Anuj Puri

Privacy debates conventionally tend to focus on information. In this paper, I argue for a novel formulation of right to attentional privacy, which protects individual autonomy from the continuing onslaught of intrusive, immersive, persuasive and addictive technologies. I contend that the harvesting of an individual’s attention through hypernudges and supernormal stimuli deployed in form of behavioral targeting undermines an individual’s autonomy. I construct a Razian justification for interest in attention that needs to be protected against sophisticated technological practices such as A/B Testing and Real Time Bidding carried out by Big Tech. I invoke dual conception of right to attentional privacy as a negative liberty to safeguard against intrusive technologies and as a positive liberty to keep at bay immersive, persuasive and addictive technologies.

In an increasingly inward-looking world governed by populist governments, existing theories of rights are struggling to protect and expand individual rights. This failure can be attributed both to the present conception of rights as well as the absence of a unifying theme to address the existence and conflict of rights. In the present paper I argue that this unifying theme, which is necessary for protection and expansion of individual rights, is provided by “meaning” in an existential and linguistic sense. I assert that the greatest challenge faced by individual rights is in form of a faceless populist doctrine called “public interest.” As long as the issue of conflict of rights will be addressed in a numerical manner, individual rights will stand defeated. We need to come up with a new model for resolution of conflict of rights, which does not examine right holders as integers but as human beings. This paper, which is a continuation of my previous effort on the subject, elaborates upon the existential role of rights and seeks to construct an inviolable nucleus of rights by examining the essence and core meaning of rights. The paper’s final contribution lies in developing a semantical framework for resolution of conflict of rights.

Introduction of algorithms in the realm of public administration bears the risk of reducing moral dilemmas to epistemic probabilities. This paper explores the interlinkages between attribution of moral agency on algorithms and algorithmic injustice. While challenging some of the fundamental assumptions underlying ethical machines, I argue that the moral algorithm claim is inherently flawed and has particularly severe consequences when applied to algorithms making fateful decisions regarding an individual’s life. I contend that free will, consciousness and moral intentionality are sine qua non for any moral agent. A well-known objection to the Turing Test is cited for the proposition that, while an algorithm may imitate morality, an algorithm cannot be ethical unless it understands the moral choices it is making. I raise a methodological objection regarding transposing moral intuitions on algorithms through global surveys. I cite the ‘consciousness thesis’ for the principle that without consciousness there cannot be moral responsibility. Moral justifications form the bedrock of legal defenses. In the absence of moral agency and the algorithm’s inability to be held morally responsible, any attempt by the firms developing and/or deploying the algorithm to escape accountability is untenable. I highlight the grave cost of masking algorithmic injustices with ethical justifications and argue for strict liability for any firm deploying algorithms in the public policy realm.

Introduction of algorithms in the realm of public administration bears the risk of reducing moral dilemmas to epistemic probabilities. This paper explores the interlinkages between attribution of moral agency on algorithms and algorithmic injustice. While challenging some of the fundamental assumptions underlying ethical machines, I argue that the moral algorithm claim is inherently flawed and has particularly severe consequences when applied to algorithms making fateful decisions regarding an individual’s life. I contend that free will, consciousness and moral intentionality are sine qua non for any moral agent. A well-known objection to the Turing Test is cited for the proposition that, while an algorithm may imitate morality, an algorithm cannot be ethical unless it understands the moral choices it is making. I raise a methodological objection regarding transposing moral intuitions on algorithms through global surveys. I cite the ‘consciousness thesis’ for the principle that without consciousness there cannot be moral responsibility. Moral justifications form the bedrock of legal defenses. In the absence of moral agency and the algorithm’s inability to be held morally responsible, any attempt by the firms developing and/or deploying the algorithm to escape accountability is untenable. I highlight the grave cost of masking algorithmic injustices with ethical justifications and argue for strict liability for any firm deploying algorithms in the public policy realm.

Human beings intrinsically seek meaning. We readily accept and absorb a proposition or even a legal stipulation, if it is meaningful. This human trait coupled with law’s ability to create, select and infuse meaning ensures that in case of conflict between rights, those rights that are perceived to be ‘more meaningful’ triumph over those that are viewed to be less so. Hence, it is important to study the relationship between meaning and law and its impact on rights and identity of an individual. In order to do so, we need to address the following questions: What is the meaning of meaning? How is it constructed? How is one meaning adopted to the exclusion of all others? What is the role played by law in construction and adoption of meaning? What is the effect of a grant of legal sanction to a particular meaning? Why does this meaning remain unchallenged? Does the role of law in creation of meaning change depending upon the right in question? I address these questions on the basis of three strands of classical theory of meaning, constitutional jurisprudence, and a few landmark cases that I have had the privilege to be part of. This paper begins by exploring the meaning of meaning and then examines a few models to better understand the role played by law in construction of meaning. I then study the conflict between the plurality of meaning of the public interest and the singularity of meaning of individual rights and the resultant effect on the identity of an individual. The paper’s final assertion lies in envisaging scenarios where the singularity of meaning of individual rights can triumph over the plurality of meaning of the public interest.

In the age of Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps, the conventional conception of privacy that focuses excessively on the identification of the individual is inadequate to safeguard the individual’s identity and autonomy. An individual’s autonomy can be impaired and their control over their social identity diminished, even without infringing the anonymity surrounding their personal identity. A century-old individualistic conception of privacy that aimed at safeguarding a person from unwarranted social interference is incapable of protecting their autonomy and identity when they are targeted on the basis of their interdependent social and algorithmic group affiliations. In order to overcome these limitations, in this article, I develop a theoretical framework in the form of a triumvirate model of the group right to privacy (GRP), which is based on privacy as a social value (Pv). An individual has an interest in protecting their social identity arising out of their participation in social groups. The panoptic sorting of individuals by Big Data Analytics for behavioral targeting purposes gives rise to epistemic bubbles and echo chambers that impede the formation of an individual’s social identity. I construct the formulation of GRP1 to protect an individual’s interest in their social identity and their socially embedded autonomous self. Thereafter, I emphasize an individual’s right to informational self-determination and against algorithmic grouping in GRP2. Lastly, I highlight instances where GRP3 entitles an organized group to privacy in its own right. I develop a Razian formulation to state that Big Data Analytics’ constant surveillance and monetization of human existence is an infringement of individual autonomy. The violation of GRP subjects an individual to behavioral targeting (including hyper-targeted political advertising) and distorts their weltanschauung, or worldview. As regards Covid-19 Apps, I assert that the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the pandemic do not provide an everlasting justification for reducing an individual’s identity to a potential disease carrier. I argue that the ambivalence regarding existence of surveillance surrounding an individual’s social identity can leave them in a perpetual state of simulated surveillance (simveillance). I further assert that it is in the long-term best interests of the Big Tech corporations to respect privacy. In conclusion, I highlight that our privacy is not only interdependent in nature, but it is also existentially cumulatively interlinked. It increases in force with each successive protection. The privacy challenge posed by Covid-19 Apps has helped us realize that while limited exceptions to privacy may be carved out in grave emergencies, there is no moral justification for round-the-clock surveillance of an individual’s existence by Big Data Analytics. Similarly, the threat to privacy posed by Big Data Analytics has helped us realize that privacy has been wrongly focusing on the distinguishing aspects of the individual. It is our similarities that are truly worth protecting. In order to protect these similarities, I formulate the concept of mutual or companion privacy, which counterintuitively states that in the age of Big Data Analytics, we have more privacy together rather than individually.