António Lopes

The concept of authenticity as a predicate of performances of musical works is discussed in the context of the Western classical tradition.I claim that the concept of a performance of a musical work raises issues of relativity and indeterminacy, since its application is not completely free from music-historical contextuality and from considerations of aesthetic value.I challenge the argument for the necessity of authenticity in performance that eschews the problem of determining the extension of the concept authentic performance of a work' by reducing the concept to that of the correct instantiation of that work.I suggest that the way the present socio-musical context defines the boundaries of correction and authenticity in performance derives from a balance, and a tension, between two types of interest in performance as an artistic practice: an interest in the performed work as the artistic product of its composer, which favours fidelity to the work; and an interest in the performance as the artistic product of the performer, which favours the latter's creative freedom.I argue for the relevance of certain moral obligations to composers on the part of performers, but also for the defeasible character of these obligations, thus blocking the view according to which historical authenticity is an absolute moral imperative.I distinguish personal authenticity, as creativity and sincerity on the part the performer, from historical authenticity, as the performance's faithfulness to the work performed, to its composer, or to the sound, performance practice or musical experience that were typical of the work's original context. I argue against the view that the historically authentic performance has an advantage over other kinds of performance in terms of propensity to generate more aesthetically successful results.The promotion of historical authenticity by the historically informed performance movement is analyzed as artistic ideology and practice. I conclude that the priority of historical authenticity is not a defensible artistic ideal, since it is ultimately incompatible with aesthetic priorities.

No primeiro semestre do ano académico de 1979-1980, regina Facuidade de Filosofia de Braga o "Curso de Licencidatura I", subordinado ao tema "filosofia e sectarismo" e subintitulado "estudo histórico-gnoseológico, no centenário da encíclica Aeterni Patris". Coube ao professor, além da introdução geral ao Curso, a introdução especial à referida encíclica, cujo centenário foi mera ocasião — e não causa — para a eleição daquele tema. Aos alunos, para as suas monografias especiais, propus, como temas subalternos de investigação, exposição e crítica, várias figuras e correntes da história da filosofia, tais como S. TOMÃS DE AQUINO, o tmismo, HEGEL, SCHOPENHAUER, COUSIN, COMTE, o positivismo, o marxismo-leninismo e o neopositivismo. Dado o interesse despertado pelo Curso, mesmo para além dos seus partidpantes e da própria Faculdade, sai agora a lume, consoante me foi solicitado, o texto da introdução geral, commodificações e acrésdmos de pouca monta. A urgência de o entregar à tipografia obstou-me a que traduzisse para português varios trechos inidalmente destinados a aparecerem na língua de Camões. Disso rogo vénia aos Idtores a quern tal prejudique. E informo qwe são minhas, na sua maior parte, as snblmhas em trechos trcmscritos.

As in other domains of art, the assessment of performances or interpretations of musical works is largely considered as a matter of personal taste. In Evaluating Musical Performance, Jerrold Levinson argues that relativism, in this matter, depends on the many interests with which a performance can be faced, and, consequently, evaluated and assessed. My thesis in this article is that not all interests have the same importance and that there is a “purely musical” perspective that must prevail over the other interests. This way I try to diminish the so called relativism.