria for opacity. I call his first criterion the substitution criterion, and I call his second criterion the quantification criterion. I first argue that Quine has not given us an unambiguous account of his substitution criterion. I then argue that the substitution criterion which he actually employs is plagued with…
Read moreForty some years ago, W. V. Quine introduced the notion of referential opacity and offered two criteria for opacity. In my dissertation, I offer a critical account of Quine's two criteria for opacity. I call his first criterion the substitution criterion, and I call his second criterion the quantification criterion. I first argue that Quine has not given us an unambiguous account of his substitution criterion. I then argue that the substitution criterion which he actually employs is plagued with difficulties. Lastly, I argue that in so far as Quine can claim to have a quantification criterion for opacity which coheres with his substitution criterion the former reduces to the latter
