Aorigele Bao

“Deathbots,” digital constructs that emulate the conversational patterns, demeanor, and knowledge of deceased individuals. Earlier moral discussions about deathbots centered on the dignity and autonomy of the deceased. This paper primarily examines the potential psychological and emotional dependencies that users might develop towards deathbots, considering approaches to prevent problematic dependence through temporary use. We adopt a hermeneutic method to argue that deathbots, as they currently exist, are unlikely to provide substantial comfort. Lacking the capacity to bear emotional burdens, they fall short of meeting idealistic expectations. By repositioning deathbots, we aim to mitigate the risk of emotional dependency and respect the natural grieving process. Our goal is to propose the use of deathbots as a novel means of mourning through transitory use, rather than as a method to alleviate grief or as a patterns for communication with the deceased.

Jecker et al critically analysed the predominant focus on existential risk (X-Risk) in artificial intelligence (AI) ethics, advocating for a balanced communication of AI’s risks and benefits and urging serious consideration of other urgent ethical issues alongside X-Risk.1 Building on this analysis, we argue for the necessity of acknowledging the unique attention-grabbing attributes of X-Risk and leveraging these traits to foster a comprehensive focus on AI ethics. First, we need to consider a discontinuous situation that is overlooked in the article by Jecker et al. This discontinuity refers to the phenomenon where X-Risk is perceived as dominating the discourse, yet contrary to expectations, it does not lead to a significant allocation of social resources for specific risk management and practical initiatives. In both the specific realm of ethical AI initiatives and the broader scope of AI risk management, the responses to X-Risk do not have the advantage of prioritising the allocation of resources over other related risks.2 This discrepancy suggests that, in terms of actual social resource allocation, X-Risks do not receive commensurate resources relative to the attention they attract. Unlike other types of risks, X-Risk is perceived as a distant threat, which does not correspond with actual initiatives in terms of media exposure. Despite the prominence of the longtermism view in various media and public discourse, the X-Risk of AI often serves merely as a cautionary note or opinion about the current situation. This suggests that concerns about an AI-driven catastrophe have not been effectively translated into practical initiatives. The gap between the attention drawn and …

Background: Disclosure of AI use is seen as a sign of the author’s honesty and commitment to the principle of transparency. However, existing discussions have paid little attention to a special case: authors who honestly disclose their use of AI feel ashamed because of their honesty. Methods and Results: The main issue discussed in this paper is why authors experience shame in the process of responsible disclosure of AI use. We redefine this emotion and its causes from the perspective of moral emotions. We argue that current disclosure policies only emphasize honesty but do not address how this honesty should be fairly treated. Conclusions: Current disclosure guidelines should ensure that authors feel more secure when disclosing AI use honestly in academic papers, thereby promoting an effective and responsible culture of disclosure. This requires more constructive narrative support. Expressing appreciation and respect for the honesty represented by disclosure is an appropriate way to address the issues discussed in this paper.