Antonio Freiles

A popular view in population ethics is the procreation asymmetry, according to which we have strong reasons not to bring a miserable life into existence but no reason to bring a good life into existence. Several philosophers have recently defended this asymmetry by arguing for incommensurability between a good life and nonexistence, on the grounds that the values of positive welfare goods are conditional on the existence of the person who receives them. In this paper I present an argument against incommensurability between good lives and nonexistence, show how an appeal to conditional intrinsic value can avoid that argument, and present a problem for that solution.

I develop a theory of naturalness according to which properties are natural relative to categories of objects. This new theory avoids a problem that, I argue, afflicts standard theories: whereas standard theories allow for only one ordering of properties, considerations of the similarity and dissimilarity made by some negative properties—like having no parts, having no members, having no determinate mass, reflecting no visible light—require admitting more than one. Additionally, I argue that my view accounts for genuine categories, category mistakes, and negation as privation, and that it accounts for a distinction between characterizing and non-characterizing fundamentality.

Spacetime singularities are expected to disappear in quantum gravity. Singularity resolution prima facie supports the view that spacetime singularities are mathematical pathologies of general relativity. However, this conclusion might be premature. Spacetime singularities are more accurately understood as global properties of spacetime rather than things. Therefore, if spacetime emerges in quantum gravity—as it is often claimed—then so may its singular structure. Although this proposal is intriguing, the attempt to uphold that spacetime singularities may be emergent fails. I provide three arguments in support of this claim, drawing on different views of spacetime emergence.

Many find it plausible that acting freely requires a kind of sensitivity to reasons. Modalists define this sensitivity in terms of what S does in the relevant alternative possibilities. Agent modalists take S to be an agent, assessing their reasons-sensitivity by considering what the agent would have done in those possibilities. While intuitive, agent modalists struggle with Frankfurt cases. This has led some to a mechanism-based approach. Here, I raise two objections to this approach and defend agent modalism. I argue that (1) the mechanism approach permits composite mechanisms, leading to an unattractive disjunction, and (2) excluding the agent undermines the original appeal of reasons-sensitivity. I defend agent modalism by arguing it can handle Frankfurt cases if it holds fixed the nonoccurrence of agent-altering events. This requirement also helps address rational blind spots. Thus, I aim to rehabilitate agent modalism as a viable account of reasons-sensitivity in free action.