Antonio Perez

Para Tomás de Aquino, varón y mujer manifiestan distintamente la racionalidad humana. La hembra-madre, razón material e incorporada, se identifica con la naturaleza y semeja la materia prima. El macho-varón semeja a la forma, encierra la plenitud del ser, e intenta ser una razón pura y desincorporada separada de la naturaleza, y necesaria para completar a la mujer. Axiológicamente, mujer es lo indecente, sucio, moralmente, es el instrumento para hacer caer al varón en el mal, mientras que el varón es el bien, lo apetecible, pues fue creado antes que la mujer para significar su superioridad en dignidad y gobierno

La materia prima existe desde siempre y es en potencia, es decir, tiene un ser que esta en disposición de ser después en acto no puede existir sola sin la forma, pero es en si misma una sustancia. Es la causa inmediata de todo cambio sustancial en el universo. El ser de la materia no parece identificarse con su potencia (ser material=potencia de la materia) sino que el ser de la materia es una sustancia que posee una potencia múltiple de recibir formas y de convertirse sucesivamente en acto(ser material=sustancia de la materi+potencia multiple). La materia es sujeto de potencias o posibilidades que se convertirán necesariamente después en seres actuales. Existe entre lo posible y lo actual una relación necesaria por la que lo posible se convertirá necesariamente en acto y lo actual en posible. Existen dos especies de materia distintas: la materia sensible y la celeste con características esencialmente distintas

En el marco ambiental del XIX se produce la penetración de Jeremy Bentham en el horizonte intelectual salmantino. Bentham el filósofo-legislador se avenía perfectamente con el espíritu de renovación jurídico y política que se respiraba en los círculos más inquietos de la Universidad de Salamanca a comienzos del siglo XIX. El método utilitarista de Bentham propiciaba una vía nueva para fundamentar una ética jurídica y política a posteriori; en vista de los resultados dolorosos y placenteros del acto humano y de sus repercusiones prósperas o nocivas en el plano social. De ahí, que la minoría intelectual que en la Universidad de Salamanca aspiraba a una profunda revisión de los esquemas didácticos vigentes eligiera la doctrina de Bentham como la más adecuada y eficaz para el logro de sus propósitos

In “The Law of Peoples,” John Rawls proposes a model for multi-culural dialogue based upon agreement. In liberal societies, we find agreement on issues such as human rights. However, I argue here that this proposal overcomes neither Eurocentrism nor Western-centrism, as liberal nations would decide which nations are “well organized hierarchical societies.” This second circle of nations would be merely invited peoples, who would not be allowed to contribute new proposals but only to accept the proposals of the liberal nations. I propose a model for attaining human rights through truly universal dialogue in which the representatives of all peoples are able to speak, make proposals, and accept the proposals of others on an equal basis.

Based on Newton’s laws reformulated in the Hamiltonian dynamics combined with statistical mechanics, we formulate a statistical mechanical theory supporting the hypothesis of a closed universe oscillating in phase-space. We find that the behavior of this universe as a whole can be represented by a free entropic oscillator whose lifespan is nonhomogeneous, thus implying that time is shorter or longer according to the state of this universe given through its entropy. We conclude that time reduces to the entropy production of this universe and that a nonzero entropy production means that local fluctuations could exist giving rise to the appearance of masses and to the curvature of the space

The problem that underlies Rawls' The Law of Peoples is the problem of how something particular—western— may become universal and human. Rawls claims that he solves this problem by means of extending particular western rights to other non western peoples. The extension of western liberal rights is done by a second original position similar to the first one in A Theory of Justice. The paper tries to prove that the second original position, in its second step, is not similar to the first one and the parties taking part in this second original position are not symmetrically situated. Rawls' proposal falls into ethnocentrism and eurocentrism. The only way to transform particular rights into universal rights is by means of a universal multicultural dialogue where all peoples can make proposals and listen to other peoples' proposals.

The purpose of this essay is to underline Heidegger’s intellectual interestand deep relation to Duns Scotus’ modern and close to life thought. At the same time, it is pointed out that Scotus’ fundamental ideas such as haecceity, the cognoscibility of the individual, possibility and contingency, impossibility of thinking without naming, will be retaken and transformed into Heidegger’s parental ideas such as Dasein, Dasein as possibility and project, being as something unveiled, identity of knowledge and language.

Which political and juridical foundation can justify the transit from the Western, particular, to the universal? John Rawls tries to answer this question in his article, "The Law of Peoples," proposing a kind of contract or agreement. A first agreement should be attained among liberal-democratic societies on a few political and social issues such as human rights. Then this agreement can be widened to non-liberal/democratic but well organized hierarchical societies or those that satisfy the requisites of being peaceful, of having a reasonably well organized legal system, of admitting a measure of freedom-political and religious-and of admitting the right of emigration. These two groups of nations would belong to a Society of Nations with the juridical and political duty of fulfilling the few political issues that have been previously accepted. But Rawls' proposal overcomes neither eurocentrism nor western-centrism. It seems that the first circle of liberal democratic nations would decide which peoples satisfy the requirements of the 'well organized hierarchical societies.' This second circle of nations are only invited peoples; they are not supposed to contribute new proposals, but only to accept the proposals of the liberal-democratic nations. I present a new effort to attain human rights through a true universal dialogue in which the representatives of all cultures and peoples can equally speak, make proposals, and listen or accept the proposals of others.